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INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

[LECTURES ON THE HARRIS FOUNDATION 1930]

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FOREWORD

Successive Harris Foundation institutes have dealt with Europe, the Far East, Mexico, the British Empire, foreign investments, and population. The lectures delivered at the seventh institute from June 16 to 26, 1930, are reproduced in this volume. The subject of the institute was "American Foreign Policy," and the attitude of foreign countries toward this policy was especially emphasized in the lectures. It was thought desirable, however, that this policy be also expounded from the inside, and Professor George H. Blakeslee, of Clark University, performs this task in the first lecture here printed. His work on *The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States* is well known, and his experience in many unofficial international conferences and as a technical adviser to the American delegation at the Washington Conference of 1921 entitles him to speak with authority on the subject.

The other lecturers are from Canada, Great Britain, Peru, and Japan. Percy Ellwood Corbett, dean of the law school of McGill University, is an authority on Roman law and international law. He was formerly legal adviser in the International

Labor Office at Geneva, Switzerland, and is the author of *Canada and World Politics*. George Young is an adviser of the British Labour party on international affairs. From 1896 to 1914 he served British diplomacy as secretary, attaché, and chargé d'affaires in Washington, Athens, Constantinople, Madrid, Belgrade, and Lisbon. He is a recognized authority on Ottoman law, and has also written on *Diplomacy, Old and New* and *The Freedom of the Seas*. Victor Andres Belaunde, now professor of Latin-American history at the University of Miami, Florida, has in the past served in the Peruvian diplomatic service in Germany, Bolivia, and Uruguay, in the latter country as minister plenipotentiary. For many years he was editor of the *Mercurio peruano*. Yusuke Tsurumi, former member of the Japanese Parliament, is acquainted with the United States through many visits. He has written extensively, including books on *Americanism and the Future of Japanese-American Relations* and *Contemporary Japan*.

QUINCY WRIGHT, *Executive Secretary*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. *George H. Blakeslee* 1

CANADA'S CONCERN IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. *Percy Ellwood Corbett* 37

EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. *George Young* . . 63

I. The United States of Europe and of America 65

II. The United States and the United Kingdom . 86

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES. *Victor Andres Belaunde* 107

I. The Recognition of Revolutionary Governments 109

II. The Havana and Washington Conferences . 130

THE FAR EAST AND THE UNITED STATES. *Yusuke Tsurumi* 155

I. American Foreign Policy from a Japanese Viewpoint 157

II. Japan at the Crossroads 189

III. The Balance of Power in the Western Pacific 218

INDEX 249

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

By George H. Blakeslee

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

It is a genuine pleasure to have the opportunity to talk over with you one of the most interesting and most important of all subjects: the foreign policy of our own country. It is my task, as I understand it, neither to attack nor to defend this policy, but to attempt to interpret it, to explain the factors on which it rests, and to discuss briefly the problems which it presents.

It is sometimes said that the United States is constantly changing its foreign policy, or, even worse, that it has no real policy. May I, however, advance the thesis that the fundamental foreign policies of the United States are clear cut; that they have been maintained, in the main, with exceptional consistency; and that they are the natural, almost inevitable political expression of a people with our historic background and geographical situation.

The United States, as every other country, has many foreign policies of varying importance, but the most distinctive of its outstanding policies are regional in character. This fact is due, as President Taft expressed it, to "the logic of our geographic

position." We have one policy for Europe, another for the Americas, and still a third for the Pacific and the Far East. We aim to keep out of European politics, to keep Europe out of American politics, and, in the Pacific and Far East, to co-operate with the countries whose homelands or colonial possessions lie in that great region.

Of these policies the first and possibly the most important is that toward Europe. To quote a recent secretary of state, Mr. Kellogg, who had the right to speak officially, "The feature of our policy which gives it its chief distinction, and which at the same time is least understood and appreciated by the rest of the family of nations, is the fixed determination to avoid participation in purely European political matters." This policy has been maintained—with the exception of a short period of some three or four years—from the birth of our republic to the present time. It was President Jefferson who said, "We have a perfect horror at everything like connecting ourselves with the politics of Europe." And only a few weeks ago, in the carefully worded manifesto issued jointly by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Hoover stated that the United States "will never consent to become entangled in European diplomacy."

To be sure, there was a reversal of this policy during and shortly after our participation in the World War. When America had two million soldiers fighting side by side with Englishmen and Frenchmen against the troops of Germany, the old slogans sounded like hollow mockery—"The broils of Europe," "No entangling alliances," "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have no or a very remote relation." But "the broils of Europe" had entangled us. The "primary interests" of Europe had not "a very remote relation," but a very close relation. We were up to our necks in Europe. So a new policy was adopted, of joining the other states in settling the issues not only of Europe, but of all parts of the world, in order to maintain international peace.

This new policy, however, was short lived. Whatever may have been the immediate causes which led the Senate to refuse to ratify the Peace of Versailles, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, if the debate be viewed in perspective, it is evident that it revealed a great struggle between two historic and apparently conflicting foreign policies of the United States: the old policy of avoiding participation in the politics of Europe and the new policy of complete co-operation in the settlement of all international issues. After the

smoke of this battle had cleared away, it was evident that the American people had returned to the faith of their fathers. To quote Secretary Kellogg again, the determination to keep out of European politics "is no less controlling to-day than when the Farewell Address of Washington was delivered."

Whether we regard this policy as wise or unwise, it is well to realize that it is a natural one for a people situated as we are. Several of the other non-European states have manifested the same attitude, though in a less marked degree. This is strikingly true of some of the British dominions. In Canada the former political leader, Sir Wilfred Laurier, would not accept any share of responsibility for British commitments in external affairs for fear that his country might be drawn, as he expressed it, into "the vortex of European militarism." Isn't that a striking expression? Senator Borah could not do any better. Yet this phrase was not uttered by an American senator, but by the responsible head of the government of Canada. Since the World War, one may find similar sentiments expressed both in the Parliament and in the press of Canada. During the debate on the recent London Naval Treaty, a member of Parliament exclaimed, "We are gradually being drawn into

interference with the affairs of Europe." The *Star* of Montreal stated, only a few years ago, "Canada is an American nation and not a European. If it were not for the fact that the center of our Empire is situated in Europe, we should have no more concern with a dispute between Poland and Germany, or even between France and Germany, than has the United States." In 1921–22 the Canadian government asked for an interpretation of the famous Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which would make it clear that Canada was under no obligation to send troops, without its consent, to maintain the territorial integrity of other states—a provision which would be most likely, if enforced, to involve it in European difficulties; and in 1924 the Canadian government, for the same reason, refused to accept the proposed Geneva Protocol. The Canadian attitude, however, is somewhat different from the American; Canada apparently does not object to its delegates in the Assembly and Council of the League participating in the mere discussion of the political issues of Europe, but it does object, as does the United States, to commitments which may involve it in military entanglements in that continent.

A similar feeling exists in Australia and South Africa. Some three years ago Mr. Hughes, the for-

mer prime minister of the commonwealth of Australia, was writing against "imperialistic entanglements," because the Australian cruiser "Brisbane" was used overseas as part of the British naval forces to protect British lives and property in the treaty ports of China.

Even in Great Britain itself there is occasionally manifested a certain amount of isolationist sentiment, a feeling that it is to England's interests to keep out of the political entanglements of Continental Europe. A British writer has said since the World War:

> Nor have we the right to criticize America's refusal to be drawn into the resultant mess. Her aloofness from Europe is *mutatis mutandis* precisely the attitude adopted by England after the Napoleonic wars. England, a hundred years ago . . . . isolated herself behind the barrier of the Channel and only reached out again into continental affairs when it became her practical interest to do so.

Recently, during the Naval Conference, the correspondent of the *New York Times*, under date of April 3, 1930, wrote:

> The British people this week have been experiencing the rebirth of an old conviction . . . . that they must keep out of new foreign commitments, whether military or financial . . . . a sentiment shared by high Tories and extreme Laborites as well as by the great organs of opinion and by the tabloids.

If, therefore, there is found in England even a measure of sentiment that the entanglements of Continental Europe should be avoided, it is not strange that this sentiment should exist strongly in America. The Atlantic Ocean is wider than the British Channel, and the United States is farther from the continent of Europe than is Great Britain.

The concrete application of this policy to keep out of European politics is seen in the relation of the United States to the League of Nations. Since the election of 1920, the United States has never been more friendly toward the League than today; it has never co-operated more fully in the League's non-political activities; and it has never been more determined not to become a member of the League.

As to the friendliness toward the League, this attitude has developed gradually during the past decade. Ten years ago there was considerable hostility on the part of a considerable group of those who were opposing the ratification by the United States of the Covenant of the League. But this feeling has changed. The government and the people of the United States both regard the League as an excellent organization—for Europe.

Of co-operation between the United States and the League there was none at first. Later, when our government desired to send an official delega-

tion to a conference called by the League, it was deemed advisable that the bill to appropriate the necessary sum for expenses should be drafted with the most meticulous care in order not to disturb the susceptibilities of the House and the Senate. Yet today such appropriation bills are passed regularly and almost without opposition. The United States is now represented officially on a large proportion of the preparatory committees and the conferences of the League which deal with the limitation of armament and with humanitarian, scientific, technical, and cultural matters. The League officials state that there is the utmost friendliness between them and the government of the United States, and as much co-operation as could well be expected. Sometimes at Geneva there are as many Americans represented on League committees and conferences as nationals of any state which is a regular member of the League.

Possibly the statement that American opinion is opposed to the United States entering the League may be challenged. Many in this audience may be saying, "I wish we would join the League, and so do most of my friends." Quite true. A couple of years ago a European scholar made a lecture tour through this country, speaking in many of our colleges and universities before groups of students

interested in international relations. When he was leaving for home, he stated that he had found all of his audiences strongly in favor of the United States becoming a member of the League. Naturally. Nearly every group of American college students sufficiently interested to attend, voluntarily, a lecture by a foreign scholar upon international affairs would be in favor of the United States entering the League. So would an average study group in a Protestant church. In this University audience I should estimate that at least two-thirds would vote to place the United States in the League. But just imagine the tremendous majority against the League which would be cast by the American Rotarians who are now meeting in your great city!

The evidence that the American people are opposed to the United States entering the League is to be found, in the first place, in the domain of politics, where professional attention is given to the evaluation of public opinion. Ten years ago, in 1920, the Democratic party declared for the League, and the Republican party, divided between its opponents and supporters, stood for some "association" of nations "to preserve the peace of the world"; but in 1928 the Republican national platform declared definitely against the League, and the Democratic platform did not even

mention it. As for the candidates for federal office, did you ever ask yourself what is the chief business of a politician—a mere politician? It is to be elected, is it not? The mere politician selects issues as bait with which to catch votes. Did you ever hear of any candidate for the House of Representatives or the Senate who, during the past two or three years, asked voters to support him on the ground that, if elected, he would try to put the United States into the League? There are, however, many candidates—both men and women—who have appealed for votes on the issue that they would try to keep the United States out of both the League and the Court.

Additional evidence is to be found in the conclusions of the pro-League leaders in the United States. So far as I know their views, they are agreed, though most reluctantly, that a referendum vote throughout the country would show a decisive majority against the United States entering the League.

The chief reason for this attitude seems to be that the League appears to the majority of Americans primarily as a European political organization. For this view there is some measure of justification provided Northern Africa and the Near East are considered as within the European area. Near-

ly every concrete political issue considered and settled by the League has been a European issue. American problems have almost without exception been settled in the Americas; and those of the Pacific and the Far East have been considered at such conferences as those at Washington in 1921–22, and at less formal international gatherings of the states of this world-region. The United States has been unwilling to enter a League, one of whose chief functions is to discuss the problems of Dantzig, the Saar, Albania, Corfu, and Lithuania—local European issues.

The strength of the opposition of the American people to political entanglements in European politics is evidenced further by a strange reluctance to enter the World Court. Although the creation of a world court has been, in principle, a distinctive policy of our country for three decades, and the adherence of the United States to the treaty creating the Permanent Court of International Justice, which is the only possible world court under present conditions, has had the support of Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, of Secretaries of State Hughes, Kellogg, and Stimson, and, at one time, March 3, 1925, of the House of Representatives, by a vote of 301 to 28, nevertheless it is evident that considerable popular opposition exists,

and it has not yet been possible to bring about America's accession on terms mutually satisfactory to the United States and to the states which constitute the Court.

American opinion, consciously or unconsciously, apparently favors a regional organization of the world, especially for the consideration of political issues of an international character. In accordance with American foreign policies, it wishes Europe, the Americas, and the Pacific to settle respectively their own political problems, at least until there should be danger of actual war. It is this political philosophy which is an important factor in keeping America from participating in the political activities of the League.

As for our future relations with the League, there are several possibilities. In the first place the United States may join the League. It should not be forgotten that the movement to bring this about has the strong support of an appreciable proportion of the American people, who are deeply in earnest in this matter, and who regard the issue as a moral, not a political one—and moral ideals are not easily surrendered. But yet there are no present indications that the United States will actually become a member of the League within the next few years.

In the second place, Europe may create a pan-

European organization to deal with the local political issues of that continent. Such a regional league has long been contemplated, and the proposal apparently has been increasing in favor. In 1924 Count Coudenhove-Kalergi advocated such a plan in his *Pan-Europa*. Shortly afterward M. Politis, one of the strongest supporters of the League, stated at the Institute of Politics that he favored the creation of a European regional association within the League. During the past few months we have all been interested in M. Briand's proposal of a United States of Europe. Since there has been some suspicion that this suggestion has been motivated by economic and industrial opposition to the United States, it has been viewed by some in this country with a measure of apprehension; but American opinion upon the whole appears to regard it with approval. If the European states in the League should form a regional group which would normally deal with strictly European political questions, leaving the League as a whole to pass upon world-problems, it would accord with normal American political philosophy and would go far to induce public opinion in this country to favor the United States entering the League. But it does not seem probable that a United States of Europe will come into being within the near future.

A third possibility, almost certain to be realized, is that the United States will co-operate with the League more frequently, normally, and cordially, until for all practical purposes it becomes an associate member of the League for all of its non-political activities.

The policy of keeping out of the politics of Europe, strongly intrenched as it appears, is faced by difficulties and perplexities. It is based, in part, upon a distinction between issues which are political and those which are economic and financial. Yet it is often difficult to draw a sharp line between these. Issues which seem to be economic or financial may involve outstanding political problems of Europe. The enormous financial investments, yearly mounting higher, which America has placed in Europe, will subject the American government to increasing pressure to take part in any political situation in that continent which may threaten their security. Then, too, our government may find it a perplexing task to reconcile this policy with other American policies. For example, should two Balkan states start fighting, the United States would be faced by the dilemma either of abandoning the leadership it took in the summer of 1929 in attempting to prevent war, and thus maintain the Kellogg Pact, or of taking part in what

would clearly be a European political issue. While the United States, then, appears likely to maintain its policy toward Europe for an indefinite future, it also seems probable that it will not interpret and enforce it as strictly as it has done in the recent past.

Leaving Europe and coming to the American hemisphere, we find a closely related group of three policies: the Monroe Doctrine, the Caribbean policy, and pan-Americanism.

As for the Monroe Doctrine you have probably heard the story of Smith, who said to Jones, "What's this I hear about you, that you say you do not believe in the Monroe Doctrine?" With patriotic indignation Jones replied, "It's a lie. I never said I did not believe in the Monroe Doctrine. I do believe in it; it is the palladium of our liberties; I would die for the Monroe Doctrine. All I said was that I do not know what it means." In a leading metropolitan daily there appeared a few years ago a statement by a widely known religious leader prominently displayed, "I believe strictly in the Monroe Doctrine, in our Constitution, and in the laws of God." Can it be that a keen British essayist was correct when he wrote, "To the Americans the Monroe Doctrine is like God or religion to a small child—something fearful, something to in-

spire awe, something, if necessary, to fight for"? Certainly the American people as a whole believe religiously in the Monroe Doctrine; and in diplomatic circles it is assumed that it is the only one of our foreign policies for which, if violated in an essential respect, they would at once go to war.

Yet, like the typical Jones, the American people do not know what it means. At least there is no agreement as to its meaning. There are two widely divergent schools of interpretation—the popular and the official. Popularly, the Monroe Doctrine is regarded as the sum total of all American policies for the Americas. In this sense it has been termed "an India-rubber doctrine" since it may be stretched to cover almost any policy; or, as one of our leading newspapers once described it, it is "as comprehensive as all outdoors." But officially, it is a definite, restricted policy of self-defense. It has been defined, officially or semi-officially, several times within the past few years. Mr. Hughes, when secretary of state, explained and interpreted it, and gave it the following definition: "It is opposed (1) to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American states under any guise, and (2) to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non-American power." In the same

limited and restricted sense, it has been interpreted and explained by the recent undersecretary of state, Mr. J. Reuben Clark, in a memorandum which has been published, and therefore approved, by the Department of State. Sections of this memorandum were incorporated, with approval, by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in its report to the full Senate on the meaning of the Pact of Paris. More recently, in June, 1930, it was announced that the Department of State had instructed its ambassadors and ministers throughout Latin America to call the Clark memorandum to the attention of the various Latin-American governments. Of the official definitions, the briefest was given by another secretary of state, Elihu Root, "The safety of the United States demands that American territory shall remain American."

Officially defined, therefore, the Monroe Doctrine is a simple, restricted policy of defense. But the Caribbean policy, which supplements it, has now come to be the India-rubber element in our foreign relations. Secretary Hughes rendered a great service by differentiating sharply between it and the Monroe Doctrine, although he did not state its full content with precision. By the Caribbean policy the United States evidently claims special interests and a special responsibility in the

region to the south of us. As President Coolidge expressed it, the United States, in the Caribbean, has "a responsibility which does not attach to other states."

The policy is based, in part, upon strategic interests. Secretary Hughes stated that the United States proposes to control the Panama Canal, as well as any other canal which may connect the Atlantic with the Pacific, and to hold the military approaches to them. On the civil side, the best definition of this policy I know is the one given in conversation by a friend in the Department of State who at the time was largely responsible for inaugurating and guiding our Latin-American relations. He said, "We aim to help the Caribbean countries to learn to govern themselves. We do not wish to govern them."

There is nothing unusual or exceptional about our Monroe Doctrine and Caribbean policy. They are natural policies for a nation situated as is the United States. Other states, apparently with less justification, have advanced similar doctrines. Australia has a well-recognized Monroe Doctrine, which is sometimes termed the British Monroe Doctrine for the South Pacific. It was first definitely formulated at the British Intercolonial Conference at Sydney in December, 1883, when the

delegates unanimously voted that the "further acquisition of dominion in the Pacific, south of the Equator, by any foreign power would be highly detrimental to the safety and well-being of the British possessions in Australasia, and injurious to the interests of the Empire." More recently, Great Britain has announced what is popularly termed a British Monroe Doctrine, in its reservations, in connection with the Pact of Paris, which relate to such countries as Egypt and such regions as the Persian Gulf. Japan has a Monroe Doctrine for Eastern Asia, by which it wishes recognition of its "special interest" in that part of the world. The precise content of this policy seems as little clear to outsiders as that of the American Monroe Doctrine. However natural Monroe doctrines and Caribbean policies may be, the world over, they are normally not viewed with enthusiasm by other powers.

The third important policy of the United States for this hemisphere is pan-Americanism. It aims to group the American states into a union for the cultivation of friendship and the promotion of mutual interests. It is a combination of idealism and commerce. This policy is also normal. The world is full of pan-movements. Before the World War we heard much of the pan-Germans and the pan-

Slavs, while since the war pan-Europe and pan-Asia have been to the fore. These pan-movements thus far, even including our own, have not been as effective as their promoters have desired.

Our policies for the Americas present serious problems and have been subjected to severe criticism. The Monroe Doctrine, generally regarded as beneficent by our own people, is widely resented throughout Latin America as a policy of overlordship and guardianship. Whatever its advantages may be, the antagonism which it is arousing is a distinct injury to the United States.

In view of this situation the query naturally arises whether anything can be done to remove the causes of criticism. Several suggestions have been made. First, a small but well-informed group advocate its abandonment. They argue that in the present world-situation there is no practical possibility that any non-American power will attempt to seize territory or control any government on the American hemisphere; therefore that the Monroe Doctrine, in the phrase once used by Senator Bingham, is "an obsolete shibboleth," of no value to us, and should be given up. This suggestion faces several difficulties. The American people do not show any indication of favoring its abandonment. Should it, however, be renounced, we should prob-

ably have a vigorous discussion, as Secretary Hughes has pointed out, as to what it is which we have given up. Finally, should the world-situation change, and some non-American power attempt to seize American territory, especially in the Caribbean, the United States would doubtless resist such an attempt, Monroe Doctrine or no Monroe Doctrine.

A second suggestion for meeting the difficulties in regard to the Monroe Doctrine is that it should be defined more officially and publicly. This might be done either by the same means by which the original Doctrine was announced, a presidential message to Congress, or by a communication from the Department of State to all other governments. Certainly a more precise definition, in the sense in which the Doctrine is now officially interpreted, would tend to remove in a measure the resentment against implications of the Doctrine which are no longer justified.

A third proposal is to place the Monroe Doctrine in some way upon a pan-American basis. This idea was widely favored shortly before the World War, when our American policies were subjected to a careful consideration in this country. Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Taft, and Mr. Richard Olney all approved the suggestion; and it apparently had the

support, as evidenced by the replies to a questionnaire, of a large majority both of American professors of international law and diplomacy and, also, of the editors of our leading newspapers. There are, however, several different ways in which the Monroe Doctrine might be made pan-American. There would be some objection to placing it so completely upon a co-operative basis that it would be interpreted and enforced in accordance with a majority vote of the American republics. To imagine a concrete case: If Germany, shortly before the World War, after making a treaty with Denmark for the purchase of the present Virgin Islands, had attempted to take possession of them, and the American concert of states had refused to regard such action as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States would doubtless not consider itself bound by the decision. But pan-American action might be obtained in another way. The Latin-American republics might announce a policy, each in its own phraseology, which would be the equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine. It is believed by some that they would be willing to do this if given adequate encouragement by the United States. The Monroe Doctrine would then become the policy of the Americas; but each state would retain its unrestricted liberty of decision as to the application

and enforcement of the Doctrine. Such a procedure should also go far to remove the objections and ill will of Latin America.

The Caribbean policy makes more difficulties than the Monroe Doctrine, and presents a serious dilemma. The United States must choose between this policy as it has been carried out during the past two decades and a genuine pan-Americanism. Latin-Americans in general resent so strongly our action in the Caribbean that if it should be continued unchanged they will not co-operate with us with the real friendship and cordiality which we desire.

Under these circumstances what may be done? The most hopeful course would appear to be to modify in some way the methods by which the Caribbean policy has been carried out. First, the principle of the policy might be retained, but the severity of its execution be moderated. There might well be fewer interventions, they might be terminated more quickly, and, especially, civil administrations might often be substituted for military and naval. Second, the policy might be made, in some degree, pan-American. But the procedure would be attended by difficulties; the leading republics to the south of us would probably refuse an invitation to co-operate in the use of force in a

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sister-state, and if they should consent to take part, a joint military intervention might well cause considerable friction. One step, however, the United States might surely take: whenever it deems it necessary to use its military forces as it has done in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, it could properly lay its reasons for such action fully and frankly before the Latin-American republics, either by identic notes addressed to their respective governments or by an explanation at a meeting of the Pan-American Union. Such a course would at least recognize the moral responsibility of the United States as a member of the family of American nations, and might do much to prevent misunderstanding and to maintain good will.

In the Pacific and the Far East the outstanding fact is that the United States regards itself as a Pacific and far eastern power. The technical justification for this position, as has often been pointed out by American secretaries of state, is the possession of Hawaii and some few additional islands in the Pacific, and of the Philippines off the coast of Eastern Asia. The popular American attitude toward this region, however, is rather to be found in our century-long interests there, both missionary and commercial. Since the United States is a Pacific—but not a European—power, the important

result follows that it is willing to co-operate with other states in the settlement of the international political issues of this region, while it will not co-operate with European states in the settlement of similar issues in Europe.

The foremost foreign policies of the United States for this, the third great region of the world, are the Open Door and the Integrity of China. As to these policies there are no particular problems or issues outstanding at the present time. In the past, however, there has been a certain divergence of view between the United States and Japan regarding their respective positions in China: Japan stressing its special interests and responsibility in that country, and the United States its equal status with the other powers. But, happily, the Conference at Washington led to a better understanding, and Ambassador Castle's recent statements in Tokyo emphasized the high regard and friendliness of America for Japan.

There is an outstanding issue, however, still unsettled between the two countries—that of immigration. Its importance, due to the attitude of the Japanese regarding it, may best be presented by narrating a personal experience. Some two years ago I had the privilege of attending a discussion dinner with the Japanese-American Relations

Committee in Tokyo. The president was Viscount Shibusawa, sometimes called "the grand old man of Japan." Among the others present were members of the House of Peers, professors from the Imperial University, and industrial and financial leaders of Japan. It soon appeared that to this group of distinguished Japanese relations with America meant just one thing: the so-called exclusion provision of the Immigration Act of 1924. Viscount Shibusawa explained that he had always been a friend of America, ever since Commodore Perry landed in Japan—an event which he remembered as a boy. He described General Grant's visit; what the General said to him and what he replied. After tracing the whole course of Japan's connection with the United States, with its many pleasant memories, he finally came to the year 1924, when he said with feeling, "Then America put this insult upon us." He wished America to understand that Japan did not regard exclusion as a closed incident. There was no desire to send Japanese to California, but only a request for treatment which would accord with the self-respect of Japan. Finally he said, "We believe in the friendship and ultimate justice of America; only we hope we shall not have to wait too long."

In addition to its regional policies the United

States has an important general policy—the preservation of peace. Although foreigners point out that the United States has been particularly insistent upon its contentions in international issues, nevertheless one of the strongest impulses of the American people is the will to peace. But since the United States is not a member of the League of Nations, it is unable to participate fully in the only world-organization which gives real promise of functioning effectively for the abolition of war. The methods therefore by which our government has recently attempted to do its part in furthering world-peace are, first, conferences for the limitation of armament, such as the Washington Conference of 1921–22, and, second, agreements for the renunciation of war, notably the Kellogg Pact.

Since the American attitude is widely misinterpreted in other countries, and many in our own land find it difficult to explain favorably all of the actions of our government and people during the past decade, it is well to remember that at times genuine idealism still characterizes American conduct in foreign relations. This was revealed on at least two occasions during the Washington Conference. When Secretary Hughes gave his startling challenge to the naval powers of the world to put on the scrap heap a large proportion of their

ships of war, and in his address had reached a striking sentence, which seemed to visualize his project —"There should be a naval holiday. It is proposed that for a period of not less than ten years there should be no further construction of capital ships" —all the Americans in the hall, the congressmen, the senators, the justices of the Supreme Court, broke out in instant and tremendous applause. But what were they applauding? A proposal to surrender the potential command of the seas then within the grasp of the United States. To destroy all of America's dreadnaughts partly built, the world's greatest naval force under construction, in the cause of an equitable mutual reduction of armament, appealed to the idealism of the American people.

Later in the Conference the United States acceded to the request of Japan that the *status quo* in fortifications and naval bases should be retained throughout most of the islands of the Pacific. The American delegation was well advised as to the significance of this request. They realized fully that if the Philippines and, especially, Guam should be adequately fortified, as could easily be done, it would give the United States, with its superior fleet, the naval command of a large area of the Western Pacific. Yet the American delegation gave

up this great strategic asset, and signed the non-fortification agreement, as an act of friendship for Japan and an evidence of its confidence in its great neighbor across the Pacific.

There are two further steps which the United States could properly take in the cause of world-peace. First, it could give up its normal right to trade with a state which had started an aggressive war. Such action would, in most cases, not only penalize a government which had violated the Kellogg Pact and therefore its treaty pledges to the United States, but would also enable the League of Nations to make effective its economic boycott against an aggressor, without fear of complications with our country. Second, it could implement the Kellogg Pact by some agreement which would make possible a greater measure of international co-operation whenever there should be a danger of war. The need for some additional provision is obvious in view of the difficulty experienced by the United States in obtaining concerted international action when actual fighting broke out in Manchuria in the summer of 1929.

There are doubtless certain obstacles to be overcome before the American government will adopt these two suggestions: its deep-seated opposition to legal engagements to take a prescribed course of

action in the future; and its unwillingness to permit any other government or agency to decide for it what that action should be. Congress would probably refuse to pledge itself to accept a ruling by the Council of the League as to which was the real aggressor of two or more states starting hostilities. The decision must be made by the United States. Some procedure therefore seems necessary which, while preserving for our government adequate liberty to determine its own line of conduct, will insure prompt action in case of war, and will also enable other states to know at once what the United States will do.

These necessary conditions appear to be met by the two following suggestions: First, the President might be authorized by act of Congress to suspend, at his discretion, normal economic relations with any state which should wage an aggressive war and thereby violate its treaty pledges to the United States expressed in the Kellogg Pact. The granting of such power has excellent precedent; it is only a step in advance of the act of 1912 which authorized the President to forbid—except under such conditions as he might prescribe—all shipments of military supplies from the United States to any country of the American hemisphere where conditions of domestic violence existed. It would

enable our government, without the possible complication of a pledge given in advance, to take prompt and effective action, and to renounce at once, if deemed advisable, its right to trade with a designated state. Second, the Kellogg Pact might be implemented by an international agreement providing for consultation between at least those states most concerned in any case where the Pact seemed in danger of violation. It was intimated semiofficially a few months ago that such a general agreement, if not a conditional part of the naval treaty, would probably meet the approval of the United States. The Republican party, it may be remembered, in its national platform of 1920, declared in favor of an association of nations "which shall secure instant and general international conference whenever peace shall be threatened by political action." Such an engagement, providing merely for consultation, would permit the leading powers to consider together which was the aggressor state, and would give them the opportunity to agree if possible upon measures to maintain the peace. It would also enable the Council of the League of Nations to know almost at once the probable action of our government in regard to an economic boycott instituted by the League.

These two steps seem to be the only ones which

we can vizualize clearly as both practicable and helpful for the years immediately before us. But looking farther into the future, there lies ahead the world's greatest task—the abolition of war as an institution. This task is so difficult, there are so many conflicting or partial solutions urged by different groups or schools of thought, and the detailed application of any plan is so full of perplexities that it is not surprising that Chief Justice Hughes has said, "The pathway of peace is the longest and most beset with obstacles the human race has to tread."

An obligation rests upon our country to do its full share, together with other nations, in helping the human race to tread successfully this long path and to surmount the obstacles until finally the war system has disappeared. This normal obligation is increased by especial considerations. The United States is one of the strongest nations; of all countries it is the most free from both the danger and the fear of serious attack; it stands, safely guarded by two oceans, midway between the two populous danger zones of the world—Europe and Asia.

The American government in its effort to carry out wisely and effectively the part which the United States should play in this movement will

need the support of a public, not intent upon selfish national gain and timorous for fear of making a false step in world-affairs, but rather a public insistent that war as an institution shall be destroyed, conscious of the difficulties of the task but with faith that it can be done, seeking less national advantage than the accomplishment of a great service to the world as a whole—a people who need only to be faithful to the principle of foreign policy laid down by one of our greatest secretaries of state, Elihu Root, who said, "Not what a nation does for itself but what a nation does for humanity is its title to honor and glory."

CANADA'S CONCERN IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By Percy Ellwood Corbett

CANADA'S CONCERN IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

My subject falls naturally into two divisions: first, our interest in the general foreign policy of the United States; and, second, our interest in the way in which this country conducts its particular relations with us. Inevitably our attitude in all matters falling under the first division will be more platonic than in those falling under the second. Many Canadians have an intimate sense of the importance of American tariffs, know something of waterways, boundaries, fisheries, and rum-running; relatively few spend any time in contemplation of, let us say, the Monroe Doctrine, American naval strength, intervention in the Caribbean, or the relation of the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice and the League of Nations. To those responsible for the conduct of our external affairs, however, as well as to all Canadians who think of the Dominion's place in the world at large, these matters assume a first-rate importance. British as we are, our welfare as a people and development as a nation are so bound up with the temper and tendencies of the United States that no student of political sci-

ence among us will attempt to predict the future of our country—and we are all constantly endeavoring to visualize that future—without certain fundamental presumptions as to the evolution of the American political mind. Those presumptions are likely to be optimistic or pessimistic not merely as we are satisfied or irritated by the treatment meted out to ourselves, but according to the significance we attach to American dealings with other countries and the rôle the United States play in international organization. I propose therefore to deal seriatim with certain aspects of the general foreign policy of this country in which some Canadians at least are specially interested.

I

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The point in Canadian history which was marked by the most active discussion of the Monroe Doctrine was of course the series of debates in 1909–11 on the question of creating a Canadian navy. Opponents of the navy urged that any protection needed over and above that of the existing British fleet was provided by the Monroe Doctrine. One of Stephen Leacock's more caustic products is an article in the *University Magazine* of October, 1909, condemning all de-

pendence on such protection as a dangerous delusion. The Doctrine, he said, was never intended to apply to Canada and, in any case, was asserted or not according to the immediate interest of the United States, not according to the need of any neighboring community. There is undoubtedly much to be said for both elements of this thesis; but I, nevertheless, cannot escape the conviction that the traditional policy of the United States in regard to non-American intervention in this hemisphere is more than ever important to Canada.

One hears less nowadays in Canada about the Monroe Doctrine than in 1909. The reason, I believe, is that Canadians think a great deal less than they did then in terms of conflict. That is true, we trust, of most civilized countries; but it is particularly true of Canada. There is no people, I believe, with a firmer confidence in peace. We are throwing more weight into the work of organizing peace than at any time since the war. It has been a commonplace to say that Canada's policy in the League of Nations has been identical with that of the United States outside it, that we no sooner got into the League than we began to water down the obligations of Articles 10 and 16, that we wrecked the Protocol of 1924, and that in general we would enter into no "entangling alli-

ances." The fact remains that we have accepted the optional clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court, thereby pledging ourselves to settle peaceably all justiciable disputes with any other party to the clause, that we abstain from armament and that we take an extraordinarily prominent part—the more prominent for the official absence of the United States—in the everyday work of the League.

We have confidence in our position—a confidence very little affected by the risk that our membership in the British commonwealth may involve us again in distant struggles. We have more to do nowadays with determining the policy of the commonwealth, and in the nature of things our influence will be for peace. I cannot say that I completely approve the Canadian government's action in the Chanak crisis, but at least it demonstrated our capacity to withdraw ourselves from the consequences of a policy which we did not frame.

Confidence in the growing efficacy of international organization, an unthreatened geographical position—these go a long way to explain our sense of security. But, somewhat unwillingly, I have come at last to the conclusion that the great strength of the United States and the likelihood of their preventing encroachments from outside

have something to do with our state of mind and with our refusal to arm. For it does seem to me highly probable that, even if certain principles of American policy had not been handed down as on tables of gold a century ago and considerably expanded since, the United States would be bound to view with profound misgivings any displacement of the control of the enormous territory to the north of them, and that those misgivings would prompt action tending strongly to maintain the *status quo*. If this view is sound, then any Canadian government which lost sight of the Monroe Doctrine in estimating measures necessary for the maintenance of security would be blind and foolish. The probable attitude of a neighboring power of the magnitude of the United States cannot but be a prime element in assessing our position in the world. And as we become more responsible ourselves for satisfying our own needs, the more importance must we assign to such an element.

Some talk is still heard from time to time of replacing the Monroe Doctrine by an agreed pan-American declaration. Such a step, while it might flatter the dignity of the other nations of the West, would hardly alter the chances of effective interposition by the United States if the occasion presented itself. In other words, if the United States

still adhere to the principle of excluding non-American aggression, they will not be content to depend entirely upon collective action to that end. But if such a declaration is made, it would, I think, be a healthy thing for Canada to take any responsibility involved in joining in it. Any public discussion on this subject—and there has not been much—has been vitiated by a largely simulated emotional reaction. The mention of Monroe Doctrine has been the signal for outbursts, made with one eye on the press gallery and the other on the voter, of that rhetorical national pride which spurns all dependence, and which serves the politician in our country, as elsewhere, in lieu of clear thinking.

DISARMAMENT

Logically, perhaps, if we count upon the power of the United States as in some measure a final guaranty of the opportunity for peaceful development, we should view with disfavor any agreement limiting or reducing American armaments. In actual fact, the contrary is the case. We have welcomed every sign of willingness on the part of the United States to reduce their navy, and should welcome further signs. We go so far, indeed, as to doubt the real necessity to you of so large a fleet of 10,000-ton cruisers as you demand.

The main reason for our attitude in this is that while we prize security we also prize our connection with Great Britain, and we see in any possibility of a naval race between the two countries the nearest approach to a risk of war between them. Now, I can safely leave to the imagination of any person possessing one the predicament in which the Canada of today would find herself in the event of an Anglo-American war. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that that predicament would be the greatest evil that could conceivably befall the Dominion—which explains why we participate so keenly in all the disarmament conferences, and why Canadians witnessed without regret the progressive diminution of Great Britain's claims in cruiser strength.

IMPERIALISM AND WATERWAYS

In Canada, as elsewhere, one sometimes hears the phrase "imperialism of the United States." Books like *Dollar Diplomacy* find a fair number of readers among us. Some quite serious-minded people declare themselves alarmed about the designs of dominance which they believe American governments, industrialists, and financiers to harbor. And of course there is much of that in our press, often because of the intimate relation between our press and local industrial or financial interests.

Very frequently when one hears a Canadian appealing to the religion of liberty against the tyranny of the United States one finds that his real worry is about dividends. At times this amounts to something like propaganda organized by interested capital. But can one reasonably deny all justification for a genuinely disinterested desire for safeguards? One of the cries most hawked about in opposition to the deepening of the St. Lawrence ship channel has been that we shall be made another canal zone. An industrious discussion group to which I once belonged went so far as to study in detail the history of American intervention in Panama and Nicaragua in order to judge whether it would be safe for Canada to intrust her neighbor with any share of control over the Canadian part of the river. We arrived at the conclusion that it would be exceedingly difficult to convict the accused of unscrupulous imperialism on the evidence. The idealist will certainly insist that the United States are too ready to impose their ideas of life, welfare, and progress upon other peoples, but a Britisher with India and Egypt in his mind will probably prefer to reserve judgment. Nevertheless, the chances of Canada's accepting any joint jurisdiction over the Canadian reaches of the St. Lawrence are, I believe, slight; and, because

we are a relatively small nation negotiating with a great one whose interest has found means of realization at times over loud protest, the American negotiators must be prepared to meet extreme caution in their opposite numbers. Another thing making for that caution will be the fact that the Yankee is notoriously a clever trader and the suspicion that we have sometimes had the wool pulled over our eyes. The exclusion of Lake Michigan from the definition of boundary waters, for example, in the Treaty of 1909, still occasionally rankles in the Canadian breast.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE PERMANENT COURT

We take a certain pride in the fact that in the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations we represent the North American continent, a position of prominence which we should lose if the United States consented to lie on the bed they had made. Yet we should willingly make this sacrifice. We believe already in the efficacy of the League—in that respect there has been a marked change in Canadian feeling within the last five or six years—if the United States were a member we feel that its power of beneficent international action would be immeasurably increased. We acknowledge the measure of official co-operation which the United States have maintained in the

League, and the invaluable private support which American citizens have accorded its institutions. What gives us most satisfaction, however, is the prospect that the Senate will finally approve ratification of the Protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice. In our view every conceivable concession has been made to the Senate's reservations, and a refusal to adhere now would place the country in a most invidious position. Apart from the accession of strength which adherence would bring to a tribunal striving to establish itself as a true World Court, Canada has a particular interest in this event. After the United States have joined the Court, the next step would logically and probably be acceptance of the optional clause. This would be in the most perfect harmony with the long-established policy of the United States in the matter of international arbitration and judicial settlement. They have advanced in the last twenty years from the old type of arbitration treaty, with its exceptions of vital interest and national honour, through the Bryan conciliation conventions, up to the almost absolute agreements to arbitrate disputes of a justiciable nature which they have recently concluded with a number of European states. The optional clause reads as follows:

The members of the League of Nations and the States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or ratifying the protocol to which the present Statute is adjoined, or at a later moment, declare that they recognise as compulsory, *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to any other Member or State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning:

a) The interpretation of a Treaty.

b) Any question of International Law.

c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation.

d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

Canada is now in process of accepting this obligation of judicial settlement, and when the United States do likewise we shall have between us a fairly complete machinery of arbitration. Not everyone, I find, realizes how incomplete that machinery is at the present moment. The old Arbitration Treaty of 1908 was not renewed in 1928 and has therefore come to an end; the Bryan Treaty of 1914 provides for a year's delay in hostilities and for a report, not for a binding decision; the International Joint Commission has compulsory jurisdiction only in regard to the diversion or obstruction of boundary waters; while, finally, the reservations to the Briand-Kellogg Pact do not encourage confidence in the application of its sec-

ond article to any particular case. Our joint adherence to the optional clause would go far to fill the gaps.

THE FAR EAST

The increase in exports from Canada to the Far East in the last fifteen years is one of the most striking features of our commercial expansion. The following figures, which show, among other things, that the rate of increase is greater than that of exports from the United States, are enough in themselves to justify close Canadian attention to the course of events in the Orient:

CANADIAN TRADE: Japan: total ('29) 55 mill.
Exports, 42 (1½ '14: 6½ '21)
Imports, 13
China: total ('29) 27 mill.
Exports, 24 (½ '14: 5 '21)
Imports, 3

RELATIVE RATE OF GROWTH:
1919 U.S. trade with China 50 times Canada's
1929 U.S. trade with China 15–20 times Canada's
1919 U.S. trade with Japan 23 times Canada's
1929 U.S. trade with Japan 12 times Canada's

CANADA'S CHIEF EXPORTS:

	China	Japan
Wheat (millions) ....$	7½	20
Flour.....	10	...
Fish.....	1	1¼
Metals.....	4¼	6¼
Forest.....	½	9¼

Our government has proved that it is awake to the importance of our relations with China and Japan by appointing a minister to the latter country, part of whose duties of course is to report on Chinese affairs. Our merchants and professors are proving their interest by the studies carried on in the Canadian branches of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and by their participation in the organization and conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations. At all the conferences, from the first at Honolulu in 1925 to the third at Kyoto in 1929, there have been active Canadian delegations, and it was a member of the first of these delegations who was responsible for the part which England is now taking in the Institute.

In all our contemplation of the Far East, the policy of the United States in that part of the world figures conspicuously. Commercially we are in favor of all that makes for stability in China; emotionally we are inclined to sympathize with the efforts of the Kuomintang to liberate their country from the unequal treaties. The Tariff Treaty concluded last year, which recognizes Chinese tariff autonomy, the apparent willingness of the American government to hasten by every reasonable means the termination of the extraterritorial régime, the appointment, by the Nanking govern-

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ment, of the American advisory committee under Dr. Kemmerer—all of these promise progress toward an independent, unified, and prosperous China, a consummation as devoutly to be desired by Canada as by the United States.

II

Turning now to the particular relations of our two countries, one fundamental observation may be made at once. That is that we have acquired a settled habit of peace. That means rather more than that there has been no war between us since 1814, near as we have come to it at times; it means that we have not for a long time now thought of war as a means of settling our differences, and that here, as in few places in the world, is it true to say that settlement by commission is the normal course.

The question that the detached observer is bound to ask is how far this uniform recourse to rational and peaceful methods depends upon the relative strength of the two nations. Has Canada made it possible by constant surrender determined by the hopelessness of enforcing her claims? Many Canadians take this cynical and unhistorical view as part of a general attitude of anti-Americanism. They point inevitably to the Maine-boundary and the Alaskan-boundary awards, and they overlook

such decisions as those given in the Behring Sea seal-fisheries and North Atlantic fisheries cases. If one points out that in all these questions the United States was opposed, not to a small country, but to an empire at the time equal to or greater than their own, the reply often is that Great Britain, to the knowledge of the United States, was willing to sacrifice the Dominion's interests in some larger imperial purpose; in effect, therefore, it was a strong nation against a colony. This, I think, has some truth in it. One can scarcely gainsay the evidence of Sir John MacDonald on the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of 1871, when the anxiety of the English plenipotentiaries to dispose of the Alabama claims made them somewhat blind to the territorial and fishery rights of Canada; and Lord Alverstone's decision in the Alaskan-boundary arbitration has always smacked of a rather doubtful expediency. But no one familiar with the conduct of international affairs can with real confidence accuse the United States of having, in any of our arbitrations, done more than make the best of their case. One side must lose, in spite often of the most genuine belief in the justice of its cause, and it is not unnatural for a nation dealing with another ten times greater than itself to find the explanation of its loss in the

influence of power. Whether we should have obtained more if our representatives had been firmer is exceedingly doubtful, but if so our criticism should be directed against them rather than against our adversaries. My own view is that there is very little historical basis for the fear that, in any future conflicts of interest, justice will have to bow to force. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1910 setting up the International Joint Commission, the Bryan treaties of 1914, the Pact of Paris of 1928, exhibit, I believe, a genuine willingness on the part of the United States to abide by judicial decision rather than depend upon their predominant power.

I have spoken of anti-Americanism in Canada. Americans are usually surprised to hear that such a sentiment exists. Relatively few of them have thought of Canada as a foreign country with interests conflicting with theirs; and those who have are probably unconscious of having given cause for animosity. And when one thinks of the exceedingly cordial personal relations existing between Canadians and Americans, it is something of an anomaly to find in many places an outspoken dislike of the American people as a whole. Do not misunderstand me as asserting that such hostility is entertained by the majority of Canadians. But

it would be foolish to blink the fact that it is a not uncommon phenomenon.

Two causes of this feeling have already been mentioned—first, the sense of injury, based upon a one-sided reading of history; second, the very human jealousy of its rights which a smaller people inevitably harbors in juxtaposition with a greater. Let me mention another which I have generally found to be as familiar to intelligent Americans as it is to foreigners—the flamboyant national pride which finds ready expression in the mouths of many of those tourists upon whom we count to maintain something like a trade balance. It cannot be denied that in regard to these we are not altogether fair. We want their money, but we should prefer not to hear their opinions. Doubtless that strong commercial sense which we share with our neighbors will in time overcome this sensitiveness.

WATER DIVERSION

There are, however, some causes not so easily disposed of. One of them is the tendency of a great state to treat as matters of domestic concern questions which are obviously and broadly international in their implications. This is well illustrated by the long story of the diversion of water from Lake Michigan, known in various states of

the Union and in Canada as the "Chicago Water-Steal." The Dominion government has been protesting against excessive diversion since 1912. True, it has never insisted that the matter must be dealt with first and foremost on an international basis. The ostensible reason for not insisting was the fact that the other riparian states were fighting our battle for us, but one cannot escape the suspicion that the real reason was knowledge that insistence would be useless. We are of course aware that the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 makes it impossible to demand the application to Lake Michigan of rules limited to boundary waters. But it seems clearly established that in the recurring low-water seasons the diversion of 10,000 cubic feet per second definitely affects the navigability of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence system. Even if that were not so, a greater diversion might well have this effect, and it is therefore important for Canada to be able to secure a limitation. In other words, if the question is looked at from a detached point of view it cannot but assume an international aspect, and one feels morally certain that if our people had numbered a hundred million instead of ten million it would have been dealt with in that light. If the question is primarily international, then it ought to be in the hands of

some international body, such as the Joint Commission, not referred for final decision to any tribunal, however august, which is purely internal to the United States. We Canadians, however, might have been content to waive this preliminary point if the substance of the dispute could have been regarded as disposed of by the decision of the Supreme Court in April, 1930. But the Chicago diversion is a hydra-headed monster, and no sooner has one head been cut off—or, perhaps, muzzled—in the Supreme Court than another springs up in the Senate. What the cause of sanitation has lost that of commercial navigation may win. How can any country with an important interest in a matter which is bandied about between the administrative, judicial, and legislative organs of another feel secure until, by agreement between the two countries, some limit is set to the possible outcome?

TARIFFS

Of all irritants, however, the proposed increases in United States customs duties have been the most active. From one end of Canada to the other there has been a chorus of indignation. I do not say that the indignation has been justified; I record the fact. It is useless to point out that no nation since the beginning of our civilization has fixed its

tariffs with an eye to the welfare of its neighbors, that in particular Canada has always fixed hers without reference to the interests of American industry. Little is heard among us of the real reasons for the effort to raise the duties on imports. If one cites the economic distress of the mid-western farmer, one is met by the answer that we are going to have to help him by paying for the development of the St. Lawrence Waterways, and that the tariff increases are going to diminish our means of doing so. The mid-western farmer is to have everything, one is told—better transportation facilities and higher prices—much of it at our expense. The most common explanation of the move for higher tariffs is that it is a farther step toward the monopolization of trade on this continent and the selfish consolidation of existing American commercial predominance. Retaliation has become the cry of the day, and this year's budget, with its countervailing duties and increased British preferences, is the direct result. Such reaction, of course, has by no means been confined to Canada. Look, for example, at the recent resolutions of French chambers of commerce, the explosions in the Italian press, and the protests of the Belgian government, to mention only a few manifestations of a general discontent.

I leave to the economists the economic aspects of a tariff war between two countries each of which is the best customer of the other. What I am concerned with here is the result in sentiment. That alone is surely sufficient to call for some reconsideration of the mode of tariff-fixation. Would it not be possible to introduce some measure of co-operation between us in a matter so charged with potentialities of bad feeling?

I have studiously tried to avoid presenting Canada as the sole virtuous and injured party in all these matters. Some of us at least are as truculent as the American tourist who owns the earth; individually and as a nation we doubtless give occasional cause for offense. The liquor traffic across our common border may perhaps be cited as the most cogent example of delinquency on our part. This cause, however, has been removed, as far as legislation can remove it, by the action of the Canadian government. The statute prohibiting the issue of clearance papers to cargoes of alcoholic beverages from our ports is, I believe, at least as popular in Canada as in the United States; for in spite of St. Pierre and Miquelon, this legislation appears to have heightened the consumer's sacrifice in Detroit and elsewhere.

In many of our differences the interests opposed

to each other are those of groups and sections rather than of the nation. The American farmers, lumbermen, and manufacturers worry their Canadian brothers-in-craft; the American labor-unions shut out the border "commuters"; the Canadian paper-manufacturer tries—unsuccessfully thus far—to raise prices against the American publisher. It is perhaps too late to urge that these interests might best be left to the unimpeded operation of economic laws; but there is surely yet time to plead that before they are elevated to the rank of matters of state they be placed, on both sides of the border, in their proper relation to the interest, and even to the sentiment, of the people as a whole. It might often happen that such preliminary deliberation, objectively pursued, would show us that the state is being employed to express something which is not at all the common will.

I have spoken of cordial personal relations. Speaking for Canadians only, I believe it to be true that they like and trust Americans individually, but like and trust them less collectively. Perhaps both sides would agree that it would be a good thing if more of that special understanding and consideration which mark the individual association of Canadian with American could find its way into our intercourse as states. I would not

lay all blame for such friction as there is on the government at Washington. Only the completely impartial observer could say with confidence which of us is the more ready to make neighborly concessions. But surely a lead in the direction of altruism might legitimately be expected from the larger community. Surely the spirit of peace, if it really lives in a nation, involves abstention from insisting on the last semblance of right. The United States, secure in power, great in all material things, have an opportunity, such as no nation has had in the past, of manifesting the real greatness of unselfishness. If the opportunity is taken, then we two countries may yet furnish the world with that example of comradeship which, with more moral superiority than real justification, we boast at present.

EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

By George Young

I. THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE AND OF AMERICA

I have been asked to speak tonight about the United States of America and the United States of Europe and the relations between them. And the difficulty is that whereas the United States of America is a fact—a giant fact—the United States of Europe is a phantom—a ghostly phantom—and the relationship between a fact and a phantom, between a giant and a ghost, calls for a more metaphysical mind than that of an average Anglo-Saxon. I am indeed driven to seek a solution from my studies when codifying Ottoman law, when I came on the interesting principle that a good Moslem might marry his fairy godmother but not a female goblin. And clearly in this case the future relationship of the giant and the ghost turns on whether the phantom of a United States of Europe is a fairy godmother bringing gifts to an infant institution, or a female goblin whom it would be unwise to let out of her bottle.

Having got so far with the help of Ottoman law, we can now turn for help to psychical research. That has, I understand, decided that if we all see a ghost at the same time, in the same place, why

then either there is something really there, or some clever conjurer like M. Briand has hypnotized us all. On the other hand, if we don't all see the same ghost, then there must be some other explanation. There must in that case be something wrong with our digestion, or our nerves, or our brain. That there is something wrong with us all is unquestionable. We all have just come through a violent brain fever of war. Some of us have digestions ruined—we call it "overproduction." Others of us have our circulation all wrong—we call it "inflation" or "deflation." And the consequence is that we are all very likely to have nightmares and see ghosts. And the ghosts that we see are different according to the different disorders from which we are suffering.

Now to a European the United States of Europe appears as an angelic vision. That Europeans living on opposite sides of a bay, a river, a range of hills, or even of a street, who are closely related in race and religion, in culture and civilization, should —thanks to a United States of Europe—be able to see one another without wasting weary weeks in passport formalities, or should be able to sell to one another without wasting all the advantage in customs dues, seems too utterly utopian. Free trade and travel within the confines of a continent

is a privilege that is peculiar to God's own country or the Kingdom of Heaven. That is how the United States of Europe appeals to a European imagination. How does it appeal to an American?

Apparently very differently. What is to us a fairy godmother is to you a female goblin. You see, for example, a president of the United States of Europe calling a special session of a European Congress to pass a measure of relief and reconstruction for, shall we say, European agriculture; and that Congress, by a process of log-rolling as between the several states and of lobbying by the various interests, eventually elaborating a billion-dollar tariff which will build a Chinese Wall of customs duties round the European continent. Where "you-all" get that strange idea from of course a stranger like myself has no idea. But there it is. And the question is whether that goblin has any objective existence, or whether it is subjective—the product of your own experience; of your own, dare I say, excessive indulgence—a phantom of the same order as pink rats and green snakes.

Needless to say, there are today Chinese customs walls round every country in the continent of Europe except the United Kingdom. But the first question is, Can they in any immediate future all

be pulled down and put up again as an extra high wall round the continent? And the second is, If they were, what would be the effect on the continent of America?

Now we can get an answer to the first question by looking at what has just happened in the Geneva Conference called by the League Assembly to arrange if possible a "customs truce"—that is, a truce that will stop for a time building higher the customs battlements, in much the same way that the Washington agreement stopped for a time the building of battleships. In this Conference all Europe except the Soviet Union and Albania were represented, and no American state except Peru and Colombia. After five weeks of what the chairman—my friend Count Karl Moltke—called "exhausting and exasperating" negotiations, a result was reached, which, as he said, "depends more on future intentions than on the present engagements." In his words, "The Conference could do no more than take a first hesitating step on the road along which the Assembly of the League had instructed it to start." And if we examine these results, we find that they consist in a convention and protocol signed by Austria, Belgium, Britain, Esthonia, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, and Switzerland, which, instead of providing

a two or three years' truce, provides a truce that takes effect next November and terminates next March. Even so, exceptions are numerous. The most valuable result seems to be that the convention may be continued and that a further conference is to be held next year. A protocol proposes further extensions of the discussion into other economic questions, and lays down procedures. The next Assembly may, of course, give the enterprise a fresh impetus. But as Count Moltke says, "The Assembly will now realize how distant is the goal, and how encumbered the path." Indeed, it looks as though the movement for a fiscal disarmament of Europe that made so ambitious a start in the Genoa Conference might, like the movement for naval disarmament within the League, lose itself in the interminable intricacies of technical controversies.

So much for the present prospects of a European continental customs union. Now what about the effect of such a union upon the commerce of the North American continent? That continent has, as everyone knows, acquired since the war a new interest in European markets as an outlet for its surplus products. Would a European customs union obstruct that outlet? It certainly would not, unless the tariff rates were higher than those of

the United States tariff, and that has come to be a skyscraper. Coming up New York harbor and admiring the towering skyline of the skyscrapers, I asked a fellow-traveler what it suggested to him. I expected him to say San Gimignano or a cathedral or the Rocky Mountains. What he did say with a scowl was, "The American tariff." And in view of this American tariff, a European tariff would not affect American commerce for this simple reason—that exports can only be paid for in imports, and that if you stop imports you stop exports. Build a wall round your own garden to keep your neighbor out and you will keep yourself in. It won't really make any difference if he builds another wall alongside yours. As it is, such American products as are purchased in Europe can only be paid for by America's lending the money for that purpose. The billion-dollar tariff will mean either a billion-dollar loss of trade with Europe or another billion dollars' worth of loans to Europe. The United States is in fact conducting its European commerce on the same credit system as that on which it was until lately carrying on its home commerce. But whereas at home the system is discounting a development of economic expansion that can be estimated with certainty, allowing for fluctuations, the application of the system abroad

is much more speculative. Even in the United States of America commerce based on credit can, as we see at the present moment, face periods of crisis and collapse. But such internal liquidations and losses are unimportant compared to the political possibilities of an international crisis of the same sort. What would be the result of a repudiation by a European people or peoples of their liabilities to an American creditor? Are not these liabilities, these credits in fact, "commitments" and "entanglements" that might be far more embarrassing than any political alliances denounced by Washington or Jefferson, or than any political undertaking to consult or to arbitrate that would be denounced by the *Washington Post* and the *Chicago Tribune?* The tariff wall has, no doubt, an appeal to the American imagination because it appears to be like a Roman wall against the barbarians—a Roman wall raised behind the ocean ditch for the defense of a higher civilization. This conception, in fact, sees the United States as self-contained and self-confident behind its waves and walls by the grace of God and Senator Grundy. Whereas really a sea is a bridge, not a barrier—and the recognition of the fact brought world-empire to the Phoenicians, the Greeks, and the British. While a wall, whether of stones or of du-

ties, is only a weakness—and the failure to recognize that cost an empire to the Romans, the Byzantines, and the Mongols.

As the world becomes smaller and more of an economic entity, self-containment even in continents becomes more self-contradictory, and isolation more impossible. A United States of Europe could not be inclosed in a ring fence of tariffs. All its most important constituents would be more closely connected with countries outside the ring than with their contiguous confederated neighbors within it. This is true also even of the far more isolated and institutionalized United States of America. New York and Ohio have more common concerns with Canada than with California; California and Texas have more concern with Mexico than with Maine. Take the Monroe Doctrine itself, that inspired mosaic Table of Stone delivered to the Chosen People, and look at the process through which it has passed. It began as a sort of sanitary cordon against European epidemics of war—as a notice board warning Europe that "trespassers will be prosecuted." It has ended as a sort of sanitary code for Central and South Americans, as a notice to "commit no nuisance under penalty of prosecution by the Washington police." Take the doctrine of parity in sea power—that also must

inevitably develop from the principle of self-defense in isolation to the principle of co-operation in maintaining the peace and police of the seas. The problems of the world today cannot be dealt with in terms of self-contained countries or even of self-contained continents.

Assuming, then, that our subject must be considered in terms of civilization as a whole and not in terms of a competition between the European and American continents, has this idea of a United States of Europe anything to contribute to the course of events? Does it add anything to the existing institutions that embody the ideal of unity—a unity that is neither unification nor uniformity, but that is above and apart from the union that is sought within the national frontiers of sovereign states? Such institutions are at the present time the League of Nations, the Pan-American Union, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the Union of Soviet Republics.

As far as the last two are concerned, they are a hindrance much more than a help to a United States of Europe. The whole philosophy and policy of the soviet system would be obstinately opposed to any association with a United States of Europe, by any procedure that would be at present practicable. The Soviet Union would indeed sus-

pect it—with much more grounds than has the United States—of being indirectly, or even directly, aimed against its own system. The frontier between such a United Europe and the Soviet Union would be a fighting front. This would not be so in respect to the United States of Europe and the United Kingdom. Great Britain and Ireland could enter into an economic European entity without its affecting the hegemony of England in the Empire—just as the economic embodiment of Canada in the American continent does not affect in principle its political position in the British commonwealth. But as it happens, at the present moment an influential element of the British electorate, including a large majority of the Conservative party and a small minority of the Labour party, see salvation from British trade depression in an Empire customs union. Such Empire customs union is as impracticable as a European customs union. Even if the British peoples could be got to swallow protection when labeled "Empire free trade," the dominion peoples have declared decisively against the surrender of any of their sovereign self-interest in tariff matters. The British will therefore work, as they have just been working at Geneva, for any general or special lowering of tariffs or raising of labor conditions. But they will make no conces-

sions either as to their insular or their imperial free-trade ideals. Their reply to invitations to join a United States of Europe based on a customs union will be that they would be delighted to accept but that they may be prevented by a prior engagement.

There remains the relationship between a United States of Europe and the League of Nations, on the one side, and between the League and a Pan-American Union, on the other. And these ideals can, it seems to me, all co-operate in one international institution. For one of the present weaknesses of the League undoubtedly is that it does not sufficiently recognize and represent the distinction between the continental collectivities. It represents civilization as a whole; it represents the various countries as states. But in between these two there are the intermediate international interests of the continents of Europe, America, Asia, and even Africa. These continental collectivities are so actual and active that they have in procedure and in practice received a recognition that is not yet recognized in principle. For example, the insertion of the Monroe Doctrine into the Covenant is not as it seems at first sight an absurdity and an anomaly. It makes formal assertion of what is an actual fact, namely, that the affairs of the

American continent as such are the business of American countries only. And we see how when a dispute breaks out as to a swamp in the Grand Chaco, the League in the absence of the United States from its councils is practically powerless. On the other hand, the position of the United States in a regional American league developed out of the Pan-American Union, in which not only Latin America but British America was represented, would be much more powerful in the interests of peace and progress than is its present position. The impotence of the Pan-American Union is mainly because Washington's predominance is so great as to arouse a national opposition in Latin-American capitals that frustrates all action. Resentment against Washington's dictation and requirements that this imperial control be converted into an international control repeat themselves in every region of the relations between the United States and Latin America. So that it seems probable that the United States, acting normally through a pan-American league and nominally under appeal to a world-league, might be able to exercise a greater pressure for peace without provoking resentment and reactions than it can acting as a self-constituted Monrovian mandatory. Again it is mainly the fear of entanglement in

purely European imbroglios that keeps the United States out of the present League. Consequently, if the League were regionally reorganized so that Europe would be primarily responsible under the League for its continental controversies in the same way that the new pan-American regional organization would be responsible for American settlements, the two main obstacles and most material objections to American association with the League would be removed.

It is interesting to note that in Europe the regional principle of grouped states within the League is already asserting itself not only in the rather objectionable form of "security" alliances and responsibility for sanctions, but also in the organization itself. For example, states are associating together in groups for purposes of representation on the Council, and we see, for example, a Scandinavian group voluntarily associating together for representation on the Council of what is at present practically a European league. Why should not European or Asiatic or American groups associate for representation on what will some day be a true world-league? But such a regional reorganization can only be effected by, with, and from the League itself, though an outside initiative and impetus may be required to start such a

reconstruction. That initiative can come both from this movement for a United States of Europe and from the movement for a regional pan-American association to include British America. Indeed, the very fact that the United States are outside the League organization is welcomed by many of us European supporters of the League as being the only good opportunity for securing required reforms and reconstructions of the League as conditions upon which the United States would join it. And I would venture to suggest that American believers in the League would find a discussion of the conditions on which their country could eventually join when the time comes more fruitful in educating American opinion and more fertile in explaining it to Europe than discussions of the straight issue—to be or not to be. It is, in fact, in a reorganization of the League that these two existing continental collectivities of American and European states represented at present by the Monroe Doctrine and the Briand Doctrine will come not into conflict but into co-operation.

Nor does this require any new departure in American policy. The issue as to whether the United States shall or shall not join the League need never be decided in the sense of a decision that will require the advice and consent of the

Senate. America is already quite as much associated with the League as is Europe. The most powerful and in a sense progressive state in America—the United States—is not a full member, but then that is true of Europe in respect of the Union of Soviets. And the League is not, as is generally assumed, a magic circle which you are either inside and safe from evil spirits or outside in utter darkness where the Hosts of Midian prowl and prowl around. It is a series of concentric circles: an inner ring—the Council with an innermost ring of Great Powers, which represents world-diplomacy; and an outer ring—the Assembly which represents already world-democracy; and an outermost ring—the commissions and conferences in which non-members are associated, which represents the co-operation of civilized countries for the common good in certain common activities. No state, not even the Soviet Union, can ignore that outermost ring and isolate itself from it. And it is in that outermost ring, as in the case of a tree, that the real life and growth of the League resides. Relationship to the League is in every case relative. In cases of full membership it is a diplomatic relation with a certain democratic element in respect of the Assembly. In cases of association such as that of the United States and Union of Soviets it

is purely diplomatic. That diplomatic relationship might be and probably will be developed normally and naturally along lines somewhat as above suggested, until Americans are in practice realizing their great responsibilities for peace and progress without ever having had to recognize them in principle. Which is the way we Anglo-Saxons usually do our work in the world.

But that blessed word Anglo-Saxon reminds me that I am running out my time for talking about the United States of Europe without having done justice to its impresario and producer, M. Briand. Whether M. Briand as promoter has done the production more harm than good it is hard to say. He has given it great publicity—that is all to the good. He has put France on the map of Europe—that is even better. For a union of Europe without France would be Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. But nevertheless Hamlet would be a better play if there were rather less Prince of Denmark. And the new government of Europe as he plans it seems to be not so much a "government of Europe by Europe for Europe" as a "government of Europe by France for M. Briand." He has no doubt almost acquired the position of permanent secretary of foreign affairs for France. Like the old British ballad of which the chorus runs, "What-

soever King may reign, I'll be the Vicar of Bray, Sir," we can hear M. Briand crooning to himself:

> This is law I will maintain
> Until my dying day, Sir,
> That whatsoever parties reign
> I'll be at the Quai d'Orsay, Sir.

But there is no record that the Vicar of Bray ever did anything besides hold down his job. And clever as M. Briand is there is no reason to suppose that he can put through the revolutionary reconstruction he proposes. For when Europe finds that the object of his United States of Europe is to promote "security," and when Europe sees that the security aimed at is the old French security based on political alliances and armaments, and when Europe suspects that another security in view is security for M. Briand in office, why Europe is inclined to reply, "I like not the security." And even M. Blum, M. Briand's fellow-countryman, sums up the plan in the *Populaire* thus—that "political union for "security" is the real booty and economic agreements merely the bait." And the imposing façade of M. Briand's federation of Europe with its president, its executive committee, its secretariat, and its annual conference or congress is in fact built up on the foundation of armed alliances that are themselves

based on armaments. He himself claims for his inspiration "the spirit of Locarno." But beneath the imposing façade of arbitration and association erected at Locarno lies the same foundation of armaments and alliances. What an American called the "pentecostal spirit" of the Geneva Assembly of 1924, when Britain, France, and Germany were under progressive and pacifist governments, at the Locarno seances a year later become more like the voice of a spiritualistic medium. And both the British and American peoples, with their inherited political insight and instinct, with their ancient tradition and training in political "production," recognize that the world-appeal of the "Briand plan" is very different from its French *appui*. Signor Mussolini in his blood-and-thunder speech at Florence puts his finger rather brutally on the weak spot when he says that "words are beautiful things, but so are aeroplanes and submarines." For, as a matter of fact, aeroplanes and submarines whether beautiful or not are as much the bed-rock basis of M. Briand's policy as of Signor Mussolini's. And when Mr. Snowden at the Hague last autumn rather bluntly broke with the pro-French proclivities of his predecessors, his policy was acclaimed by all parties in Great Britain for the same reason Sir Austen Chamberlain used

to proclaim that "he loved France as a woman." But such Parisian flirtations of elderly gentlemen can come expensive. And we know that France is not one woman but two. One is, at her best, the Joan of Arc, at her worst the *vivandière* marching behind the regimental band—the daughter, and darling, of the regiment. The other France is the France we cannot so easily love but can more easily respect—the woman who is mistress of the shop in which her husband is only a figurehead, who is mother of her children, who would be a capable and not unkindly matron or mother superior for the hospital that Europe now is. Which France is represented in M. Briand's plan?

That plan is both utopian and utilitarian. In the first respect it is interesting to note that the historic utopian plans for a united Europe are all of French authorship and originate in a similar political conjuncture as at present, in which France is endeavoring to convert a military supremacy of armaments into a political security of armed alliances. This is the origin of the famous plan proposed by Sully and of the no less famous plan of the Abbé St. Pierre. In both these cases we have in fact the same development as in the Briand plan—an international pacifist movement inspired by war-weariness that has been adopted by the

leading military power and adapted to its own national diplomacy.

This does not imply any sinister or even cynical policy. France is perfectly justified in directing this peace movement, if she can, for purposes of her own policy—for a peace by "security." She is even justified in pushing it as a wedge into the Anglo-American association for pursuing a peace by disarmament. But so far as British and Americans are concerned the plan seems to represent a policy that no doubt seeks peace but will not ensue it. And as the British see it, this plan, which subordinates economic co-operation to political combination, which sets up an independent European political institution in competition with the League, and which makes disarmament dependent on diplomatic combinations directed against such peoples as France assumes to be aggressors, is a utopian appeal which deserves a sympathetic response but a utilitarian approach that is from a wrong angle. The angle of approach must be from within the League itself, not by way of setting up a combination of European governments in competition with or in completion of the League. It must be by creating an atmosphere of security that can never exist so long as civilized peoples

continue to arm to the teeth and to concentrate in armed camps.

Now to sum up: The United States of America is a fact—an institution. The United States of Europe is a faith—an ideal. The middle ground on which they can meet, the common center at which they can co-operate, is the League of Nations, which is both a fact and a faith, both an ideal and an institution. By so co-operating they can give executive expression to the faith in progress and to the ideals of peace that inspire both Europeans and Americans. By so co-operating they can give a more effective extension to the existing international institutions on which the future of their national cultures and of their international civilization depends.

II. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Last Monday I spoke about the relationship between a United States and a United Europe and pointed out that it was the relationship between a fact and a faith. Today I have to speak about the relationship between the United States and United Kingdom. And I have to begin by pointing out that these two represent about a hundred and twenty million facts on the one side and about forty million—or four hundred million—facts on the other, according to whether you are speaking about England or the Empire, and that when you have so considerable a number of pretty independent and fairly intelligent facts their relationship will in the first place depend on the faith which is in each of them. If it is a faith in their common Anglo-Saxon race, their common Christian religion, their common civilization and culture, their common law and their common lives, then all will be well with the world. If, on the other hand, it is a faith in self-isolation, in self-sufficiency, in competition, or in conflict, then the civilization of our respective continents will crash down into a waste of war. That is what the relationship of the United States and United Kingdom means to the world.

Now both these two peoples being of a somewhat pugnacious disposition, Providence, with commendable prudence, arranged that there should be three thousand miles of Atlantic between them as a water-cooling apparatus in case of friction. It put a polar ice cap both above and below as a further precaution, in the hope it would keep their heads cool and give some of them cold feet. But, nevertheless, recent issues of the *Chicago Tribune* and of the *Morning Post*, representing the more militant elements in either community, would seem to suggest that these two peoples are in active competition, if not in conflict, for control of the Atlantic, of the North Pole, and of the South Pole. And putting aside the future claims of Washington to "the immense natural resources" of the Antarctic and Arctic as being more especially the concern of Signor Belaunde and Dean Corbett, I shall today confine myself to the Atlantic. It will be a quite sufficiently extensive and stirring subject.

Indeed, about five years ago the Labour party, which I have had the honor of assisting for fifteen years, came to the conclusion that unless the course of the British ship of state was changed, a collision with the American ship of state was only a question of time. We accordingly worked out, after the failure of the Geneva Conference, a program

to be put into effect as soon as Labour again came to office. The first item on our program and one of the most harmonious assets of our party was the fine rendering of "Spirituals" by Mr. MacDonald; and so we created a precedent in the Anglo-American relationship by sending a British premier to talk turkey with an American president on a log by the Rapidan. And the next turn on the program was the great National and Naval Ballad Concert with a ballet of admirals, a full orchestra of experts, and a choir of special correspondents. Frankly, it was not so successful as we'd hoped. It was very long. The orchestra was not always in time, the choir often out of tune, the ballet was better trained in hornpipes than in round dances with their "set to partners, hands across, and down the middle," while there was an unfortunate fracas between the Italian and French prima donna. But, on the whole, it went off all right and the box-office receipts weren't so bad. So now we have the next item. And what that is I shall allow you to guess if you pay great attention. Anyway you will soon see what it is in the newspapers if you and the Labour government live long enough.

We on our side, then, are making a planned and persistent effort to convert the Anglo-American relationship in respect of sea power from a menace

of conflict into a movement for co-operation. And why? Because competition in sea power contains the only menace of war between us, and because co-operation in sea power is the best means both of us have for banishing war from the world. As to the first point, let us look back a little.

Twenty years ago the Bryce Embassy, in which I was head of the chancery, and the Root State Department, in which some of you here were associated, had just started "cleaning the slate" of a long score of old claims, counterclaims, and controversies whose continuance throughout the previous century was in itself evidence that the relations between Washington and Whitehall had so far failed in representing the friendly and almost fraternal feelings of the two peoples. Attempts to settle these disputes had repeatedly failed because there was no real will to agree between the negotiators and no real appreciation of one another between our upper middle class and your upper Middle West (and these two sections embody, as we all recognize, the souls of our respective countries). When sometimes our governments succeeded in effecting a settlement, as, for example, in the Alaska-boundary question, the decision made more ill feeling than the dispute. But in the decade before the war there was altogether a new atmosphere.

Disputes dating from the War of 1812 and from the War of Independence were settled with no more controversy than as to what would be the most appropriate procedure, while the agreements or awards were accepted without question. This, too, in spite of the fact that there were at that time disturbing factors on either side that have now happily disappeared; for example, the Irish and German influences on the American side. On the British side the difficulty was due to imperial responsibility for Dominion interests being then still retained by Whitehall instead of as now being directly represented at Washington.

What, then, was the reason why in spite of this clean political slate, in spite of our comradeship during the war, in spite of co-operation in rebuilding civilization after the war, the United States and United Kingdom were coming into collision over sea power? Just simply because they were approaching the same fundamental issue in their respective national policies from different angles, and because they were adopting in doing so their own rather angular Anglo-Saxon attitudes. The American aspect of sea power being, of course, freedom of the seas; the British aspect, command of the seas.

These two policies are elemental and essential

factors in the genesis and growth of both the British and the American peoples. It is to command of the seas that we British owe our national existence, our colonial empire, and our daily bread. It is to freedom of the seas—a temporary loss of command of the seas by the British—that you owe your national independence, your new economic empire in Europe, and if not your daily bread—if you are foolish enough to want it—your daily drink. And if today a collision on this issue is "unthinkable" it is only because both British and American are as a rule unthinking. For this question of sea power—of the British claim to command of the seas and the American claim to freedom of the seas—has already caused a war between us in the eighteenth century, the War of Independence, and another in the nineteenth century, the War of 1812, and it very nearly caused one in the twentieth century, during the Great War. Indeed, it makes no difference if the two parties change sides and British contend for freedom of the seas while Americans claim command of the seas, as in the Civil War. They are just as ready to fight about it that way.

Which suggests what is in fact the case—that these two policies are merely points of view of the same thing. And this appears clearly when we get

the question into historic perspective. For example, British command of the seas began with a fight for freedom of the seas. But for the British adventurers in the days of the Papal Bull, and but for the defeat of the Spanish Armada, I should be having to speak here today in French or Spanish. While the American fight for freedom of the seas by American navigators of unknown oceans under command of Senator Borah or Congressman Britten will inevitably end in American command of the seas unless something different is soon settled. What that something might be we shall see later, and we shall then realize that so far as policy is concerned there is no real need of armaments on either side.

Now, then, we come to the armaments, to the *pièce de résistance*, the battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, naval bases, tons, guns, yardsticks, and so on. Well, you probably know the history of the principle of parity. How Wilson made freedom of the seas the second of his fourteen points, and how the British cut it out of the peace. How then the Wilson and Harding administrations started construction, and the British couldn't compete. How at the Washington Conference the Americans offered parity in battleships, which the British gladly accepted, and how the Americans

thought they'd got parity in cruisers and found they hadn't. How the Geneva Conference broke up over cruiser parity between British and Americans, and how the London Conference broke down in respect of cruiser parity between French and Italians.

And what folly it all is! You can fight *about* cruisers, but you can't fight *with* them. No doubt if there are no battleships cruisers will be capital ships and can be put in the line. But capital ships are as obsolete as cavalry squadrons, and action in line of battle at sea will soon be as obsolete as the charge of Balaclava. It was your Admiral Sims who said at one of my meetings that it was now strategically out of the question for a naval armament to cross the Atlantic against another armed antagonist.

The fact is that the whole of this issue of sea power and of international relations overseas in peace and war has been revolutionized in our own time. We know that we are living in a revolutionary age. But when we are inside a revolution ourselves as often as not we are so busy commiserating the revolutions of our neighbors that we don't see our own, and this issue of sea power has been—or rather is being—revolutionized in all its three principal issues: in its political, in its legal, and in its naval issues.

The political issue has been revolutionized by parity. For the last two centuries the British have exercised a command of the seas by a sort of tacit mandate. This imperial responsibility has cost them heavily in men and money, but it also has brought in, no doubt, ancillary assets. On the whole its services have, I think, not been overpaid. The graft has not been great and the job has been well done. But the time has now come when this imperial police power has got to be converted into an international police power. And the natural and necessary procedure for this purpose is by parity: Parity first in the offensive and defensive armaments of the two leading naval powers—the United States and the United Kingdom; and thereafter proportionate ratios of parity between secondary powers; and, finally, the reduction of national naval armaments to national naval contingents composing an international sea naval police, to which contingents all powers might contribute if they wished on a basis of parity. There could hardly be a greater revolution than this, or one which would go farther to establish peace on the seas—that is, over the greater portion of this globe. Make and maintain peace and parity at sea and you have gone a long way toward making war impossible on land. But to get the full ad-

vantages of parity abroad you must recognize its full implications at home. We have made an agreement in London to maintain faith, hope, and parity. But also don't forget that parity begins at home—at Washington.

For what is the consequence of parity so far as it concerns British and American relations? Simply that it is forcing them to convert their relationship from one of competition on the seas to one of co-operation for world-peace and police. There is nothing new in that. At the time when the American navy was first established the European seas were still infested with the pest of piracy from the petty North African states. Owing to their own rivalries, European sea powers had suffered these Barbary barbarians to take toll of their commerce, enslave their subjects, and even exact tribute from their governments. It was only a century ago that Americans and Britains combined to end this scandal. A British naval expedition in which my grandfather held a command bombarded Algiers, while an American naval expedition under Admiral Preble bombarded Tunis. And from Washington I took back to England with me two wine decanters that Preble had with him in the "Constitution"—partly by way of redressing the balance of trade in historical relics, and partly so that the health

of Anglo-American naval co-operation might be drunk with an enthusiasm in my country that is at present unattainable in yours owing to political and other inhibitions.

But whether you wish it or not, that co-operation is bound to come now that you have parity. You cannot in this world, no matter what the reason, assert a right without assuming a responsibility, and it is really the responsibility that is worth while, not the right. Nor is the isolation of any country—even of a continent like these United States—any longer possible. The very policy of isolation defeats itself. The Monroe Doctrine, a policy of political isolation, becomes, as we have seen, a policy of intervention. The tariff, a procedure for economic delimitation, becomes an entangling commitment of loans and liabilities. Even purely internal enterprises like prohibition cannot be enforced without international co-operation. The British in Canada have had to assist you with domestic legislation against liquor contraband; the British in the Bahamas have had to allow you to police their coasts; the British in the Empire have had to assist you by modifying for your benefit one of the few established rules of international law—the three-mile limit. And if this is true of internal issues, how much more is it true

of the international issues in which you are annually becoming more commercially, financially, and politically involved.

I know that here in the Middle West there is a sound and sane apprehension of this sort of argument as leading to European entanglements. But the entanglements already exist and are evolving economically and inevitably. You will have as business men and women to deal with them either internationally or imperially. And I ask you as business men and women to answer me frankly whether British experience in Egypt, Persia, India, and China, whether your own experience in Cuba, Central America, and the Philippines, does not prove that the imperial competition method involves more political and military commitments than ever could the international co-operation method.

Now for the next revolution on our list. The legal revolution is no less radical. Hitherto, international law has been divided into two volumes: one the law of peace; the other, a great deal fatter —the law of war. Theoretically now, we ought to put Volume II, on war, into the wastepaper basket. Because if the Covenant, as it will shortly be amended, and the Peace Pact, as recently agreed, have any meaning at all, it is that the legal status

of warfare is abolished, that war is outlawed. A state of war we know cannot be altogether prevented by a "scrap of paper." But its status can be changed by such contracts as we have concluded. And the consequence of that is that the status of belligerency and of neutrality on which are based all these issues of freedom and command of the seas also disappears. In a future general state of war there will not be statuses of belligerents fighting one another and neutrals trading with them under special legal conditions. There will be one or more outlawed states breaking the peace and the rest boycotting or blockading them into keeping it again. And this raises the question whether in case the United Kingdom under its new obligations to the Covenant and Peace Pact exercises its old responsibility for keeping the peace by enforcing such an international boycott, the United States will frustrate that effort by asserting its old right as a neutral of supplying the outlaws with men, money, or munitions.

I know there are constitutional difficulties in any declaration as to an American renunciation of their neutral rights in regard to such a public blockade, in return for a renunciation by the British of their old belligerent right of declaring a private blockade. But my own country has difficulties quite as

great, even greater, in respect to constitutional obstruction representing conservative opinion. Everyone knows about the peculiar position assumed by the Senate. Few people know about the peculiar power acquired of recent years by the Committee of Imperial Defence. Their power is even greater for obstructing this sort of pacific proposition than that of the Senate. For the Senate can be called to account by public opinion. The Committee cannot. Nevertheless, we can deal with our difficulties, and so can you with yours. It would be impertinence for us to show you how.

There remains in this connection the next step that we shall have to take together, and that is a revision of sea law for the establishment of freedom of the seas under international control on the basis of Wilson's second point—"Freedom of the Seas for commerce in peace and in war except in so far as it may be restricted by international covenants" —covenants such as those of the League and of Washington. In realizing the necessity for such radical reconstruction your international lawyers are more enlightened than ours; your government is less hampered than ours by parties in obstruction and public opinion. You have now an opportunity of realizing this traditional principle of your national policy. That opportunity will not be per-

manently open. It is up to you to give a lead for an international conference with this purpose like the lead you gave in 1922 in respect of naval disarmament.

We turn now to the third and last revolution—that in naval warfare itself—which is the most complete of any. Just as now mathematicians, thanks to Einstein, have to learn to work in four dimensions instead of three, so marine strategists, thanks to submarine and aeroplane, have to work in three instead of two. Instead of their problems being all on a plane surface of the sea, they are now mainly under water or overhead. The admirals, being chips off the old block, especially in respect of their heads, can't do it. But the younger sailors can and do. They know we can no longer blockade with a cordon of warships. If you tried it the goods would simply go round by land or air, and as soon as the sun went down your warships would go down too. Future blockades will be enforced by mine, submarine, and aeroplane; and they will be executed by control of all commerce at source in the farms and factories as was done at the end of the Great War. Moreover, such a control of world-production and transport can only be carried out by international agreement between all the principal nations for the purpose of main-

taining or imposing peace. The new warfare has killed the old private-war blockade, with all its concomitants of contraband and right of search, and has substituted the new public-peace blockade. It has killed the battleship and crippled the cruiser, and all this squabbling over cruisers is a battle of Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee. You remember how

Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee agreed to have a battle
'Cos Tweedle-dum said Tweedle-dee had spoiled his nice new rattle.

And for rattle we can read "ratio." And then you remember:

But then came down a monstrous crow as big as a tar barrel
That frightened both the heroes so they quite forgot their quarrel.

And I can tell you that the hero I represent is already pretty thoroughly frightened. If you, like me, had known your children were spending their nights in the cellar every dark of the moon in a probably vain effort to escape aeroplane and Zeppelin bombs, or if you knew, as I do, that now one such aeroplane bomb can destroy all life in Central London and that it can't be stopped from doing so, why you wouldn't be worrying about whether cruisers had six-inch or eight-inch guns. The channel that used to be as Shakespeare said "a moat

defensive to our house" is just about as much use as a moat would be. The Atlantic is still of some use, but it is only a matter of years, almost of months, before it becomes as useless. What are we going to do about it? What are you going to do about it? It is up to us people of this war generation. Once we who went through the war are all dead the opportunity will have passed. The romance of war will have reasserted itself. The new chivalry of the air, the new desperate adventure of the submarine, will capture the imaginations of the young. Even here in Chicago, the city most remote from menace of war in a continent the most remote from menace of war as I speak, there is a military entertainment going on of considerable educational import. But whether the representation of the bombing of a village will be educational as it ought to be—or as it is intended to be—is a question. We have the same sort of thing in England though we fight against it. At Aldershot in my country they no longer bomb a German village as they did at first, or an Arab village as they did later. They now bomb a representation of the capital of an outlawed nation that has defied the League of Nations, which though it is intended as a concession to us Progressives is really the worst of all.

Now in conclusion let us return to the relationship between the British and American peoples. I have argued and you will, I think, most of you agree that the future peace of the world depends on their co-operation in the political and economic reconstruction of civilization, and that the American contribution will be made in due course, if not by political evolution then by economic pressure. And you will also agree that this reconstruction must begin by disarmament and first of all by naval disarmament and internationalization of the seas. Finally, and to return to what I first said: Our progress toward peace depends on whether our two peoples, who are the most powerful in the world and also both the most pacific and the most pugnacious, whether they act from their pacific or from their pugnacious point of view.

In that last respect we can all make a contribution. Policy we must leave to our governments. But public opinion depends on the personal point of view taken by each one of us in these problems. Let me illustrate what I mean by "point of view." At a recent meeting I was put this question by one of the audience—needless to say, a man. It was, "How much more steel can the British shipyards turn out per week in case of war than can the American?" And the only reply I could give him

was to ask him first to answer a question from me as to

> "How much wood would a wood chuck chuck,
> If a wood chuck would chuck wood?

Because if we approach disarmament problems from that point of view there is no answer to them and we had much better not attempt to solve them. We shall only quarrel over them.

On the other hand, if we really seek peace we can answer it by looking at foreign peoples and foreign problems from a peace point of view. We Britishers must learn to look on America not as a money-greedy Uncle Sam whose self-satisfaction and self-isolation menace the international system. You Americans must learn not to look on us British as a bloated but bankrupt John Bull, whose diplomatic intrigues menace their material peace and prosperity. Above all, let us not visualize each other as beasts or birds of prey—a British lion or an American eagle. We really have outgrown those barbarous tribal totems. I wish that all that menagerie of lions and bears and eagles had drowned in the deluge of which we are the survivors instead of being saved as they have been by our naval Noahs in their archaic arks.

Let us rather remember that the world is not made up of Britishers and Boches and Bolshies and

Hunkies and Wops and Dagos but of men and women like ourselves who like what we like and who want what we want. And one thing that we all want alike is peace. Therefore, let us Americans and British not look too much at the waste of waters in which we have all nearly been overwhelmed or to the naval ark from which we are escaping, but rather lift up our eyes to the hills from whence cometh our help and look for a Bow in the Clouds—a new Covenant of Peace.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

By Victor Andres Belaunde

I. THE RECOGNITION OF REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENTS

I deeply appreciate the honor conferred upon me by the invitation of the Norman Wait Harris Foundation to lecture in this year's session. I consider this invitation and the subjects of discussion as proof of the fact that you are going to keep the tradition established in past years regarding Latin-American questions.

The main problems in Spanish America today are consolidation of political institutions and international peace. In both, the influence of the United States could be decisive. The United States has the powerful weapon of non-recognition to use in the event of the establishment in a Latin-American country of a new government by a coup d'état or an unjustified revolution. Furthering of international peace can be greatly helped by the United States in fostering arbitration and conciliation, continuing the important progress already made in the Havana and Washington conferences.

The policy of non-recognition must take into consideration two factors: first, the increasing influence of the United States in world-affairs; second, the frequency of revolutions in Latin America.

Interestingly enough, the necessity of recognition of new governments has not arisen very frequently since the United States assumed the economic leadership of the world. In earlier periods, when Latin-American revolutions were more frequent, the United States did not have its present great influence; today, with more effective prestige, there is less opportunity for its exercise.

Many persons believe that the present political situation in Latin America will not give many opportunities to apply this policy and that there will be even less in the future. I frankly do not share in the optimistic point of view that considers that revolutions in South America are past. Political evolution in South America has been paradoxical. After a period of anarchy that varied in length in the different countries, political consolidation took place through the effort of an intelligent oligarchy, frequently dominated by a very strong leader. Respect for individual liberties and the establishment of a constitutional government in South America were not the results of a general democratic state of mind but rather the work of an honest and unified leading class. In recent years, however, an evolution has taken place; the center of political gravity has been shifting from this intelligent oligarchy to the middle class. This

latter group unhappily is not economically independent, and it retains its old bureaucratic character. As a result, the régime arising from the triumph of the middle class in elections has not consolidated the achievements of the old ruling group, but has produced a government having the one-man rule as its distinctive feature. We are in the epoch of bureaucratic Caesarism.

Those who have greeted the rise of Alexandri in Chile, Yregoyen in Argentine, and Leguia in Peru as the latest step toward democracy and constitutionalism have not realized that those countries which apparently have enjoyed for decades a constitutional régime, under middle-class and bureaucratic control, are in reality going back to a dictatorship perhaps worse in certain respects than the earlier personal régimes. Of course, there is considerable difference in the situation of the various countries, such as Chile, Argentine, and Peru, so far as the proportion of an independent class is concerned. But all have in common a disregard for constitutional formulas and individual liberties, creating a political problem for which there may be no other solution than revolution.

After the long rule of Diaz in Mexico, everyone forecast a period of anarchy. The personal régimes in South American countries such as those in

Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile cannot be everlasting. Just this morning I read of a revolution in Bolivia, and the news was not surprising. With a political change in some South American governments more or less imminent, the whole question of recognition becomes a vital one both for Latin America and for the United States.

The policy of the United States regarding revolutionary governments in Latin America has not been consistent. Jefferson laid down a doctrine entirely in agreement with the conception of sovereignty when he said, "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any Government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared. . . . . The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded." The Jefferson doctrine was susceptible of interpretation, leaving the problem of a criterion from which to know the will of the nation.

Van Buren adopted a realistic standpoint in the application of the Jefferson doctrine when he said, on June 9, 1829, "So far as we are concerned, the Government *de facto* is equally so *de jure*." Livingston, some years later, on April 30, 1833, expressed with equal emphasis the same presumption that the government *de facto* was the legal government, "by its establishment in the actual exercise

of political power, [the government] may be supposed to have received the expressed or implied assent of the people." Logically it was presumed that once established, investigation of the legality of the government was impertinent.

Buchanan on March 31, 1848, synthesizes the policy inspired by this realistic principle adopted by the United States, "In its intercourse with foreign nations, the government of the United States has, from its origin, always recognized *de facto* governments. . . . . We do not go behind the existing government to involve ourselves in the question of legitimacy."

President Pierce in his message of May 15, 1856, reiterated this policy in a most clear and emphatic way.

> We do not go behind the fact of a foreign Government, exercising actual power, to investigate the question of legitimacy; we do not inquire into the causes which lead to a change of government. To us it is indifferent whether a successful revolution has been aided by foreign intervention or not; whether insurrection has overthrown an existing Government and another has been established in its place, according to pre-existing form; or in a manner adopted for the occasion by those whom we may find in the actual possession of power. . . . . All these matters we leave to the people and public authorities of the particular country, to determine; and their determination, whether it be by positive action or by ascertained acquiescence, is to us sufficient warrant of the legitimacy of the new Government.

It is possible to say that in the application of the *de facto* principle in the government there were two stages, one in which the presumption in behalf of the régime that has the actual control of the administration was simply the presumption *juris*, and the second stage in which this presumption was converted to *juris* and *de jure*, accepting without question the legitimacy of any new government, provided it be in actual possession of power.

This realistic policy claimed to have two foundations: one regarding the facts, another regarding the principles. The only possible criterion to be applied in the matter of recognition of a new government was the positivistic one. The only tangible, and unquestionable, thing regarding a new government was the control of the governmental machine. Other questions were matters of appreciation or judgment, subject to different opinions and standpoints. The juridical foundation of this policy could be enunciated in this way. Any inquiry or investigation about the origin, legitimacy, and process of the new government will imply an unjust interference in the internal politics of the country involved. The best way to respect the sovereignty of a country will be to pass no judgment about her new government. It is preferable to accept the recognition of an illegitimate govern-

ment than to give to other powers the right to decide when a government really represents the will of a determined nation.

Secretary Seward's policy represented a reaction against the extremist expression of the *de facto* theory. Instead of the readiness to accept as definite any change in government, Secretary Seward emphasized the necessity of a delay in the recognition in order to learn the extent and importance of the facts and conditions of the new government. Furthermore, after this delay recognition could only be accorded in case of the solemn and legal approval of the new government by the nation. What were the causes of the radical change of the policy of the United States? Of course there was a natural reaction from the extremist point of view taken by President Pierce, who was ready to recognize governments that were aided by foreign intervention. But the main purpose was stated by Seward himself when he said that his policy was intended

> to discourage that spirit [of revolution] so far as it can be done, by standing entirely aloof from such domestic controversies until in each case the State immediately concerned shall unmistakably prove that the Government which claims to represent it is fully accepted and peacefully maintained by the people thereof.

The same idea was asserted by Seward again in 1868, in the case of Peru:

> The policy of the United States is settled upon the principle that revolutions in republican States ought not to be accepted until the people have adopted them by organic law, with the solemnities which would seem sufficient to guarantee their stability and permanency. This is the result of reflection upon national trials of our own.

The last sentence of this quotation reveals that the Seward policy took into consideration not only the conditions in South America, but also the conditions in the United States. The *de facto* principle could be applied not only to the government that has the control of the entire territory, but also to the government established in a part of this territory. From the realistic standpoint the delay in the recognition for a reasonable period cannot be objected to. Precisely to fulfil the purpose of basing on the well-established facts the policy of recognition, this delay seems entirely necessary. Difficulties, however, arise about the "legal and solemn" approval. Consideration of such matters may convert a foreign government into a judge of any new régime.

Some years later, during the Hayes administration, the opportunity was presented of recognizing revolutionary governments in Mexico and in Ven-

ezuela. President Hayes and Secretary Evarts on those occasions paid attention not only to the control of the governmental machine, but also to a new element: the fulfilment of international obligations. The government of the United States was insistent in obtaining certain guaranties from these revolutionary governments of South America regarding the payment of debts and respect for foreign rights. The "solemn and legal" approval by the people which had been the main point of Secretary Seward was abandoned, and this new criterion about international obligations took its place, proving that the policy of recognition was bound to change according to the necessities of the historical moment. It is worth while to know the terms in which Secretary Evarts, in the case of Guzman Blanco, expressed this new point of view (April 8, 1879):

> Good faith in the observance of international obligations is the first essential toward the maintenance of such relations. At present there is no indication that any change for the better has taken place, either as regards the payment of the indemnity instalments, now for several months in default, or the security of the rights of the citizens of the United States sojourning in Venezuela.

This policy was followed also by Hay in the case of Santo Domingo in 1899. Many people were in-

clined to believe that the abandonment by the United States of the old realistic theory and the adoption of a new one emphasizing juridical conditions was due to the fact that the policy of recognition was applied chiefly to the unstable and weak nations of Latin America, while the old theory was applied chiefly to the nations of Europe. There is a great deal of truth in this consideration. Revolutionary changes which take place in a great nation, whether or not backed by the people, create a situation that is generally regarded with acquiescence or respect by other countries. It is difficult to apply or even to invoke the old constitutional standards of legitimacy in situations that are going to determine important changes in history. We cannot neglect this consideration; the juridical requirements have been emphasized chiefly in dealing with small nations, victims of constant anarchy and instability.

In the early period of confusion and perpetual intervention in Latin America new governments were recognized according to sympathies and political bonds with the party in power. When we passed through this period and reached the stage of normal international coexistence, the *de facto* theory was generally followed. Some people adopted the Seward position of discouraging the habit

of revolution by denying recognition to the government established against the constitution. This point of view was expressed in the so-called Tobar Doctrine, formulated by the minister of foreign affairs of Ecuador, Dr. Carlos Tobar, in his note to the Consul of Bolivia in Brussels on May 15, 1907, according to which the prestige of our continent demanded the non-recognition of *de facto* governments sprung from revolution against the constitution. The idea of Dr. Tobar was to establish a bond of solidarity in the defense of the constitutional régime in Latin America. It was not intended to make revolutions impossible as a defense of the people against abuses of the government, but to discourage the attitude of the military and political leaders in taking possession of the governmental machine by unlawful means. The doctrine emphasized the difference between the popular revolution and the coup d'état, a differentiation that certainly is of great importance in South America in which real popular revolutions have been very few and coups d'état very frequent. I am inclined to consider the Tobar Doctrine with sympathy, believing that solidarity for the maintenance of our independence ought to be completed by solidarity in the maintenance of democratic institutions. Evidently this solidarity was in the in-

tellectual atmosphere of America, and was considered not only as an idealistic purpose, but also as a useful and practical one. The application of a doctrine like this had particular importance in the Central American republics in which revolutions, coups d'état, and wars of interventions were frequent. When the United States and Mexico mediated in the Central American crisis of 1907 and invited these nations to the Washington Conference, the Tobar Doctrine received practical consecration. In the treaties of 1907, signed as a result of this Conference, we read this provision.

> The governments of the High Contracting Parties shall not recognize any other government which may come into power in any of the five republics as a consequence of a coup d'état, or of a revolution against the recognized government, so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the country.

Unhappily this provision was not complemented by others regarding the procedure for a collective action. Another defect of the treaties of 1907 was the lack of a connection between the policy established in Central America and the future policy of the United States, although it was assumed that the government of the United States would adopt the attitude of the Central American countries regarding any political changes in Central America.

As the United States was not a party to the treaty, the policy adopted by the Central American nations did not bind the American government. The treaties of 1907 also established an international court of justice, destroyed later by the policy of Taft and Wilson regarding Nicaragua.

The Wilson administration faced the difficult situation created by the anarchy in Mexico after the overthrow of the Diaz régime. President Wilson added a new element in the policy of recognition, based entirely on moral principles. The régime of General Huerta, responsible according to public opinion for the murders of President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suarez, was not recognized. President Wilson did not bind himself to this non-recognition policy; he decided to co-operate in the creation of a new situation in Mexico, sending a personal representative who proposed to General Huerta the following conditions: a general armistice among the different parties, guaranties for a new free election, withdrawal of the candidacy of General Huerta, and the agreement of the parties to abide by the result of the election and to co-operate with and support the new administration. Although President Wilson claimed that his policy did not have the character of intervention against the sovereignty of that country, it is un-

deniable that the proposals referred to were an undue interference in the internal affairs of Mexico. Although highly inspiring in moral and generous purpose, the policy of President Wilson, I think, with all due respect could not be defended in the juridical field. The same moral criterion was applied to the non-recognition of the Tinoco régime in Central America. In Mexico and Costa Rica the Wilson policy of non-recognition was successful. The régimes not recognized were overthrown. The new Mexican government presided over by General Carranza came into conflict with the United States in the difficult period of the Great War. This story is recent and present in the minds of many Americans. The only thing to which I wish to call attention is the attempt at collective action with some South American countries in order to solve the problem of the recognition of a new government and the difficulties it presented. The first mediation, in the conference in Niagara Falls, failed entirely. The causes were various and complex, but one of them was surely the lack of authority of the ABC powers to represent the whole continent. The discrimination for collective action in South America between powerful and weak nations is always badly received by the public opinion of the continent. The second attempt

at collective mediation in which two small powers were represented was more successful, and through this mediation the difficulties were removed and the Carranza government was recognized.

In the case of the Leguia régime in Peru, President Wilson departed from his policy of non-recognition probably with the purpose of not depriving Peru of the continuity of her international representation at the moment when the League of Nations was holding its first meeting, and when the hopes of the Peruvian people were focused on the solution through the League of the great problem of the Tacna Arica nationality.

The revolution against Carranza in Mexico and the establishment of the Obregon régime gave an opportunity to the secretary of state of the new administration, Mr. Hughes, to apply the policy of non-recognition. Once more the different circumstances and economic purposes of the moment added new elements to the policy of the United States regarding the recognition of revolutionary governments. The new constitution of Mexico, because of Article 27, created a very important problem for the American interests in Mexico. Besides that, during the revolution the payment of the Mexican debt was suspended. The policy

of Hughes, going beyond the principles established in the Hayes administration, was inspired by the purpose of demanding from Mexico as condition of recognition guaranties regarding the right of American citizens and the payment of the American debt. President Obregon, with the support of the public opinion of the Mexican people and of the Latin-American countries, refused to sign the treaty demanded by Secretary Hughes, and for some years the recognition was delayed. The South American countries did not follow the policy of Hughes. They recognized the Obregon régime and sent special ambassadors to the celebration of the centenary of Mexican independence in 1821, but European powers delayed recognition, inspired probably by the purpose of harmonizing their policy with that of the United States. In an article published in *Current History*, I had the opportunity of expressing my opinion regarding the policy of Secretary Hughes, which I consider an attempt to interfere in the legislation and administration of Mexico. I pointed out, also, the contrast between the non-recognition of the Obregon régime, though it was recognized by the rest of the governments of America and strongly backed by the Mexican people, and the hasty recognition of the Orellanna régime in Guatemala,

which to many people seemed entirely favorable to the American interests. The answer to this criticism which came from Washington was not convincing. It is not necessary to insist on this point since happily the difficulties between Mexico and the United States are now settled.

In dealing with Central America the policy of Secretary Hughes revived the project of a conference in Washington, to renew the international status, created by the treaties of 1907, but practically destroyed by the policy of the United States during the Taft and Wilson administrations. The conference met under the auspices of the government of the United States and without the cooperation of the South American nations. The Central American treaties of 1922 regarding the problem that concerns us adopted the juridical standpoint of the treaties of 1907, repeating the same principle of the non-recognition of governments established by a coup d'état and not approved by the people. Going farther, the new treaties said that even in the case of this approval the governments of Central America obliged themselves not to give recognition if the persons elected as president or vice-president were, in any of the following classes: chief of the revolution, his secretary, his relative, or a military commander during

the coup d'état. A Central American writer, Mr. Moreno, said, "Intentionally or not this provision made intangible the government of Nicaragua." The provisions of the treaty of Washington were not well received by the opinion of the serious-minded and responsible people in Central America. We have the proof of that in the report of the faculty of law of Salvador which insisted on the well-known difference between a coup d'état and a revolution.

Making a résumé of this historical presentation, it is possible to say that through a historical process and without any conscious purpose the different policies of the United States regarding recognition had resulted in the completion of a theory that paid attention to these three elements in the solution of this problem: first, the control of the governmental machine; second, the legal approval of the nation; and third, the fulfilment of international obligations. The first element is recognized by all and is less difficult to ascertain. The second element enunciated by Seward has received acquiescence in certain intellectual quarters in South America and international consecration in the Central American treaties of 1907 and 1922. The third one is founded on the fact that a community of nations really exists and a new member should

not be accepted without the proof or the presumption that it is going to fulfil the obligations that this community implies. Secretary Colby in his note to Baron Avezzano, August 10, 1920, combined the last two elements in the case of Russia, synthesizing the Seward and Hayes doctrines, when he said that the Russian government did not represent the will of the Russian people, but the rule of the minority, and, second, that the Russian government was the negation of any principle of honor and good faith which are the bases of international relations. Of course I am not going to deal with the justice in the application of this doctrine to the particular case of Russia. I merely emphasize, from the theoretical point of view, the culmination in the Colby note of the historical process about the two juridical elements or requirements that could be taken into consideration in the recognition of the governments, besides the control of the governmental machine.

The new theory is not objectionable in principle, but demands an international situation of co-operation and organization which does not exist at the present moment in the world. In the present stage of international evolution in which nations, especially in this continent, are isolated, with only inorganic co-operation and without a system of

rules and institutions to define and enforce them, the unilateral application of the new theory presents serious objections and inconveniencies. Who is going to be the judge about the constitutional character of a new government or about the fulfulment of its international obligations? A country could be misled by wrong information or by her own interests. This inconvenience does not exist in the case of collective action, which certainly has more guaranty of accuracy regarding the facts and impartiality regarding the moral or juridical qualifications. I am dealing with the Latin-American nations. Our international situation is still one of isolation. The pan-American conferences have recommended some important resolutions and initiated treaties in different matters; but there is not a permanent organ of international co-ordination. The Pan-American Union has been deprived, and curiously by the initiative and support of the South American countries, of any political function. In this situation the juridical theory, except in the cases of the Central American treaties, is going to be applied unilaterally, and we have the risk that it will be used as a justification of selfish purposes. Put in the dilemma between the old theory and the new one, under the present conditions, I would not hesitate in choosing the former and rejecting

the latter. There is a strict correspondence between the realistic criterion which involves respect for absolute sovereignty and the situation of a simple international coexistence without an organic co-operation. If some day, putting aside the obsolete conception of absolute sovereignty of the states, we are going to build an international structure corresponding to the modern ideals and exigencies, the proper time will arrive for the application of the new doctrine. When a real international society exists it will be proper to demand of its members, forming one family, the same standards of constitutional government and of international responsibility.

II. THE HAVANA AND WASHINGTON CONFERENCES

National unity is the orientation of United States history. Nationalistic differentiation is the characteristic of Hispanic America. We were not destined to be the states of one nation, but nations of an international system. Our great ideal (not only a romantic dream but a practical necessity) was to find the formulas first for *convivencia*, that is, coexistence; then for economic and cultural co-operation; finally for the formation of a permanent international organism. While you have achieved your ideal of national unity during the nineteenth century, we have hardly passed through the first stage of our evolution. We are still far away from the ideal of international organization formulated by Bolivar.

The nationalistic differentiation of South America implied an absolute respect for every sovereignty. It was necessary to leave to every country the settling of its own questions, and to establish its government in accordance with its national traditions and necessities. But as a natural result of the War of Independence, the co-operation of the different nations, and the meeting of the two main

currents in the Peruvian territory, we have had, since the beginning, interference of the leading nations in the lives of the others. Our early difficulties were due to this interference. Our first wars were practically wars of intervention. That explains perhaps why the word has always had a disagreeable sound in Latin-American history. Colombia exercised practically a hegemony in South America at the end of the revolution. The program of the early leaders, chiefly Bolivar, was to form an international society, based on the principle of equality. The liberator laid the immortal bases of permanent union of the Hispanic-American countries in his letters, in the invitation to the Congress of Panama, and in the confidential memorandum that he wrote for this assembly. The scheme of this union or amphictyonic league was unhappily abandoned and there was substituted another project, confined only to five nations and permitting more efficiency and coherence. For the old amphictyonic league was substituted a federal state to be called The Federation of the Andes. The differences between the amphictyonic league and the Federation of the Andes were great not only because of the number of nations involved, but also because of the character of the union. While the amphictyony was only an international society, implying at most

a permanent alliance, the Federation of the Andes was a new national unity. The carrying-out of the scheme of the Federation of the Andes implied the interference of the leading states in the life of the others and the permanency of the Colombian army in Peru and Bolivia. The Federation of the Andes was impossible from an internal point of view because of the strong nationalistic feeling in every state, and from an external point of view because it was going to raise suspicions and rivalries on the part of the nations outside. The Colombian troops revolted in Peru when Bolivar left this country. The attempt to create this Federation left terrible consequences. Mistrust and rivalry between the Peruvians and Colombians resulted in the War of 1829.

When Santa Cruz, president of the Peruvian Council under Bolivar, afterward president of Bolivia, tried to revive the ideal of the liberator establishing the federation of Peru and Bolivia, dividing Peru into two states, a new series of wars took place in South America. Co-operation between the Peruvian nationalists and the Chilean government resulted in the invasion of Peru by the Chilean army and the defeat of the Santa Cruz scheme. In the third decade we have another instance of war of intervention for political reasons.

Since the beginning there was a rivalry in the Río de la Plata between Argentina and Brazil regarding the eastern bank of the La Plata River, called the Oriental Province. This rivalry was settled through the constitution of a buffer state, which is now Uruguay. The Argentine dictator, Rosas, tried to extend his influence to Uruguay, supporting General Oribe. The liberal element in Uruguay and Argentina resisted in Montevideo. The intervention of Rosas resulted in the intervention of the European powers. The outstanding fact in the history of South America in the middle of the nineteenth century is the Paraguay war, which was also the result of political intervention. The ruler of Paraguay, resenting the constitution in Uruguay of a government backed by Brazilian influence, decided to fight against it, and with this purpose crossed Argentinian territory. The Triple Alliance was formed, partly for the purpose of changing the government of the Paraguayan nation. The wars of intervention are still carried out in Central America, giving occasion to the attitude of the United States and Mexico in 1907 and resulting in the treaties of Washington. Regarding South America, the period of wars of intervention has passed. It is possible to say that we have achieved definitely in our evolution the first stage:

the affirmation of mutual respect in our internal development. In the second half of the nineteenth century we have been living in harmony, or at least in peace—the democratic Colombia and the autocratic Venezuela, the Argentine conservatives or simple progressives and the radical Uruguayans. Even the international disputes between Chile and Peru have not resulted in a frank and direct interference of one of these nations in the internal politics of the others.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the vital issue was territorial. Countries were absorbed by boundary questions. Of course arbitration was the natural solution for these questions in case of the failure of amicable agreements. The rule has been the application of arbitration when there was not great difference of power and influence between the nations involved. In other cases agreements were signed through the influence of the most powerful nation. Brazil has settled by arbitration the boundaries with the Guianas, owned by European powers, and the boundaries of Misiones with Argentina, but she practically imposed her solution on the weak nations, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, continuing the advance of Portugal in the Amazonian region. The boundary questions between Colom-

bia and Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador, Colombia and Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras, Chile and Argentina, and Bolivia and Peru were submitted to arbitration. In some cases the award was modified to face the protest of the defeated country.

The great problem of South American diplomatic history in the second half of the nineteenth century was not a territorial or boundary dispute, but rather the result of a conflict determined by economic causes. The nitrate fields of Tarapaca and Atacama belonging to Peru and Bolivia were conquered by the Chilean army. The United States decided to offer mediation and to back it with the proposal of a general conference for the consolidation of peace and international co-operation. The old idea of Bolivar and the Congress of Lima was revived in 1881 by Secretary Blaine. The project failed this time; the conference was put aside by the successor of Blaine. Some writers, such as Ambassador Ferrara in his book *El panamericanismo y la opinion europea* are inclined to believe that in the abandonment of this policy there were some more important causes than the difference of point of view of the secretaries of state who dealt with it. The phrase of Blaine regarding the new attitude of the United States,

"voluntary humiliation," is a matter of speculation. What was the decisive cause of the abandonment of the conference? Fear of the opposition of the European powers, personal influence of the Chilean representative, or the selfish desire to get rid of the worries and responsibilities of an efficient and active mediation? Probably all of these causes combined in the result.

Eight years afterward Blaine was again secretary of state; the First Pan-American Conference was summoned. The living issue at this time was the settlement of the questions derived from the war, and, I may say, of the unjust and cruel peace with Peru and the inconvenient truce with Bolivia. Many South American countries believed that arbitration was the best solution for the past problems. The United States was interested in the formation of an American *Zollverein*, an economic understanding. Mr. Blaine was thinking, probably, at this time as M. Briand thinks now regarding the United States of Europe. The economic scheme of Blaine coincided with the idealistic aspirations of the Spanish-Americans. All the countries proclaimed compulsory arbitration and condemned the principle of conquest except Chile. This theoretical pronouncement ought to be considered as one of the precedents of the movement toward

the outlawry of the war. The recommendations of the First Pan-American Conference have not had practical consequences.

Eleven years afterward the Second Pan-American Conference met in Mexico. Some important changes took place in America: increasing rivalry between Argentina and Chile, intense protest of Peru about Tacna Arica nationality, pursuance on the part of Brazil of a very well-defined policy in the Amazonian region. In Europe there was approaching the climax of the imperialistic policies. In the Hague Conference arbitration was defeated by the German opposition, laying stress on the classic exceptions—honor, vital interest, and territorial sovereignty. The United States became a world-power through the Paris Treaty of 1898 and obtained recognition of her paramount interests in the isthmian highway and in the Caribbean region by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. The atmosphere of the Second Pan-American Conference was by no means favorable to idealistic schemes. The countries were divided in the main issue. Small nations in South America with the backing of Argentina were favorable to the idea of compulsory arbitration, but Mexico, the United States, and Brazil accepted only the so-called voluntary arbitration of the Hague Convention of 1899.

The movement toward arbitration did not advance in the Third Pan-American Conference that took place in the year 1906. The opinion prevailed to leave the questions to the world-conference of the following year. The conference at Rio had a certain importance because of the partial acceptance of the Drago Doctrine and the visit of Secretary Root who made eloquent pronouncements regarding equality, sovereignty, and co-operation in the pan-American policy.

The Fourth Pan-American Conference at Buenos Aires in 1910 abandoned definitely vital issues dealing only with secondary questions. Public opinion in South America was general at this time about the failure of the Pan-American Conference in building up an efficient international system. This opinion was expressed in papers and even in the speeches in the parliaments. Some critics considered these conferences only as agreeable but useless social gatherings. The policy of "balance of power," rivalry, and affirmation of nationalism prevailed in Europe, making impossible through her influence and example the revival of any idealistic program. The United States was developing in the continent a policy that its critics deemed to be similar to the European policy. The Great War brought ruin to Europe and to the world. Its

terrific lessons revived humanitarian and idealistic tendencies. Many countries of Latin America faithful to the arbitration tradition—Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, and Cuba—regained hope in the final triumph of the new international principles.

That explains the enthusiasm aroused by the ideas of President Wilson and the almost unanimous joining of the League of Nations and the World Court. After the failure of arbitration in the land in which the ideal sprang up we felt compensated, thinking that the old materialistic Europe was converted to the ideals of Bolivar and the tradition of Panama. In extending to the world these ideals we believed that the United States and Latin America were going to take a leading position. Disappointment came soon. The United States did not join the League; few hopes were entertained that she would join the World Court. The Latin-American countries were bound to belong to two international systems: to the European by economic and cultural ties, and to the American system by geographic and economic factors and historical traditions. Their rôle in the League might be handicapped by the fact that the pan-American system might work apart from the League if not in opposition to it.

The pan-American conferences were abandoned

during the war and in the immediate period after peace, for obvious reasons. After the presidential elections of 1920, the question of the participation of the United States in the League was definitely settled. The idea appeared over the revival of the pan-American movement; the Fifth Pan-American Conference was summoned in Santiago for the year 1923. The submission one year before to the arbitration of the United States of the Peruvian and Chilean question, the main issue in South America diplomacy, seemed to create a favorable atmosphere for the Conference. In spite of this, Peru and Bolivia declined the invitation. Mexico, in conflict with the United States on the question of the conditions of recognition, was also absent. With this handicap the Santiago conference started. It was not possible to continue the secondary and colorless character of pan-American meetings. It was necessary to make an attempt to give to the pan-American movement vitality and efficiency in face of the increasing success of the League of Nations. Dr. Brum, delegate of Uruguay, proposed the constitution of an American League of Nations and the continentalization of the Monroe Doctrine. This proposal was flatly rejected by the American delegation. Mr. Gondra presented his project of a treaty establishing com-

missions of investigation in any conflict, and the suspension of any hostilities during the procedure of such commissions. In spite of the importance of the so-called Gondra Treaty, the upholders of arbitration and international justice in America were again disappointed with the results of the Conference. The contrast was striking between the timid work of the Santiago conference and the projects that were going on in Europe, such as the Geneva Protocol, and, when it failed, the Locarno treaties.

The difficulties in the adhesion of the United States to the World Court gave the impression in Spanish America that through the influence of the nationalistic element the United States was bound to remain entirely aside in the movement toward international justice and co-operation. Many South Americans believed that the best policy was to remain in the League and to offer our constant co-operation, breaking definitely the continental solidarity and accentuating the position of the Iberian group in the world-council and assemblies. But even this policy was not possible because of the abstention or withdrawal from the League of Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Honduras, Costa Rica, and finally Brazil. The sad reality was that neither within the League nor

through the inefficient pan-American movement could we attain the goal of international solidarity and justice.

Besides that, we were witnessing during this epoch the revival of the Caribbean policy, initiated in 1912, through the intervention in Nicaragua. I am inclined to believe that the government of the United States did not realize that this policy was going to arouse a tremendous movement of public opinion through Latin America. In this situation which I have described—disappointment for the failure of the pan-American movement in building up a system for international solidarity and a real continental protest because of Nicaragua—the Sixth Pan-American Conference was summoned to Havana. Two factors were bound to have a decisive influence in this meeting: the remarkable progress of the ideas of international co-operation and justice in Europe through the working of the League and the Locarno treaties, and the Latin-America public opinion regarding the Nicaraguan question. The government of the United States was well aware that in the Pan-American Conference of Havana, pan-Americanism was going to pass the acid test. That explains why the American delegation was so carefully and successfully chosen. The United States had many

powerful cards in her hands to deal successfully with the Latin-American countries. Brazil was suffering a very serious economic crisis. The United States bought 48 per cent of the Brazilian coffee crop. Peru, Chile, and Bolivia had in the hands of the United States the decision of the vital problem: the nationality of Tacna Arica. The successful activities of Ambassador Morrow in Mexico paved the way for a permanent agreement between the United States and that country. The enforcement of the award of Chief Justice White in the Panama and Costa Rica boundary question inevitably put the United States in a favorable mood. Colombia obtained the approval of the treaty with Peru, giving her an outlet to the Amazon River, through the influence of the United States on the Peruvian government. The recognition of the government in Guatemala, the natural American influence in Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua, the old political and international bonds with Cuba and Panama, the friendship between the United States and Uruguay during the war and after—all these factors combined put the United States, in spite of the criticism of her policy in Latin America, in a favorable condition. Only Argentina, because of the tariff question; Ecuador, whose government was not recognized in Wash-

ington; Salvador, which was getting a certain international influence in the League of Nations; and Paraguay, which was far away, were entirely free to receive and to reflect the popular opinion of the continent regarding the great question: the intervention in Nicaragua.

If the American government was surprised at the outburst of public opinion in Latin America on the Nicaraguan question, the American delegation had probably a greater surprise at the cautious and timid attitude of the Latin-American delegations. Many persons were expecting, and I was one of them, that some delegates reflecting the public opinion in the continent were going to present the Nicaraguan case frankly and courageously, at the beginning of the Conference, not, of course, as a subject for resolution, because it was not in the program, but as a simple pronouncement. International assemblies are not only deliberative bodies but also organs of public opinion. A pronouncement something like this was expected: "In the solemn moment in which the Pan-American Conference inaugurates its sessions, a sister nation is occupied by the marines of the United States. The question whether or not this occupation took place through the agreement and the appeal of the so-called government of Nicaragua is immaterial for

us. The fact of the occupation of the territory of a nation by the forces of the other concerns the moral interests of the whole continent, and we are bound to declare this before the Conference and before the world."

But the opposers of the United States policy were diplomats and lawyers, and they decided to face the situation in other ways. The strategy of sidetracking the policy of the United States was indicated already in the press discussions. One of the subjects included in the Pan-American Conference program was the discussion of the project of a code of international law, prepared in Rio de Janeiro, containing an article which forbade the intervention of a state in the internal affairs of others. If this article was approved, indirectly the policy of the United States government was condemned. But against one strategy there is always another.

The committee in charge of the report about the first parts of the projected code, in which intervention was included, decided to substitute for the text approved in Rio de Janeiro a more elaborate pronouncement regarding the rights and the duties of nations inspired by the declaration of the American International Law Institute in 1916. In the dramatic session of February 4 the report was

discussed. Some delegates protested against the elimination of the project approved in Rio de Janeiro. The Conference decided to appoint a subcommittee in order to get an agreement. During two weeks the work of the Conference was practically suspended while discussion was dragging on in the subcommittee, which decided in the end to postpone the question. In spite of the postponement, the question was presented in one of the last sessions, and the crisis that should have taken place at the beginning took place at the end. The new president of the Argentine delegation, inspired by public opinion in the continent against intervention, made the pronouncement. Other delegates were obliged to follow, even those of the countries that were trying to avoid this burning question and to prevent a frank disagreement with the United States. The absolute and indiscriminate condemnation of intervention made the answer of the American delegate very easy. Mr. Hughes, after making a clear reference to the Nicaraguan question, said: Intervention is accepted by international law, and the conference is not able to modify international law by political declarations." Unhappily none of the Latin-American delegates arose and asked which kind of intervention was accepted by international law, or

said courageously that intervention could only be acceptable for humanitarian reasons and in a collective form. It is a matter of speculation as to what would have been the answer of Secretary Hughes. An atttempt to maintain unilateral intervention would have put the American delegation in a very difficult position. The acceptance of the principle of collective intervention and only for humanitarian reasons would have been a great triumph for the Latin-American cause.

During the deadlock in the subcommittee, in order to calm the excitement and to give hope for the future, the American delegation very shrewdly spread the idea that the United States government was disposed to make great concessions in the main point, which was arbitration. I heard, during the Pan-American Conference, some friends of the American delegation say: "The real interest of the continent, not a political momentary one, lies in arbitration and not in intervention. The extension of the field of arbitration not only will consolidate peace and co-operation in America but will prevent in the future any intervention. Instead of adopting an attitude that is going to embitter the relations between the United States and Latin America, we ought to work for the permanent solution of these problems through arbitration. The United

States government is more disposed than ever to accept compulsory arbitration in a most generous way." The Mexican delegation, acting, doubtless, in agreement with the United States, moved that a special conference meet in Washington to discuss arbitration.

According to Brown Scott, the motion of the Mexican delegation broke the tension of the Conference. Ambassador Ferrara confirms, in his last book, this assumption. It is possible to say that the protest in the Nicaraguan question was useful in spite of the indirect and inefficient way in which it took place. To attenuate the anxiety and protests of the Latin-American countries the United States was disposed to make the most generous concessions in the way of arbitration. Such was the origin of the Washington Conference of 1928.

The meeting took place under these favorable auspices; with the exception of Argentina all the countries of South America were represented. The Bolivian-Paraguayan conflict came as a providential warning of the necessity of establishing in America an efficient organ for conciliation and arbitration. Secretary Hughes had affirmed that the mediation was made possible only because of the happy circumstances of the sessions of the arbitration and conciliation conference.

Two treaties were signed, one of arbitration and another of conciliation. Regarding the first it is just to remember that the United States generously dropped the reservation made regarding independence. The remaining reservations were only two: first, domestic questions; and, second, "those matters involving the interest or referring to the action of a state not a party to the convention." According to Brown Scott, "it was a faultless although disguised expression of the Monroe Doctrine." As to domestic matters, which are rather difficult to define, Mr. Maurtua proposed the adoption of the principle already established in the General Act of the League of Nations, according to which "domestic matters should be such as international law decides." Arbitration was applied to judicial or legal matters, defined as "those that may arise between the parties by virtue of a claim of right made by one against the other under a treaty or otherwise." The treaty also accepted the categories established by Article 36 of the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and Article 13 of the Covenant; a formula founded, according to Mr. Taft, by the profound, judicial mind of Secretary Root. Very important is the clause regarding the *compromis*. The protocol established clearly that if the parties had not reached

an agreement within three months, reckoned from the day of the installation of the Court, "the agreement shall be formulated by the Court itself." I have not time to deal with the problem as to whether the *compromis* ought to be submitted to the approval of the legislative body or to be considered only as a part of the process of the execution of the treaty. Probably in the discussion of the arbitration treaty in the Senate this problem will be taken into consideration. Impartial observers were surprised at the change in attitude of the United States and Latin America regarding arbitration. While the United States put aside the traditional reservations, some countries of Latin America, which in the previous conference were upholders of the most liberal provisions of arbitration, took precisely the opposite rôle. Some reservations were made to the treaty by the South American countries. Bolivia stated that the zone to which the arbitration is applied must be previously determined in the arbitral agreement. Guatemala provided that the questions relating to boundaries of a nation ought not to be submitted to arbitration except with the approval of the legislative assembly. Paraguay excepted the question affecting the integrity of the national territory, and Salvador, the question regarding the political con-

stitution of this country. In order to foster arbitration, a progressive clause was signed providing for the withdrawal of reservations without the necessity of negotiating a new treaty.

The general convention for conciliation broadened the scope of the Gondra Treaty which was already ratified by fifteen nations. The Conference believed that it was much better to extend the Gondra Treaty than to sign a new one. Conciliation is applied to political questions, that is, non-judicial ones. The convention provides for the submission to the procedure of conciliation of controversies "of any kind which may have arisen or may arise," dropping the reservation established in the Gondra Treaty regarding the questions affecting constitutional provisions or questions already settled by other treaties. Another difference between the Gondra Treaty and the Washington Treaty is that the commissions established by the first were only fact-finding commissions, while the commissions of the new treaty are really commissions of conciliation. Other advantages over the Gondra Treaty is that it makes possible the conciliation before or during the process of investigation, and also gives more time, practically almost two years in the whole process, for the cooling-off of all the excitement and the seriousness of

the crisis. In spite of these advantages it is not possible to say that we have made a great step toward conciliation. The report of the commission has only a moral character. No provision is made in the case of the failure of one of the parties to accept the recommendation proposed by the commission, and of course the way is open to war. Another objection, a very serious one, lies in the lack of a provision regarding the contention about the judicial or non-judicial character of the controversy. Another defect is the character of the so-called "permanent" commissions (Professor Brown Scott preferred to call them "preparatory"). They are composed of the three senior members of the diplomatic body, in Montevideo and Washington. All persons well acquainted with the diplomatic life in Latin America know that such commissions could not be efficient. The working of conciliation demands the establishment of a permanent commission composed of persons of high training and position, direct interest, and responsibility. For the appointment of a permanent commission there are two difficulties: to find questions to keep this commission an active body; to find a method of election. The first one could be solved by assigning to the commission other functions—for instance, claims. The second one apparently has no

solution, because the big countries such as the United States, Brazil, and Mexico, or even Argentina, will not be disposed to leave the designation of the commission to a plurality of the small nations. Perhaps the device to solve the problem will be the election by sections or cultural groups in America or to conciliate the principle of international equality and the element of population.

Minister Alfaro, who was a reporter on arbitration in the Havana Conference and took, also, a very active rôle in the Washington Conference, says that the treaties signed in Washington are the most advanced steps taken toward international peace and justice. I cannot, unhappily, agree with my colleague in this matter. I have no time to compare the treaties of Washington with the General Act approved in the ninth assembly of the League of Nations, but a careful reading of this document (and it seems to me that it is also the opinion of my colleague, Dr. Wright) gives the impression that arbitration and conciliation are more completely and technically treated in the General Act than in the Washington treaties. All the gaps that could permit the breaking-out of hostilities are filled with the provision for eventual arbitration of cases where conciliation fails. The

General Act also incorporates the optional clause of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

It is not very flattering, of course, for our continent, in which the aspirations and ideals of international justice were practically born and have created such important movements in the nineteenth century, to state that we have permitted ourselves to be outstripped by Europe in this line, but sincerely it is necessary to recognize the facts. Dr. Brown Scott was entirely right when he wrote in the *American Journal of International Law:* "The convention of arbitration is a long step in advance, and the conciliation convention is an acceptable document."

Let us hope that the Pan-American Conference of Montevideo will give us new and more progressive formulas.

THE FAR EAST AND THE UNITED STATES

By Yusuke Tsurumi

I. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM A JAPANESE VIEWPOINT

I

To be a speaker at the Annual Conference of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation of the University of Chicago is an honor that a Japanese student may well covet. The name of the Foundation, to say nothing of the University itself, reached Japan many years ago, and our traditional reverence for scholarship has taught us to look to this institution of learning with a special mark of admiration. The spirit of the Foundation, as I understand it, is a fearless search after truth which alone has made the grandeur of modern civilization possible, and all the speakers are expected to lay aside the embarrassing consciousness of race, nationality, and differences of culture and try to add to the store of human knowledge by an honest and frank expression of their views on the subjects given them to deal with. Therefore, if I fail to rise to the worthy tradition of this institution I am not only doing injustice to the institution itself but also to the hospitality of the great country of which I am a guest at this moment. If unwittingly I fail in any degree to live up to the proverbial virtue

attributed to our race, i.e., too polite to be frank, I beg you to assume that it is not due at all to the lack of respect on my part for a Chicago audience, but rather to the sense of obligation which I feel toward the spirit of this institution.

However, I must confess that the task before me on this occasion is not so difficult as the one I experienced in August, 1924, at the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Massachusetts, immediately after the enactment of the so-called Anti-Japanese Immigration Law. It was a pretty delicate moment for a Japanese to come to this country and say something very frank. But I made bold to do so, and to my great surprise, instead of being jeered or stoned or mobbed, I was applauded. And this approval was not confined to academic gatherings like Williamstown but was the same all over the Union. I was very much impressed by this experience, and on my return home I told Japanese audiences about the generous reception which Americans give to an expression of truth whether agreeable or otherwise. Owing to the constantly increasing number of travelers and over expanding trade, knowledge about each other is fast spreading and, on the solid basis of facts as well as on broader human sympathies, the traditional bond of friendship of our two nations is tightening every-

day. You stand on the shores of the Pacific and scan the sky and you will not sight a particle of cloud to disturb your peace of mind. All is quiet and serene.

Such is the atmosphere and such is the spirit. The best proof of all this is the result of the recent Naval Conference at London. Before I left Japan this time, I had many intimate talks with the people who attended the Conference and sensed the atmosphere and spirit of the gathering. It was, if I may say so, the victory of statesmanship over technicalities. America must have encountered difficulties raised by experts; Japan had enough of them. But they were overcome by delegates who were statesmen simply because they knew that they represented the wills of peoples at home. And why did the peoples support the decisions of their delegates? Because they had confidence in the peaceful intentions of other peoples.

II

American-Japanese relationship is a subject to which, to my mind, not enough attention has been paid, particularly by the American public. America has faced Europe for centuries, and has not as yet realized that her lengthening shadow already mingles on the Pacific with those of the Asiatic

nations even with deeper tint than some of the European countries in the Atlantic.

In the past Japan's relationship with America was one sided. We were the party mostly to receive and had little to give in return. Now the situation has changed in no small degree. Although in the matter of culture unfortunately we have not as yet induced you to import from us so much as we do from you, in matters of material we have been able to give more than we have received. To cite silk alone is enough to prove this. And American trade is fast expanding in the East. Do you realize that the unemployment of thousands of lumbermen in the states of Washington and Oregon is largely due to the fact that Japan has ceased to buy as much lumber as she used to? Chicago's unemployment to some extent is due to the falling-off of Oriental trade—and America's Oriental trade means trade to Japan; that is, either selling to the Japanese or to the Chinese through the Japanese. The future prosperity of America will depend greatly on her Oriental trade and that means mainly Japanese trade.

Now trade among nations does not expand simply because you have good things to sell. International trade is influenced a great deal by emotional reasons. A friendly nation buys more than

an unfriendly one. A misunderstanding or supposed wound in national honor inflicted by one nation upon another shifts this afflicted nation's trade to some other quarter from that of the offending country. Therefore, even from a sheer utilitarian standpoint the study of American-Japanese relationship is important.

Now, what is Japan thinking about America? We know what you are thinking about us because we know your language. But very few Americans know the Japanese language well enough to understand what we are thinking, talking, and writing about you. This disparity of knowledge between us about each other has been the cause of much misunderstanding and even of suspicion. In the course of three lectures I want to present to the best of my ability what Japan thinks about Uncle Sam and his foreign policy.

In order to approach the subject of America's foreign policy I should like to take Professor Blakeslee's lucid generalization in this matter as a basis of my discussion. Dr. Blakeslee, in his work on *The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States*, generalized American foreign policy as consisting of three major principles, namely, (1) to keep out of European politics; (2) to group the American republics into a pan-American union under Ameri-

ca's own friendly leadership; and (3) to co-operate politically in the matters of the Far East with the far eastern and European nations whose homelands or possessions lie in the Pacific area. These three policies may again be replaced by such well-known terms as Monroe Doctrine, pan-Americanism, open door and equal opportunity in China. How these fundamental policies of American diplomacy react upon the Japanese mind and interests will be the topic of my discussion in the course of three lectures.

Japanese-American relationship can be divided into three periods. The first period is from 1873 to 1905, in which America's rôle was chiefly that of a disinterested elder brother assisting a new nation to come to her feet and the latter's unalloyed gratitude toward the former. The second period is from 1905 to 1921, in which the signs of uneasiness and even of suspicion began to appear and sometimes threatened to alienate the two friendly nations. The third period is from 1922 to the present moment, and is marked with a gradual dispersion of the said uneasiness and suspicion and is characterized by a growing consciousness of common interest in the Western Pacific.

These constitute only a general classification for the purposes of study and discussion, for in these

three periods, of course, things happened which were not quite in conformity with the generalized characteristics of the periods themselves.

III

When we look over the balance sheet of diplomacy between America and Japan we feel that Japan's moral debt to America is manifold and heavy. As a whole, America's record in the Far East is worthy of commendation, compared to the dealings of other occidental countries in this quarter. Japan is sincerely grateful for the assistance America rendered to her during the precarious period when the country was opened to the world, with almost no experience in diplomacy. The name of the first American representative in Japan, Townsend Harris, is still remembered with reverence by a great number of Japanese. Commodore Perry is a household name in Japan.

Therefore, when the American government, through its secretary of state, Hay, presented the famous note on the open door and equal opportunity on December 20, 1899, to the Japanese government, the latter responded on December 26 by saying, "The Imperial Government will have no hesitation to give their assent to so just and fair a proposal of the United States provided that the

other powers concerned will accept the same." And a very important fact is that this willingness to accept the American proposal was shared by all the people of Japan at that time. There was no suspicion of America's intentions in the minds of the Japanese. Particularly impressive was the assistance and sympathy shown Japan by America during the crucial years of the Russo-Japanese War, in spite of the fact that Russia had been a traditional friend of America. President Roosevelt's good offices in calling the two belligerent nations into the peace conference at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, were enthusiastically welcomed by the Japanese nation. It marks the highest point of Japan's gratitude and good will toward America.

IV

This, however, spelt the end of the first period, because when the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth was made public, a curious and sudden change came over the minds of the two nations. The Japanese people were keenly disappointed by the result, and strangely the dissatisfaction was directed most strongly against America, whom it had so warmly thanked a few months before. But this change seems not to have been confined to Japan alone, because there began to appear at this time some

modification in the tone of America's newspapers toward Japan. Some papers openly doubted the wisdom of having a strong and independent Japan in Asia. Then again, close on the heels of the Portsmouth settlement, followed the unfortunate incidents of anti-Japanese agitation in California.

Some Japanese thought that this change of sentiment had come in America because the rise of Japan's power in the Far East and the subsequent shift in the balance of power in that region was not compatible with America's Asiatic policy. Thus with the end of the Russo-Japanese War, American-Japanese relationship began to assume quite a different aspect.

Now I may quote here a representative opinion of a Japanese scholar. He is a historian of note and specializes in the history of the Pacific Ocean. According to his version, America's chief concern from the beginning of the nineteenth century was the Pacific. America's westward expansion can be explained only when we keep this fundamental policy in mind. Beginning with the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas and California, and the purchase of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, America kept on reaching out to the Pacific, acquiring at last the islands in the Pacific such as Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines. And

for what? To reach its ultimate goal, the Chinese continent. According to this version, therefore, it was no wonder that the rise of Japan as a great naval power was destined to clash with America's great drive toward the Asiatic continent. This view was naturally accepted by some naval admirals. The acquisition of the Philippines was particularly viewed with concern by this group of people as marking a stepping-stone in America's progress to the Asiatic continent.

It was the period, you will remember, when imperialism was not out of fashion in the world and people with international interests naturally thought in that term. To put it plainly, the question whether imperialistic America was destined to clash with imperialistic Japan was the issue to these people.

In 1907 President Roosevelt sent the American fleet around the world, and when the fleet left Yokohama harbor Admiral Evans is said to have reported, "We have left Yokohama without any accident." Without any accident! That can be construed in more ways than one. That was the psychology of some on both sides of the Pacific some twenty years ago.

There are two other incidents which sank into the consciousness of the Japanese much deeper

than you probably realize in America. One was the proposal of E. H. Harriman to finance the South Manchurian Railways immediately after the conclusion of the Peace at Portsmouth in 1905. While the late Marquis Komura, the then foreign minister, was still in America as chief delegate to negotiate peace, Mr. Harriman visited Japan and obtained the consent of Premier Katsura to his proposal for financing the South Manchurian Railways recently ceded to Japan from Russia. And Mr. Harriman left for America. When Viscount Kaneko, who was in America helping Komura in an independent capacity, got wind of this transaction, he hastened to stop it. He secured a pledge of financial assistance from a certain American banking firm and then won Komura over to his view.

On his arrival in Japan, Komura at once took the matter up with all the important people in Japan, urging a cancellation of Katsura's commitment to Harriman's scheme, and succeeded in his design. So when Mr. Harriman reached San Francisco he found a cable from Premier Katsura informing him that the approval of the Manchurian Railway project had been withdrawn.

For what purpose Mr. Harriman wanted to use the South Manchurian Railways we do not know.

But the current opinion held in Japan was that he wanted to construct transcontinental lines across Alaska, Behring Straits, Siberia, Manchuria, and then to Europe, which again would be connected with American steamships to the United States, thus girdling the whole world with American railway and steamship lines. Then according to the version of some Japanese, if this was carried out, along with the acquisition of Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines, America's hold on the Asiatic continent would be complete, and Japan's leadership in Asia would be lost forever. So you can well understand the degree of importance that some Japanese attached to this Harriman proposal.

The second incident which had direct bearing on this Harriman scheme was the proposal of Mr. Knox—the secretary of state in Mr. Taft's administration—for internationalizing both the Japanese and the Russian railways in Manchuria.

On January 18, 1910, Secretary Knox sent identical notes to both the Japanese and Russian governments proposing to establish an international administration and control of the railroads in Manchuria. To Japan it came like a bolt from the blue. With Harriman's scheme still fresh in mind the Japanese public was profoundly impressed by this new proposal, coming this time from the American

government itself. Manchuria is a sore spot for Japan, and any incident or suggestion relative to it calls forth a keen national feeling. The Japanese government replied on January 21, 1910, and declined to accept the American proposal. Russia did likewise on the same day. The matter was thus closed and there has been no similar proposal since, but the memory of the affair is still there in the Japanese mind. Some Japanese who contemplated America's advent in the Western Pacific waters with concern construed this as a part of the systematic and consistent American policy of Asiatic aggression. Of course all Japan was not united on this point.

Quite recently while, I was talking with Mr. Yukio Ozaki, a member of the Japanese Parliament since its first session and a tower of strength in Japanese liberalism, he referred to the foregoing Knox proposal and said, "I was among the very few Japanese who agreed with Mr. Knox, and urged our government to accept the proposal. I did not suspect the good intention of America for an instant. If that proposal had been accepted, we would have been saved these constant troubles in Manchuria." But neither the public nor the government thought the way he did, and Knox's proposal unfortunately added to Japanese suspi-

cions of America's designs on the Asiatic continent.

The Harriman incident created among some Japanese a kind of apprehension that America might establish close relations with Russia over the head of Japan. But Knox's proposal drove Japan and Russia into the fold of common interests, and with the wound of the war of 1904–5 gradually cured by the great healer, time, the two governments began to embark on a new *rapprochement*. However, during these years another factor of international importance began to loom upon the horizon. That was the estrangement of China from Japan and the former's increasing friendliness with America.

China is Japan's vital issue in foreign affairs. Japan's whole diplomacy can be said without exaggeration to revolve on the Chinese pivot. Curiously the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 did not alienate China from Japan. Particularly the war with Russia made Japan closer to China. The Japanese victory over a formidable European nation set fire to the hopes of other Asiatic peoples like China, India, and Turkey, and gave rise to strong nationalistic movements in these countries. They looked to Japan as the leader of an Asiatic revival. This sentiment was most eloquently man-

ifested in the swarming number of Chinese students arriving in Japan. In 1906–7–8 the number of Chinese students in Tokio was over forty thousand. They were inspired by a zeal for learning from Japan the secret of assimilating the material civilization of the Occident, which had made the Japanese army and navy victors over Russia on land and sea. Those students went home and began to occupy important government positions, and Japan's influence in China rose year by year.

In 1908 America decided to return the remaining part of her share of the Boxer indemnity, and this money was devoted to the education of Chinese students in America. This began to draw quite a number of Chinese students away from Japan. This decline in the migration of Chinese students to Japan was accelerated even more by the so-called Twenty-one Demands made on China by Japan in 1915. It has continued ever since, and there are now only a few thousand of them in Tokyo against forty thousand of 1907 and 1908.

This movement of Chinese students has a special bearing upon not only the relationship between China and the other two nations, but also upon that of America and Japan. As the ascendancy of the returned students from Japan in China ushered

in the heyday of Japanese influence in that country, so the rising tide of students returning to China from the United States enhanced the prestige of America in China. This reacted at once on American-Japanese relationship. Only a few names will be enough to make the situation clear—Dr. Wellington Koo, Dr. C. C. Wu, Dr. C. T. Wang, Dr. David Yui, and Dr. Hu Shih. Although most of the military leaders are now drawn from among the former students in Japan, the leaders in diplomacy and education are fast being replaced by the returned students from America. In international conferences these Chinese spokesmen used the language of America, democracy, justice, peace, equality, etc. It naturally aroused an enthusiastic response in American hearts. In the early days of the sixties and seventies, picked boys of Japan were sent to America to study. On their return they were invited into government and were given important positions—men like Viscount Kaneko, the late Marquis Komura, and others. But after Japan developed her own universities the best boys ceased to go abroad. This naturally led to a change in the language and psychology of Japanese in important positions. They speak the language of Japan and not that of America, even when they are orally talking in English. By way

of digression I may add a few words here. The rôle language plays in international understanding is important beyond measure. By language I do not mean mere words, but the psychology behind it, and the grasping of this psychological effect is only possible when you are brought up in your young days in the atmosphere of that language.

This difference in the Japanese representatives and Chinese has a greater bearing upon the American-Japanese relationship than you can possibly imagine. The upshot of the whole thing is that it created among some Japanese a painful impression that America is impartially inclined to China. The real situation is, to my mind, however, that you found it easier to follow the orations of China's spokesmen than those of the Japanese.

There is another factor which had a far-reaching effect upon the American-Japanese relationship. That is the opinions and activities of the American missionaries in China. Because of their imposing number and great outlay of money, to say nothing of their vigor and enthusiasm, these missionaries occupy a position far exceeding in importance that of similar workers in other parts of the world. In Japan the missionaries had no occasion to get involved in politics. But in a country like China, where the government system was falling down

and a social upheaval on a gigantic scale was going on, it was quite natural and human between ourselves that these missionaries should take interest in the activities of the Chinese with whom they came in close contact. That has nothing to do with the topic of this lecture. But when there arose a tension between Japan and China after 1915 and some Chinese were filled with indignation against Japan, it found an echo in the minds of the missionaries and then again it began to re-echo in America. I was in America from 1918 to 1921 and saw the keen interest this country took in the matter of the Shantung controversy. I do not mean to say that this was all due to the influence of the American missionaries in China, nor do I venture to guess to what extent they were responsible for that. But I honestly felt that they had no small influence in creating this sympathy for China. Some of them were pretty outspoken about Japan. I am not saying this in any critical spirit. I am simply stating facts which had a great bearing upon the relationship between our two countries.

The Japanese who were in America in those days frankly had an impression that the pictures of China presented to the American public by the Chinese students and American missionaries creat-

ed if not a wrong view at least an exaggerated hope for new China. We also felt that the criticisms by some Americans of Japan in the Shantung affair were not quite fair. It gave an impression—it may be entirely wrong, but still an impression it was to the majority of Japanese—that China, with the support of America, was trying to take away from Japan by words what Japan had acquired by years of patient acts.

And why is America so constantly on the side of China, some Japanese wondered at heart. Their reasoning ran somewhat along the following line of logic. "We have never shown any keen interest in the affairs of America in her dealings with a third country. Why should America alone be constantly butting into our business? We promised to return to China the port of Tsingtao in Shantung which we took not from China but from Germany at the cost of considerable money and blood. And we have never failed to live up to our international promises. Why should not America leave us alone and allow us to settle the matter of Japan and China between ourselves? It is only understandable if we conceive of it as a part of the consistent American policy of march to Asia." They may have been entirely wrong but their argument followed these lines of thought. Here you

will find an almost humorous contrast of two decidedly opposite pictures on both sides of the Pacific. America was talking about Japanese imperialism, and Japan was talking about American imperialism.

You can also add to this the controversy over the island of Yap, severe criticisms of Korean affairs, and ever recurring agitations against Japanese in California. And in the meanwhile, the navies of both countries were fast being increased. It was quite natural that the well-wishers of the two nations thought that something must be done and pretty quickly too.

V

It was at such a moment and in such an atmosphere that the Washington Conference was called in 1921. Secretary Hughes's inimitable statesmanship and the whole-hearted support of the American public, along with the sincere endeavors of the delegates of all other nations assembled, succeeded in erecting in Washington a historical monument of international moderation and good will. And with this the history of the American-Japanese relationship turned a new page and entered upon its third period of mutual confidence and rediscovery of each other. At Washington, besides the cessation of the competitive naval construction, many

other difficult problems were cleared out of the way—for instance, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Shantung affair.

In June, 1924, the late Count Kato's cabinet came into existence, and its foreign minister, Baron Shidehara, formulated a new and very liberal China policy calling for strict non-intervention, support for the legitimate aspirations of China, and the return of the Boxer indemnity accruing to Japan. It had a wholesome effect in China, and the feeling between Japan and China was greatly improved. This again had a very favorable effect upon the American-Japanese relationship.

Prior to this a thing happened which suddenly awakened a warm feeling of affection between America and Japan. When the national calamity of September 1, 1923, smote Japan, the heart of the whole world reached out to her in sublime sympathy and gallant aid. The American nation arose as one person and rushed to Japan with material and moral help. The heart of Japan was touched to the core. The two nations in the days of disaster cast off all petty feelings and faced each other soul to soul.

On March 26, 1930, the city of Tokyo went into gala fête, celebrating the completion of the work of reconstruction six and half years after the calam-

ity. It was a bright March day and the southern sun showered its flood of beams over the eight hundred and eight streets of ancient Yedo, remodeled and remade after the newest designs yet retaining its old simplicity and dignity. The wide, resplendent boulevards, all paved and planted with trees, new and great bridges lit with Japanese stone lanterns, and high reinforced concrete buildings apologetically towering above the quaint old houses of Yedo design. That is the new Tokyo, and that was made possible by the sympathy of the whole world, particularly of America. The lives and destinies of modern nations are so inseparably knit together.

In 1924, however, an unfortunate incident occurred that marred the smooth march of the ever improving feeling between our two countries. That was the passing of the American immigration bill with the so-called "anti-Japanese clause" in it. It was unfortunate that America did not realize what a profound impression it was going to create in the minds of the Japanese. It was also unfortunate that the Japanese people did not know that it was far from the American people's mind to inflict any insult upon Japan. But the harm was done just the same. And it is there. It is my sincere hope, therefore, that some day when the passion has

died down, some proper steps will be taken agreeable to both nations. Because in every transaction with America this memory is in the way. Not only in diplomatic dealings between governments but even in commercial relationships among individuals it is doing harm.

Scarcely had the outburst of the indignation over the immigration law died away in Japan when in 1925 the whole American fleet conducted a long maneuver around Hawaii and ended it by a visit to Australia. I do not doubt for a moment the intention of the American government, but you will pardon some Japanese stretching their imagination and connecting this with the American design on the Asiatic continent.

Almost at the same time Japan concluded a treaty with Russia and giving recognition *de jure* to the soviet government entered into a normal diplomatic relationship. It was again viewed by some in Europe and America as a design on the part of Japan to lean toward Russia. Of course it was far from the truth. But this much must not be denied, that there are in Japan, although a small minority, some people who wonder whether, after all, Russia without any racial prejudice may not be the ultimate friend of Japan.

In April, 1927, the Tanaka cabinet was formed

and a change came over Japan's China policy. The talk of "a positive policy in China" began to get afloat. And Baron Tanaka, as his own foreign minister, gave an impression that he was going to change Baron Shidehara's program. But it turned out that the only difference, after all, was that Tanaka would send expeditionary forces into China to protect the lives and properties of Japanese residents endangered by impending civil wars, while Shidehara would not.

What interested me most in this matter was that practically no criticisms were heard in America. Even when Baron Tanaka sent the famous memorandum of May 18, 1928, to Chang Tso-lin's government stating Japan's interest in the preservation of peace and order in Manchuria, no voice was raised in America. This silence revealed more eloquently than words America's confidence in Japan's peaceful intention in China. When the so-called Kellogg Pact was presented to the nations of the world, Japan was one of the first to express her willingness to agree and duly signed it later, again showing Japan's willingness to co-operate with America.

An incident that happened in the autumn of 1927 is also significant in proving Japan's change of mind toward America. This was the case of the proposed Morgan loan to the South Manchuria

Railway Company. It did not come through, owing to the objection raised by China. But compare this situation with the hesitation shown by Japan with reference to including the areas of Manchuria and Inner Eastern Mongolia in the sphere of work for the consortium in 1919. What a change it was! In 1927 Japan invited of her own accord the capital of America to open up Manchuria. Mr. J. Yamamoto, who was the president of the South Manchuria Railway Company at that time, was of the opinion that the best way to develop Manchuria was to bring about American-Japanese co-operation in that region. He is a prominent member of Seiyukai, the conservative party of Japan. So you can well imagine to what an extent Japanese liberals are prepared to go. This is a proof of the increasing confidence entertained by the responsible people of Japan in the peaceful intention of America.

VI

A most significant event that has taken place in recent years in the development of American and Japanese relations is undoubtedly the Naval Conference at London. The treaty is now before the proper ratifying bodies in each country for study and discussion, and is, therefore, still a lively issue in a political sense. I have not the slightest doubt of its final ratification in Japan.

The discussions that took place in Japan during the Conference as well as at the time when the final agreement was published are of no small interest because they brought out in a most vivid way the cross-sections of Japanese views on America's foreign policy. The Japanese government announced at the beginning its basic principle for the coming Conference. It was the famous slogan of "No menace and reduction." That is to say, the aims of the Conference should be twofold: that no nation's navy should constitute a menace to the security of others and there must be an actual reduction of navies.

The discussion of the Japanese navy inevitably brings on a consideration of the American navy. Then again talk about the American navy brings in its train the question, For what does the American navy stand? In other words, what is America's foreign policy? So the discussions in Japan of this Conference developed into a study of America's foreign policy.

One party pointed out that the fundamental difference between the Washington Conference and the London Conference lay in the fact that the latter based its spirit on the Pact of Paris, renouncing war as an instrument of policy. Therefore our mental approach to the problem of the navy must be entirely different from that of the

Washington Conference. There should be no squabble over the matter of ratio. Ratio is based on the eventualities of war. If we do not think in the terms of war but in those of peace the thought of ratio cannot occupy our minds so seriously. Equality or parity among nations must be the order of the day. Then the argument went on and said that the only war which the Pact of Paris envisaged was a war of self-defense. All offensive wars were ruled out. "If so, the question is, granting that the ratio principle prevailed, for what purpose does America want to keep the Japanese navy down to the ratio of 6 against her 10? For what defense? Not the defense of the Monroe Doctrine, decidedly. Then the only logical reason is found in America's desire to operate with superior force in the Western Pacific in order to maintain the open-door policy in China. But can maintenance of the open-door policy of China be properly called a matter of self-defense of America? Decidedly not." Then they questioned, "Is it in conformity with the spirit of the Pact of Paris that America should insist on keeping Japan's navy down to the ratio of 6?"

What is the Japanese version of the open-door policy of America, her fundamental far eastern policy? Opinions are divided, and no unity is found in the matter. But there are two or three outstand-

ing features in the tone of Japanese discussion which may throw some light in interpreting the past as well as the future foreign policy of Japan.

Some Japanese would start by asking why Secretary Hay addressed the famous notes to six powers in 1899? And they answer themselves, because it was America's traditional policy after the middle of the nineteenth century to arrive later and try to share with other nations all the interests they had acquired in China after some hard struggle with force or negotiation. After the opium war of 1842 America came in with the demand of the most-favored-nation clause, and after the war of 1862 she did the same thing and got away with almost the same advantages acquired by England and France without hurting the feeling of China. So when the spheres of influence were established by other powers, Secretary Hay came in with the plea for the open-door policy in China. America was entirely motivated by her self-interest, otherwise she would not have practiced such inconsistent policies—one in Asia and one in the Americas. If the Monroe Doctrine with its exclusive attitude in the Caribbean region and Central America is justified, why does she insist on the open door only in Asia? If the open door is her sincere intention, why does she try to be exclusive, sometimes, in her

near regions? The two things are inconsistent and we cannot understand, unless the so-called open-door policy in Asia is based entirely on a more ambitious design on the Asiatic continent. Why, then, are we under obligation to adhere to the open-door policy in Asia?

Then again there are some Japanese who contend that America may not be logically consistent. But no nation can always be logically consistent. And, moreover, in the case of the Monroe Doctrine America has never committed herself to any country on the principle of an open door on the two American continents, whereas in our case Japan has accepted America's plea for the open door. Therefore we are under an obligation to observe this. It is a matter of international justice with us. Then again, in America's far eastern policy we discern a decided element of idealism. It stands for equity, equality, moderation, amity, and freedom among nations. It is not good logic to say that now that America does not practice the open-door policy in her own quarters we should follow her example. A better and saner attitude for a liberal is to practice in Asia the open-door policy with all fairness and at the same time ask America to assume a more moderate attitude in her application of the Monroe Doctrine in her neighboring regions.

Now I have been talking only about the Monroe Doctrine here, because my topic is on America's foreign policy. But Japanese discontent is not confined to the Monroe Doctrine alone. It goes, of course, to the attitude of Great Britain in her dominions and the French and Dutch attitude in their colonies. But this brings my discussion into another field—that is, the balance of power in the Western Pacific—and I shall leave that to my third lecture.

The line of argument I have tried to develop above is the difference of views between conservatives and liberals. A liberal looks toward America with a hope for moderation; a conservative expects from America no moderation and no toleration and wants to formulate our own policy in Asia accordingly. Thus the discussion over the naval treaty brought out in an outspoken way views on America's foreign policy. But the present government, which had received an overwhelming indorsement at the polls last February and had the full support of the majority of the press, adhered firmly to its liberal stand. There was even a rumor of a rift with the naval general staff over the matter of accepting the agreement at London. It was so evident that the government had implicit faith in the friendly intention of America and did not doubt

a moment that the co-operation of the two nations on the Asiatic continent was the best possible thing for the world. The opposition could not arouse any enthusiasm in the public mind.

It was also very fortunate that we had at that crucial time a very worthy representative at the American Embassy in Tokyo, Ambassador Castle. The good feeling he created in Japan by his private talks as well as his public utterances had profound influence in improving the situation. I quote from his famous speech on February 4, 1930, at the dinner of the America-Japan Society. He said in part:

> The time of suspicion of each other's motives has happily gone by. Every nation works primarily for its own interests but I know of no pair of nations whose interests more thoroughly coincide than those of Japan and the United States. In endeavoring, therefore, to advance its own interests, each nation is helping the other. Just as we like to believe that the influence of the United States on the American Continent is a guarantee of peace, so we do believe that the power of Japan in the Orient, a power due to the vigor and forward-looking nature of its government and people, leads to order and progress and peace in the Western Pacific.

It is thirteen years since the Ishii-Lansing agreement recognized "Japan's special interest in Manchuria" that in an official statement America took cognizance of Japan's position in the Far East as a

leader. In so many words Ambassador Castle expressed his belief that Japan is a stabilizing force in much-distracted Asia. His words practically amounted to conceding to Japan a leadership in Asia, and nothing could be a better sign of American confidence in Japan's peaceful intention in the Far East. Japan was quick to respond to this expression of good will. How far it has gone in modifying the "imponderable in politics" nobody is in a position to measure. But in the future unfolding of the great drama of the Pacific this will undoubtedly have a far-reaching effect. The peace of the world is possible only through the co-operation of organized societies, no matter in what form of government or by what kind of race. And the creation of an organized society is the result of the patient endeavors for decades and centuries on the part of its constituent members. Every nation, therefore, has its history. America's foreign policy is only understandable viewed in the light of her history. So is Japan's. Japan has a profound respect for America's past and ardently hopes for the reciprocal appreciation of Japan's history by America. Then two nations proud in their own past can face each other and co-operate in a new Asiatic policy as the two well-organized bodies politic on the Pacific.

II. JAPAN AT THE CROSSROADS

I

In the last lecture I tried to explain the diplomatic relations between our two countries and some Japanese views on American foreign policy. One party inclines to think that America has Asia as her ultimate goal of economic imperialism, whereas another party contends that America, although not altogether free from blame, has as her underlying motives noble aspirations for a better world, and that therefore we must fall in line with America to realize the common ideal of the co-ordination of the Pacific powers.

Before we proceed to the discussion of the topic of whether the co-ordination of the Pacific Powers is possible or not, let me present in this lecture a picture of Japan as she is at present. Then we can link it up with the broader problems of the Western Pacific.

II

The changes that have come over Japan in the brief period of sixty-two years since the Restoration of 1868 have been a subject that attracted the attention of the people interested in the progress of

mankind. Some wondered how a nation with a background of twenty-six centuries of continued organic life could change so profoundly within so short a space of time.

The sixty-odd years of modernization of Japan will read like a romance if written by a pen of genius. Her social, political, economic, and intellectual fabric underwent a thorough change, and an agricultural nation which rested on a feudalistic system of government in 1868 is now an industrial nation with representative form of government based on an universal manhood suffrage. A popular and compulsory educational system lessened the amount of illiteracy to less than 5 per cent of the whole population. Her manufactured commodities are seen in the shop windows of the farthest corners of the globe, and her merchantmen are plowing the waves of the seven seas under the sun. Her statesmanship succeeded in keeping the country away from the disasters of civil wars and the still greater calamity of defeat in foreign wars. What an enormous amount of difficulties has beset the path of this small island empire since the days of opening to the intercourse of the whole world in 1854, and what a careful steering she has needed on the part of her leaders to bring the ship of state into the safe haven in which she finds herself at

present, are the aspects that an intelligent audience will imagine and sympathize with without even knowing their details. It was with a territory less than one-half of the state of Texas, with a population scarcely exceeding thirty millions, with no machine industry, with no modern army, with no navy to speak of, with no experience in the mysterious art called diplomacy, that Japan began to tread her new path in the world in 1868.

She looked across the waters and found two formidable neighbors: China, with thirty times as large a territory and her inherent weakness unexposed; and Russia, with her untold natural resources and immense man power. Then there were the navies of Great Britain, France, Russia, and America operating in the waters of the Western Pacific with designs known only to themselves. At home three hundred feudal lords were still a stupendous factor of decentralization, and the new government of Tokyo hopelessly lacked money and experience. "Precarious" would have been a very mild way of describing the situation.

How could the leaders of the Restoration of 1868 overcome these almost unsurmountable barriers? It was youth. It was the radiant youth of Japan that came through the test of national crises in the years following 1868. The Restoration of 1868

which overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate and placed the imperial family in its legitimate seat of power was in every respect a revolution, political as well as economic. And the leaders who brought about this momentous change were the men of the lowest grade of *samurai*, the hereditary warrior class, and they had one thing in common: They were young. It was a revolt of youth instigated by the knowledge of national danger and fired by indignation against the corruption and inefficiency of the governing class. They were ready to go through any hardship and danger. They defied death. Consider, for example, Katsu Awa's negotiation with Saigo at Shinagawa; Yamagata's own story about abolishing feudalism; and Yamaoka's lesson to the young emperor.

Years of experience in government taught these young leaders one thing above all others; that was that Japan must proceed with all caution in matters of diplomacy. A great nation like Russia or China could afford to make mistakes in foreign affairs, but Japan could not. A single false step might spell irretrievable ruin. A defeat in a foreign war might wipe out Japan once for all as an independent nation. So it was with utmost care and patience that these leaders of new Japan attended to the matters of international affairs. Rushing re-

forms through at home with almost reckless speed, they tried to climb the ladder of diplomacy inch by inch with utmost fortitude. Caution and moderation are the virtues, if I may say so, that made Japan what she is at present internationally. For instance, the abolition of extraterritoriality, regaining of tariff autonomy, and the ultimate safeguarding of national existence by fighting her two menacing neighbors, China and Russia, were all the results of patient endeavors and thorough deliberation. We have learned thus by the difficult lessons of the past that the greatest weapons of a small nation are caution and unity.

Thus the sixty years of the progress of modern Japan was builded upon the emancipation of the exuberant youth, the mobilization of the intellectual and material forces of the whole nation, relentless reforms at home, and a very cautious handling of diplomacy abroad.

III

Let me now describe a more intelligible part of Japan's change in the past sixty years—I mean her economic change. Economic features are easier to understand because they deal with the more obvious side of our life measured by figures.

The downfall of the Tokugawa Shogunate was

brought about by the three following economic conditions: (1) the inefficiency of the Shogunate which was built upon a strict hereditary system and excluded abler men from the seats of government (this resulted in an utter failure to provide for the economic welfare of the whole people and called forth the revolt of youths belonging to the lowest stratum of the *samurai* class); (2) the growth of a new economic system based on commerce, challenging the old feudalistic system of self-supporting village agriculture; (3) the impact of the capitalistic nations of the West. Therefore, the task before the new leaders who replaced the Tokugawa régime was to accelerate the process of economic change at home and prepare the nation to hold its own against the competition of capitalistic nations of the world.

It was the contact of an agricultural nation which had remained closed to foreign intercourse for over two centuries with industrial nations which had gone through their industrial revolutions. Therefore, the only way in which Japan could successfully meet these industrial nations was to go through an industrial revolution herself. So the whole energy of the new government was bent upon bringing about an industrial revolution in Japan. Started in the early seventies, it was

fairly through by the end of the nineteenth century or after the war with China. The agricultural Japan of 1868 with an annual export of only fifteen million yen, 95 per cent of which were raw materials and silk, became an industrial nation by 1900 with an export of over two hundred million yen. The export of raw materials fell in these years from 54 to 23 per cent, and that of manufactured goods rose from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 18 per cent.

The reasons for the rapid progress of the Japanese industrial revolution are attributed to the following three reasons: (1) an easy importation of sciences and machinery from the West, (2) the existence of undeveloped natural resources at home, and (3) low wages.

IV

Now let us study the effect of the industrial revolution of Japan.

It broke down the little self-supporting units of villages and made the whole country one economic unit and stimulated domestic trade. Then foreign trade increased rapidly. It all went to a new accumulation of capital and a demand for labor. Then again a most fortunate feature of the Japanese industrial revolution was that it was spared the evils and sufferings that were prominent in the

Western countries during the transition period. There were reasons for this.

In the first place, the industrial revolution came to Japan not as the result of the invention of machines which took away work from the handicraft workers in the Occidental countries. There had been no great number of such handicraft workers in existence in Japan. So the introduction of machines and creation of new industries had only the beneficial side of an increase of work and a demand for more laborers.

In the second place, the greatest effect of the industrial revolution of Japan fell on the farmers in the villages. They lost their hand-spinning and hand-weaving work to the cotton and silk factories of the cities. But at the same time they gained even more by a new demand for their silk and tea for export. Also they could send their sons and daughters to the new factories in cities.

In the third place, the impact of the industrialized West was toned down by the greatness of distance, four to six thousand miles of water separating Japan from them.

While the industrial revolution was speeding its smooth march in the economic field, Japan's prestige as a nation was rising fast in the political world. The installation of the cabinet system in

1885 and the opening of the new diet in 1890 changed the Japanese system of government. Then the victory over China in 1894–95 and that over Russia in 1904–5 gave Japan a place in the councils of nations.

In the intellectual field, the creation of a pretty thorough educational system equipped the nation with an adequate means of getting the benefit of the scientific progress of the Occident, and the traditional Japanese love of books and knowledge was stimulated to a boundless extent by the importation of printing machines and the introduction of newspapers.

The years that immediately followed the Russo-Japanese War were the heyday of modern Japan. Everything seemed to work well. Heaven seemed to smile on us benevolently, and merrily we trod our path of prosperity and growth. But the unseen hand of destiny was weaving a new pattern out of the sight of the mortals who, drunk with the sense of success, kept on marching confidently on the road of expansion. When the World War broke out in 1914 Japan had been fairly well prepared for another change.

The industrial revolution of Japan did not arrive as a natural course of events. It was a thing systematically planned by the government and

given to the people. And the government was in the hands of the new leaders who came from the lowest class of *samurai*. Low or high, they were *samurai* all the same. So, curiously in Japan the industrial revolution was fostered by the last rear-guard of feudalism. For instance, the factories of all kinds were government-owned factories, which were later turned over to private corporations. It was a paternalistic industrial revolution. The result was the ascendancy of the so-called bureaucratic party in government, which lasted until the beginning of the World War. It had won for Japan two international wars and expanded her territory and increased her wealth. Naturally, it got the credit for its success.

But two things were encroaching upon these bureaucrats steadily and stealthily. It was the rising power of the moneyed class, bankers and industrialists—the same old fight of the bourgeoisie against feudalism. The weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie was money in the first place and then political parties. There are some people in Japan who are inclined to think that democracy under capitalism means plutocracy. So the Japanese bourgeoisie began to hold its head high before bureaucratic rulers.

Engaged in a more and more ambitious scheme

on the Asiatic continent, the Japanese government was frequently in need of money. And these were the chances for the financial magnates to let their new power be felt by the leaders of the glorious restoration. Even the late Prince Ito, perhaps the greatest statesman of modern Japan, had to bend his knees before the uncrowned kings of the financial world. The party leaders who had been fighting their unending battles against the bureaucrats in power were not slow to take advantage of the situation. In the name of democracy the fusion of moneyed class and the political parties was being accomplished.

Then there was another factor to accelerate the process of this new change in the political field. This was the rising power of the press. The press of Japan has a characteristic peculiar to her. It was not deriving the major portion of its income from advertisements but from the sale of the papers. So naturally it had to cater to the interest of the readers, who were the masses. A Japanese paper, therefore, is always successful when it keeps independent of the government, financial concerns, or political parties. There are two papers in Osaka which have a daily circulation of over a million and a quarter. The strength of the Japanese press, in this new fight between the bureaucratic rulers and

political parties, was put in the scale of the latter, because the latter at least represented one step forward toward the rule of the people.

So the bureaucratic rulers had to experience the same disappointment as the proverbial hen seeing her hatched ducklings going into the water. The industrial revolution which they hatched under their wings was the cause of their own downfall. The famous political upheaval of 1913 which sent the all-powerful Prince Katsura's cabinet down the precipice of destruction sounded the death knell of bureaucraticism in Japan.

The Seiyukai, headed by the strong and shrewd Hara, came into power only to divide the seat of the mighty with the opposing party, Minseito, headed by the late Count Kato. The accession of Hara to power as prime minister in September, 1918, ushered in the heyday of bourgeois democracy in Japan. Party government has been firmly established ever since, although with occasional digressions.

V

When the Japanese industrial revolution reached its logical conclusion and created party government, apparently supported by the people but really sponsored by great financial magnates and captains of industry, another aspect inherent in it

was steadily coming into fructification. That was the rising tide of the middle class and the laboring class. These again were making a steady encroachment upon the newly enthroned bourgeoisie in a new contest of power. But in order to study the ensuing fight of these new forces, we must again go back to the study of the economic development of industrialized Japan.

What were the results of the fifty years of industrialization at the time of the World War? To pick up the thread of the story where we left off, the success of the industrial revolution gave Japan a few prominent industries which served her in good stead at the time of the World War.

When the great industrial nations of Europe were engaged in a gigantic strife, orders for manufactured goods and foodstuffs fell like a flood of sunbeams upon the countries not engaged in war or not in the heart of it. America first and to a less extent Japan were the recipients of these orders. Japanese industries sprang forward by leaps and bounds. A boom unknown in her brief history of industrialization came banging upon her. It strengthened the position of the capitalists, but it did not fail to increase the prosperity of the middle and labor classes.

Economic prosperity gave a new consciousness

of power to these classes. They began to articulate their wishes in more forms than one. The press, quick to respond to the interest of its customers, began to take up their cause in its columns. Politicians, their proverbial ears on the ground, sensed the advancing steps of the masses. Artists, writers, and scholars, not always belonging to the class of the wealthy, naturally had their sympathies for the "have-nots." All told, the intellectual currents of Japan began to assume a new turn. It concentrated on a demand for universal manhood suffrage, which was carried through the two houses of the Diet in March, 1925, and emancipated ten million new voters who were added to the old three.

Political democracy, however, was not the ultimate goal of the labor nor the radical theorists of Japan. They wanted to go much farther. Labor, particularly since 1918, was falling under the leadership of theoretical socialists of the Marxian school. And from 1919 to 1922 it was under the leadership of anarchism, and from 1922 to the beginning of 1924 under that of communism. But the earthquake of 1923 sobered the rank and file of labor, and it turned perceptibly to the right along the line of social democracy. But I will come back to this later.

In April, 1920, a sudden collapse came to the Japanese business world as a reaction from the great boom during the war. Contrary to the hopes of many and the promises of politicians, good times did not return to Japan after the panic of 1920. A chronic state of depression weighed heavily upon the country, and people began to wake up to the real economic situation of the nation. They realized that the slump of 1920 and the depression that followed it were not the result of the ordinary cycle of business depression and prosperity. They were rather due to more serious reasons, people learned. The roots of these were deep in the economic life of the country itself.

In the first place, the three peculiar conditions that made the Japanese industrial revolution smooth and easy in the latter part of the nineteenth century were all gone. There was a limit to the importation and imitation of foreign inventions and machines; the natural resources of Japan were mostly used up or had become inadequate for the requirements of the expanding industries; and the rise of wages and the price of things in general deprived Japan of its advantage over the Western nations.

Then again the burden of maintaining a large army and navy as well as the protective policies of

the government in tariff and other things was weighing heavily on the people.

In the third place, we were losing our best market, China. Formerly we could export to China with greater advantage over the Western nations because of geographic propinquity and lower wages. But gradually China began to develop her own industries with still lower wages than Japan's and entered into a sharp competition in her own market with Japanese goods.

Then the only alternatives left for Japan were either to follow the suit of Western nations and develop "finer industries" such as chemical and quality industries, or to develop new industries of machines and implements. But was this possible for Japan? Here we are going into a very important feature of the modern world, because it touches the taproot of economic imperialism and economic nationalism of the present-day world.

Because, in the first place, in attempting to develop "finer industries" we are seriously handicapped in not having the raw materials to feed the industries nor the market to sell the products. Japan is not only limited in territory, but is also seriously handicapped in not containing important natural resources for industries. Then again, were we to import the raw materials from our prospec-

tive competitors, how could we send them back again as manufactured goods into the territories of these countries surrounded by such high tariff walls?

In the second place, suppose we decided upon another alternative of manufacturing not the things for direct consumption but the things for production, such as machines and implements, we again would be confronted by the fundamental weakness of our country, the lack of iron. And the sale of these machines of production is usually accomplished by giving loans to the purchasing country, but Japan was not in possession of enough capital to make the necessary loans.

In such cases the nations in the past resorted to force and extended territories which in turn supplied raw materials and markets. But imperialism which was the order of the day in the nineteenth century has been ruled out of court, so to speak, since the Great War. The maintenance of the *status quo* is the order of the day now. Japan thus found herself in the years following the panic of 1920 in a serious situation. It became clear to the far-seeing people that economic expansion of Japan was gradually approaching an end. We were caught between two things, the renunciation of military imperialism and the rise of economic imperialism.

At this very moment Japan was being menaced by another danger: the sudden upward curve in the increase of population since 1919. The rate of the increase of population took an ascending grade in contradistinction to the descending curve of economic prosperity. In 1918 the increase per 1,000 was 6; in 1919, 10; in 1920, 12; in 1921, 13.5; and in 1925, almost 16. It has tended to come down since 1927, but still the annual increase is over eight hundred thousand. In thirty-five years Japan's population will exceed the hundred million mark. Gradually, birth control will work itself out to put an end to the increase, but it cannot be expected to solve the immediate problem.

Finding herself between the devil and the deep sea, Japan's internal situation began to take a new turn.

VI

The serious nature of the economic plight of Japan is manifest particularly in two ways. One is the ever growing unemployment, and the other is the trend of intellectual currents that are flowing with increasing volume toward radicalism.

The panic of 1920 threw many factory workers out of employment, and the subsequent depression brought down the prices of agricultural products and made the farmer's life very difficult. The in-

dustrial slump drove city workers into rural districts, which again made the burden of agriculture doubly heavy. According to the statistics given out by the Department of Agriculture, the average income of agricultural laborers is 97 sen, or around 48 cents a day.

The middle class fared no better. The small shopkeepers began to feel the keen competition of big stores with immense resources. Artisans and owners of small factories were gradually crowded out by big industries. The salaried class was greatly harassed by the ever rising cost of living. At all turns the middle class, or little bourgeoisie, was meeting difficulties and defeats.

The plight of the young people just out of college is depressing. There are college graduates far in excess of the openings for them. To cite only one instance, when the South Manchurian Railway Company tried to get twenty new recruits from college graduates this spring (college commencements in Japan falling in early April), two thousand applicants rushed to the office for examination. It is the same with other industrial, commercial, or banking concerns. Big newspapers are very popular and get over twenty applicants for one post. The result is, as is so obvious, the ever increasing unemployment among the young and edu-

cated people, which again can lead but to one thing —a dissatisfaction with the present economic and social order. Naturally the tone of newspapers and magazines became more and more radical in order to make a satisfactory appeal to this educated middle class with a discontented frame of mind.

This process of pressing the middle class downward is creating a new and serious situation in politics; that is, how will this discontented middle class vote? I will come back to this later.

Now let us turn our attention to another side of the picture. What were the conditions of the wealthy class? Here we find the universal process of concentration of wealth steadily taking place. A few facts will suffice to explain the situation.

According to the statistics at the end of the year 1928, the total amount of the bank deposits, trust-company deposits, and insurance companies' reserve funds of Japan was 11,743,570,000 yen. And out of this, 5,701,733,000 yen, or 48.5 per cent, were the deposits of six great financial concerns: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Kawasaki, and the First Bank. In other words, the money power of Japan is under the control of these six concerns, particularly that of Mitsui and Mitsubishi. Then again the major parties are closely affiliated with these two houses. The present government party,

Minseito, is close to Mitsubishi, Baron Shidehara, the present foreign minister, being the brother-in-law of the present head of the Mitsubishi family. And the opposition party, Seiyukai, has been for many years on friendly terms with Mitsui. With every slump and with every panic, to say nothing of a boom, money is flowing into the coffers of these two houses at the expense of the smaller capitalists and the middle class.

The concentration of wealth in a small group of people and the growing hardships of the middle classes, the same world-phenomenon, is being repeated in Japan. Thus the industrial revolution is tending toward its logical conclusion.

VII

There are the pressure of population, the lack of raw materials at home, and the increasing difficulties of extending markets abroad. To wit, Japan is surrounded by three great unsurmountable walls: the anti-Japanese immigration walls prohibiting Japanese migration, the high protective tariff walls excluding Japan's manufactured goods, and the peace walls stopping Japan's acquisition of land and raw materials. She gradually feels the inexorable hand of economic law around her throat. Will she starve or will she explode?

VIII

I have been spending rather a long time in painting the darker side of the picture. Let us now turn our eyes to a brighter side of the canvas so as to gain a better-balanced idea of the Japan of 1930.

This is not the first time that Japan has been confronted by difficulties. We have always managed to tide over the period of darkness. Why should it be impossible for us to free ourselves from this predicament again? Then what are the hopes of Japan to meet this grave situation?

In this world of ours it is not the material forces alone that decide the destiny of a nation but there are spiritual forces that are even stronger at times to command the situation. It is the mentality of a race as well as its physical surroundings that constitutes a nation. What, then, are the forces that go to make up the mentality of a race? It is the sense of history. In other words, the teachings handed down by thousands of generations of your forefathers sink so deeply and irretrievably into your consciousness that they go to make the fundamental basis of your world of mind.

This sense of history is profound with us in Japan. The consciousness that we have lived for over twenty-six centuries on the same islands, with one tradition, with one race, and with one system

of government is inseparably interwoven into our fabric of mind.

The sense of solidarity is perhaps one of the outstanding national characteristics of Japanese. It was born partly of necessity and partly of the artistic cravings for harmony. Grim necessity taught us that the only weapon of a small nation is to hang together as otherwise we would be hanging separately. Our artistic nature found beauty in harmony. One jarring note will spoil the beauty of music, so will one obtruding member destroy the beauty of community life. The best example of Japanese love of harmony and subsequent scheme of life is sensed in going into one of the famous gardens of Japan. Those who visit the Shugakuin Garden in a suburb of Kyoto will instantly feel this sense of harmony. The garden was not made a garden as such, but a part of the whole scenery, the neighboring woods, distant hills, and flowing streams outside. So is the scheme of an individual life. How to harmonize with the surrounding community and become a part of the picture of the whole is an intuitive reaction of a Japanese mind.

The industrial revolution with its harsh and crude aspects has undoubtedly gone to harden the minds of many, and the former artistic delicacies

must have been replaced to some extent by a competitive spirit for gain. But a tradition dies a slow death even if it dies. And I do not think that the emotional life of the Japanese has been very much changed.

Of course, this sense of solidarity has its drawbacks. It tended to tone down the bold and confident personality, the outstanding characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon race, and blurred the sense of distinction, the corner stone of modern science. But this strong sense of solidarity, with its corollary of the sense of self-sacrifice, stood us in good stead in the times of crisis in the past, and I think it is going to serve us again to meet the serious situation before us.

The sense of solidarity in its political aspect has a concrete center as its rallying point in the imperial house of Japan. We look toward the imperial family as the center of the national life. The Japanese imperial family is not the conqueror of our race, but our race grew with the imperial family. The concept of state in Japan is that it consists of members of the same family with the emperor as its father. It is more of an emotional nature than an intellectual one. "One emperor and myriad subjects" has been the Japanese idea of equality.

So with this rallying point in the center, the

sense of solidarity was translated into the actual scheme of the political life of the nation. As it is an emotional quality with us, it is not easy to convey to outsiders. Disputes help us little in the matters of emotion and tradition. As the tantalizing criticisms of the American Constitution and of your belief in democracy by occasional foreign visitors must be irritating to you, so are the superficial observations of our scheme of political life by travelers who do not understand our language, and hence cannot entertain much sympathy for our emotional experience, unpalatable to us.

An organized society needs a center around which all the constituent members can rally at the time of crisis. The safety of the Japanese nation, to my mind, lies in the fact that we have a strong rallying center which has stood the test of twenty-six centuries. And that gives us a sense of security and confidence. Millions of yen may flow into the coffers of the financial magnates, orators of highly strung nature may make occasional outbursts of an alarming character, business depression may drive the tone of the laboring masses to radicalism, but we feel that these have not gone so far as to affect the fundamental scheme of political life supported by the affection and conviction of the people.

We Japanese are the children of sunshine, southern in inheritance and optimistic by nature. Fifteen centuries of Buddhistic training could not imprint upon us indelibly the philosophy of pessimism. We feel that hard times will be followed by good times and that the only thing we need is a little patience. Then again we Japanese are not great thinkers. We are men of action. We have not created a great system of thought in the world of metaphysics. But we have produced many men of great achievement in the field of action. We take delight in doing things. What, then, are we going to do at this period of economic difficulties?

To wit, the near future of Japan will be decided by the course that its middle class, or little bourgeoisie, will follow. Will this discontented middle class tend toward the direction of the laboring class? Or will this little bourgeoisie support the present capitalist rulers as they did the bureaucratic rulers until the Great War? Or will they organize themselves independently and try to rule the country as their brothers and sisters did in England in the days of Gladstone? The great majority of the thirteen million voters of Japan belong to this class, and their votes will determine the future policies of Japan at home as well as abroad.

IX

In the future drama of Japanese politics there are four conceivable ways in which the middle class may cast its deciding force in the scale of one of the two contending parties, the capitalists and the proletariats. One is the total eclipse of the middle class as in Russia by the tidal wave of labor's dictatorship. This is the least likely thing to happen in Japan.

Another extreme case is the stampeding of the middle class to the extreme right as happened in Italy. This is only possible when the proletariat falls under the sway of the extreme left and threatens to destroy the social structure. But this is also beyond the realm of possibility at present.

Then the third possible alternative is that the middle class throw its lot with the capitalist class and organize a Gladstonian type of liberalism more or less similar in form to American politics. The present situation indicates this. On February 20, 1930, the overwhelming number of the middle-class votes of Japan was cast for the candidates of the government party. At present, Japanese politics seems to have found a solution in this manner. But there is one important point, i.e., how long can the present rulers continue to hold the confidence of the little bourgeoisie? They will do so only on one

condition, that is, that they will give prosperity to the country and warrant the economic security of the majority of the people. But how can this be done?

This links our discussion at once with the political scheme of the whole world. Japan cannot continue to provide adequate means of support for the middle and labor classes unless the policies of the world change in the direction of more moderation and mutual help and away from unrestrained nationalistic competition. I shall develop this subject more in detail in my third and last lecture.

The last and fourth possible alternative for the middle class of Japan to adopt is to join hands with the moderate elements of the labor class and proceed to reorganize the country along the line of social democracy of the British Labour party.

With the increasing distress and hardships on the part of the middle class this seems to be a logical direction to take. But there are things that hinder the realization of this process. In the first place, in its brief history Japanese labor has been often under the leadership of either anarchistic theorists or theoretical communists. Such leadership tainted the Japanese labor movements with extreme radicalism. And new movements are always keener on the points of logic than on the

actual game of give and take. The uncompromising attitude of Japanese labor in the matter of abstract theories makes it rather difficult for the middle class to swallow the whole of labor's principles and collaborate with it. But if the present distressing condition continues much longer, the possibility of the middle class going the way of socialistic labor is not beyond the domain of possibility. It may mean a new Restoration of Japan in a changed form.

As a whole, the mind of Japan is not made up yet. We are not one in mind, as in the days of the Russo-Japanese War and before. Old leaders are gone and new ones are not in sight. Japan stands at the parting of ways, bewildered for the moment in which direction to move. We are awaiting a new orientation. If we only get a new orientation we will march in unbroken solidarity. But from what direction will the new orientation come? That will be the subject of my third and last lecture.

III. THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

I

In the last lecture I tried to describe, in as short a space of time as was at my disposal, the causes and effects of the industrial revolution in Japan and the difficulties in which Japan finds herself at present. I explained that the chief cause of these difficulties was an economic one. Industrialized Japan has lost all her beneficial conditions in recent years and has been fast approaching her limit of expansion. The exhaustion of natural resources, the rise of wages, the development of industries in China, the difficulty of creating new industries owing to the lack of raw materials, particularly iron, are the obstacles that beset Japanese capitalism. Then I referred to the rapid increase of population pressure which Japan has begun to feel in recent years.

Then I went on to discuss the possible remedies. In the first place, the migration of Japanese to foreign countries is impossible because of the exclusion of Japanese in all possible parts of the world, except South America. In the second place, the acquisition of raw materials in the old way of

territorial expansion is impossible because of the desire of the ruling countries of the world to maintain the *status quo*. In the third place, the export trade is becoming more and more difficult for Japan, owing to the prevailing economic nationalism in the leading powers of the world which results in their raising of tariff walls year by year. This distressing economic situation is manifest in two ways, i.e., the increasing amount of unemployment, particularly among educated people, and the ever growing radicalism in the intellectual life of Japan.

I also explained the changes that were taking place in the political field of Japan: the opening of the Diet in 1890, the strength of the bureaucratic party until the beginning of the World War, and the new arrival to political power of the fusion of capitalists and political parties in the name of democracy. Party government has thus been established in Japan since 1918, and the political emancipation of all the male population in 1925, increasing the total voters from three to thirteen millions.

Then at the close of the lecture I explained that numerically the middle class, or the little bourgeoisie, was strongest and that these middle-class votes were going to decide the fate of Japan. I sug-

gested four conceivable courses which the middle class may follow: (1) the total eclipse of the middle class in the labor's dictatorship as in Russia; (2) the stampeding of the middle class to the extreme right as in Italy; (3) the support of the middle class for the capitalist group as in America; or (4) the coalition of the middle class with the socialistic labor as in Great Britain.

Then I concluded that the first and the second courses had the least chances of happening, and that the choice would be between the third and the fourth. I also said that the present condition indicates the trend toward the third—the middle class supporting the capitalists. But I also pointed out that the important point at issue is how long this would continue, and that the continuance is only possible on one condition, i.e., that the present rulers would continue to give economic prosperity to the people and that this depends on the world-situation at large, particularly Japan's position in the Western Pacific.

You will also recall that in the first lecture I went rather in detail in explaining what Japan thinks about America's foreign policy and the existence, in the main, of two schools of thought: one insists that America has an imperialistic design on the Asiatic continent and, therefore, that it

is impossible for Japan to co-operate with her; while the other contends that America has nobler elements of idealism in her diplomacy and that co-operation of Pacific powers is possible and desirable.

Now, in this third and last lecture, I propose to link up the internal situation of Japan with the whole problem of the Western Pacific and try to point out the new directions into which the unavoidable forces of nature are driving us. Directions are not one but many, and I do not pretend to assume the rôle of a prophet.

I also want to add at this point that the phraseology of the title of this lecture is not quite accurate in expressing my views on this matter. I am not using the phrase "balance of power" in the narrow and conventional sense of agreements between nations to bring about two equally balanced camps to maintain the *status quo*. But rather I am using this in a broader sense of equilibrium of all natural and human forces by some kind of concert or co-ordination. I might just as well call this a balance of "forces" in the Western Pacific.

II

The center of world-importance gravitates from time to time. At present, the European affairs still

seem to attract the attention of the Occidental world, but how much it is due to the historical associations and how much to the actual importance of the thing itself I do not know. When it comes, however, to the matter of the East, what with the new names, what with the distant scenes, and what with the innate laziness of human nature to acquire new knowledge, adequate attention demanded by the gravity of the situation has not been paid to it by Occidental countries. The problem of the Western Pacific, to my mind, is one which will grow rapidly in importance as the years roll by, because I think there new settlements and new readjustments of world-importance are fast coming into existence.

The Western Pacific is a vague term, but what I mean by it, for this present purpose, is the area east of Singapore, north of the 10 degrees in south latitude and west of the 180 degrees in longitude. Within this area we find three main countries, China, Russia, and Japan, as well as the colonial possessions of Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Netherlands. Therefore, it is the push and pull of these seven countries that have main bearing upon the problems of this region. There are other countries, it is true, but in the degree of importance as well as in the point of ac-

tual influence these seven or rather five powers, namely, China, Russia, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, are to be mainly taken into consideration. In other words, it is the problem that affects the destinies of three major naval powers of the world and two great continental countries of the Far East. In what respects the interests of these five countries clash or harmonize with each other, and where lie the dangers and where lie the hopes of co-ordination are the subjects I intend to take up in this lecture.

III

The center of interest is, of course, China. How China will evolve herself from her present internal upheaval and what will be the attitude of the other four nations toward China is one of the main issues of the Western Pacific. Then again there is another factor the importance of which has been neglected these years even by the students of international affairs. That is the problem of Japan. It is true that Japan, since her Restoration of 1868, has been taking a normal course of development and has not had the dramatic appeal of China. But, as I pointed out in the last lecture, Japan has undergone a thorough change in the past sixty years and now faces a new and grave change. It is also true that

Japan, because of her limited territory and population, does not command such an important position as China does with her immense natural resources and man power. But Japan, because of her strategic position in the Western Pacific as well as her being the only organized society with all the means of national self-expression, occupies a peculiar position in the settlement of the affairs of this region. In the matters of America and Europe, Japan does not pretend to claim any voice. But in the problems of the Western Pacific, Japan is frankly conscious of her duty as well as her right as a leading power.

Now let me take up the relationship of Japan to China during the past sixty years.

Since the Restoration of 1868, Japan's relationship to China has gone through four different periods. The first period is that of intermittent bickerings with a shadow of menacing clash hanging over our heads. It culminated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, when we entered upon a second period. Japan's victory over China exposed the inherent weakness in the Manchu monarchy and marked the beginning of European aggression in China. The powers vied with each other in their encroachment upon China, which resulted in the anti-foreign Boxer uprising of 1900. The inevitable de-

feat of the Chinese before the allied armies of all powers opened a still darker period of European dominance, dividing China into different spheres of influence and threatening the very independence of that nation.

In those days China was in serious danger of partition, while in Japan there were some who honestly thought that since she could not stem the tide single-handed she might as well ride on it, thus getting a share in the spoils. Particularly, the aggression of Russia from the north was insistent and menacing and seemed to overrun the whole of Manchuria and to reach the outer wall of Peking. When we look back on those dark days we shudder with horror. What would have been the fate of Japan if the great powers of Europe had settled down on the Chinese continent all partitioned and divided?

Secretary Hay's famous note of July 3, 1900, standing for the integrity of China as well as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 30, 1902, enunciating the same policy, went a long way toward checking the movement. But in order to keep Russia away from Manchuria and Korea, Japan had to stake her national existence in a war with the former in 1904–5.

However, the economic penetration of the

powers in China kept on unhampered, and the ruthless competition for railway construction by foreign powers which forced upon the unwilling China loans for the construction culminated in the disorders in the autumn of 1911 in the provinces of Szechuan, Hunan, and Hupeh, and led to the revolutionary uprising on October 10 of the same year at Wuchang.

The third period came with the World War and the collapse of imperial Russia, which brought about a fundamental change in the far eastern situation. It left Japan for some years alone in the field. The presentation of the so-called Twenty-one Demands to China in May, 1915, made the world entertain a new apprehension as to whether Japan was not intent upon dominating China all alone. The Versailles Treaty and Washington Conference, however, dispelled the doubt, and the rising tide of liberal and labor forces in Japan culminated in the formulation of a new liberal policy toward China. The rise to power of the Nationalist party in Canton with the help of communist Russia again created a new concern among the powers which, however, subsided again with the purging of the Nationalist party of its left wing of communists in 1927. Thus gradually left to herself without much foreign interference, China's whole

energy began to be centered on the unification of the country.

It is now nineteen years since the country became the victim of intermittent civil wars. When and how this will end is a conjecture which will take a pretty bold man to venture. I leave it to a better student to undertake. For my own purpose it is sufficient to take things as they are and to build my conclusion on them.

China, in a chronic upheaval with the system of government falling down; Russia, with her ominous activities spread far outside her own boundaries; and India, boiling all over in revolt—these form the continent of Asia that faces Japan today. At all turns we see the receding tide of the white races from the East. How are these facts reacting on the Japanese mind?

IV

Here let us turn our attention to the mental attitude of the Japanese toward China and other Asiatic nations.

Japan, being a next-door neighbor of China for over sixteen centuries since the first introduction of Chinese books by way of Korea in the third century A.D., has had all manner of experience with China. Although similar in appearance, using the same characters, and holding to the same heritages

of Confucius and Buddha, these two nations have not, however, always been acting like sisters. This apparent lack of sympathy between these countries has puzzled the world and is still puzzling it, I think. It is more or less like the situation between England and France, if not between America and England. It is due to a difference in our psychology as well as in our outlook on life. As pointed out so vividly and rightly, to my mind, by Count Keyserling in his *Travel Diary of a Philosopher*, Confucianism, interpreted and practiced in China, is not the same as the one that exists in Japan. There is a vast difference. So it is with Buddhism; so with art; so with government; so with literature. All these agencies of civilization, originating either in India or China, when they crossed the narrow strait of Chosen and found their way into Japan, gradually took different aspects and became "Japanesque." For instance, the family system and ancestor worship are two entirely different things in China and Japan. I am not going into the discussion of merits. I am just stating facts as the basis of my following discourse. However, the respect of the Japanese for ancient China was immense. We looked up to China for new lights. We had a traditional reverence for China as shown by the story of Yamasaki-Ansai and his disciples.

A change came with the Restoration of 1868 when Japan began to learn that the West had something superior to offer to her. The fresh eagerness to acquire Western knowledge suddenly changed Japan's mental attitude toward China. But it was not until the war with China that Japan began to look down upon the former teacher with an overweaning confidence. Japan's new contact with the industrialized West gave a new sense of values, measured by success and efficiency in government, warfare, sanitation, industry, commerce, transportation, and such things. Viewed from this standpoint, China looked hopelessly behind the time.

This created in the Japanese mind two pictures of China—that of classical China and that of modern China. Before the classical China with all her arts, literature, philosophy, religion, and government Japan doffs her hat and stands in reverence. It is the land of Confucius and the poet Lippo. For the modern China with her civil wars, famines, and social disintegration Japan has little respect. This lamentable Japanese sense of superiority, more than anything else, in my opinion, is the cause of the misunderstanding between our two nations. For it naturally reacts on the Chinese mind. I do not blame our Chinese friends for feel-

ing more at home in America and Europe than in Japan. It is one thing to be looked down upon by a stranger and an entirely another thing to be so treated by your own brothers. And frankly this is the same deplorable situation in Korea.

I may make a digression here with your permission and narrate my own personal experience with the late Sun Yat Sen, the founder of the nationalist movement in China. Japan had entertained sincere respect and affection for this hero even in his darker days of exile. I made a special trip to Canton in April, 1923, in order to meet him. He was engaged in a war against General Chen. I saw him at his headquarters across the river. It was during this interview that he suddenly flared up in indignation and almost shouted at me:

I have been the friend of Japan. Even now she occupies a warm spot in my heart. So when Japan won the war over Russia I was overjoyed. I thought, "Now the time has come for Japan to lead the whole of the Asiatic races from out of the dale of the white men's dominion." It was the same all over India, Turkey, Persia, and the South Seas. I saw the great ovation the Egyptian people were giving to two Japanese battleships on their way from Europe to Japan during the Russo-Japanese War. But what did Japan say and do to us? You behaved as though you were one of the white races and turned your back to us. It is like a farmer who returned from California. All the relatives are happy to receive him. On the

arrival this returned farmer says, "I am no more an Asiatic. I am a rich American." This is precisely the way you behaved. And you lost your place as the leader of the Asiatic races. We do not need you any more. I am now organizing the union of Asiatic races with the help of Russians.

This is what Sun Yat Sen said to me in 1923, and these words are still ringing in my ears. The great man is gone, yet his predictions have partly come true. But it is also true that part of his prophecies have been contradicted by subsequent events.

Now let us go back again to the study of the situation. With the changes that have come over Japan since the Great War in the politico-economic as well as in the intellectual field, the mentality of the Japanese began to change with respect to the Chinese. We began to measure the values of things not so much in terms of efficient government and a strong army. The devastating war of Europe began to open our eyes. If Western nations with all their parliaments, sciences, educational systems, and philosophies could not escape the horrors of human slaughter, the miseries of social revolution, and the overthrow of states and civilization, have we not something to contribute, in the teachings of forefathers handed down through thousands of generations? Was it our mistake that we pinned such high hopes in test tubes and telephones? And

Japan, after sixty years of modernization, began to take up anew the study of Oriental civilization.

It then dawned on us that Oriental culture with its heritage of centuries had many things in store to contribute to the solution of the great problems of inherent permanent national stability, serenity of the spirit, and man's greatest achievement—the conquest of himself. Japan, which had her face turned to the Occident, began to turn it again to the countries of the East. And our attitude toward China began to undergo a marked change.

V

Does this mean at once Asia for Asiatics? Or pan-Asiaism?

Now let us turn our gaze from the stars and get down to brass tacks. What are the issues between China and Japan? Japan's interest in China are:

	Yen
1. Investments	2,000,000,000
2. Government loans	400,000,000
3. Trade (1928):	
Export to China	373,141,911
Export to Manchuria	110,190,388
Import from China	234,556,683
Import from Manchuria	150,439,022
Also import and export to the South Seas amounting to some 350,000,000 yen are mostly handled by Chinese merchants there.	

	Persons
4. Japanese residents in China (October 1, 1927)..	250,000
China proper..... 65,000	
Manchuria..... 185,000	
Koreans in Manchuria (estimated).....	1,000,000

Japan's interests in China are, therefore, the expansion of trade and the protection of investments and residents there. Of the trade, the export of manufactured goods and the import of raw materials and food stuffs are significant features. We have no desire to send immigrants into China nor any ambition for territorial expansion. Strategic considerations have subsided in recent years, and the need of defending our northern Korean frontier is not so much in the mind of Japanese now. In regard to the matters of unequal treaties, Japan gave back tariff autonomy to China by the recent treaty, and as for extraterritoriality, Japan follows practically the same policy as America and England. We are in favor of the gradual abolition of extraterritoriality. That is to say in regard to regions we want first to relinquish it in the provinces such as Chekiang and Kiangsu where there is a greater number of foreign residents and, therefore, a greater acquaintance with Western civilization. In regard to laws we want to give back to the Chinese courts matters relating to civil law first and those relating to penal law later. The most

important point concerning the abolition of extra-territoriality is the question of police. So Japan is now helping China in the reorganization of her police system by training some Chinese police officials in the police school in the Home Department in Tokyo. There are twenty of these now sent from the Nanking government. You will notice that, in these matters of abolishing unequal treaties, Japan is now taking an even more liberal stand than either England or America. This liberal attitude of Japan is appreciated by China, and Japan's relationship with China is getting back to a normal path.

Japan's chief interest in China, therefore, is not political, legal, or military, but economic, i.e., the protection of her investments and the expansion of her trade. Now in the normal intercourse between nations, these economic considerations involve no political issues. However, it is the most unfortunate phase of Sino-Japanese relationship that, owing to the unsettled conditions of China, economic interests could not be dissociated from political rights, particularly in Manchuria.

VI

The problem of Manchuria brings at once to our minds a most vital issue of the Western Pacific and

perhaps one of the most thorny problems of the world.

Manchuria is a territory lying northeast of China proper, and is divided into four provinces with territory exceeding four hundred thousand square miles, twice as large as the whole empire of Japan. In this Japan exercises jurisdiction over the leased territory of Kwantung amounting to 1,300 square miles, and the railway zones of 100 square miles. Japan operates five hundred miles of railways and has rights in coal and iron mines. Japan's presence in Manchuria has kept the land in continued peace, unlike the constant turmoil in other parts of China, and this has resulted in an enormous increase in the Chinese population there. Chinese in the war-stricken provinces of Shantung and Chili are migrating into Manchuria to the number of over a million a year, and in the past fourteen years the population of this region doubled and is now estimated at twenty seven million. But it is quite a safe guess that it will not take very long before it reaches one hundred million. Over 70 per cent of the trade of Manchuria is with Japan. The major portion of the two-billion-yen investment of Japan in China is in Manchuria. Japan is particularly dependent upon Manchuria for the import of raw materials to feed her indus-

tries at home, and looks forward to a great future market for her manufactured goods. To wit, Manchuria is a matter of life and death for Japan's economic life.

What with the pressure of population and the urgent need of acquiring raw materials, Japan has an intense desire to keep the Manchurian market open and safe. Japan's need in Manchuria is primarily economic, and when China's internal condition guarantees security and peace in Manchuria, Japan will be sincerely happy to negotiate with China for rendition of her political rights there. But owing to the bitter experience of 1895 when Japan, after returning the ceded territory of Kwantung at the intervention of Russia, Germany, and France to China, saw it taken by Russia within a few years and had to fight Russia in that very region, she will naturally be very cautious in this matter. Manchuria constitutes the only outstanding issue between China and Japan at present.

VII

Now let us survey the problems between America and Japan.

The matter of the navy has found satisfactory solution at Washington and London. As to the immigration issue, Japan entertains an implicit faith

in the sense of justice and fair play of the American people. The trade is a bond of friendship, and unless too high tariffs do not interfere with the normal exchange of goods, it will never be a matter of dispute. The only point of contact between our two nations worth discussing is that of China.

America's policy in the Far East consists in the maintenance of the open door and equal opportunity in China. In this Japan is in accord with America not only in principle but in actual practice. A fair-minded critic will admit that Japan is strictly adhering to this principle in Manchuria, to say nothing of other parts in China. Not only that, but America's interests are identical with those of Japan. In fact, America's China trade is, with the exception of tobacco and oil, mostly with Japanese industrialists and merchants in China.

In the political field Japan is more anxious than any other nation of the world that China should attain national unity and internal peace. Japan stands in no fear of a strong China. On the contrary, a united and prosperous China means a better market and a greater security for Japan. Therefore, as Ambassador Castle recently stated, "We have no quarrel on the subject of China. I can see none even faintly looming in the distance." However, a most serious menace to America's

foreign policy as well as to other nations' with Pacific interests is beginning to gather force in an unexpected quarter in a new form. I will come back to this later.

There is another point which needs a few words of explanation; that is the subject of the Philippines. There are people who entertain a serious concern as to the future of these islands in case America should give them independence. Will Japan swoop down upon the defenseless Philippines? These people will point to the increasing population of Japan and the fate of Korea. In the case of Korea a glance at the map will show how it points to the heart of Japan even as a dagger. Korea in the hands of a formidable enemy means a standing menace to the safety of Japan. But the Philippines have no such geographic analogy. In the second place, certain reasonable treaty stipulations with an independent Philippines will give all that Japan wants without going to the danger of outraging the public opinion of the world by an armed conquest with its subsequent troubles. Japan's sincere desire is rather to see more independent nations in the Western Pacific so that she can organize a friendly association of Asiatic nations for the purpose of mutual assistance. The fact that there are only China and Siam in this region as independent

nations is becoming a serious handicap for the formulation of a new Asiatic policy for liberal Japan. If we had a few more independent countries in the Far East, the friction of Japan and China would be easily smoothed with these countries as mediators. Far from endangering the independence of the Philippines, liberal Japan will welcome her as a new factor in the balance of power in the Western Pacific.

I do not pretend to know what America's intentions are concerning the Philippines. The only point I have tried to make clear is that Japan has no territorial designs on these islands.

VIII

Now let us study where Great Britain comes in in the balance of power in the Western Pacific. British interests in China are trade and investments. In these she is in no particular friction with Japan, although it is true that we had some competition in the past. The seriousness of the internal situation of China is driving us gradually toward a common ground. Then, as regards the colonial possessions of Great Britain, there is no reason to fear any cause of friction. The keen disappointment that Japan felt at the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at Washington is not yet forgotten.

However, that did not constitute any actual harm. Traditional friendship between the two nations is still warmly cherished by some Japanese, and the same insular position and the similar form of government are a strong connecting link between us. The only thing that Japan frankly does not like is the Singapore naval base. This brings us at once to the subject of India and Australia.

There is a small group of people in Japan who are in sincere sympathy with the Indian Nationalist movement. But it is not such a widespread interest as is the case with similar Chinese movement. It may gain ground later but is not very important at present.

Australia presents a different problem. Although there is very little knowledge about Australia in Japan, that little knowledge is not altogether a fortunate one. Australia's suspicion of Japan's aggression is entirely unfounded. But the day will come when Australia's exclusive attitude will become a matter of dispute among more crowded countries. However, Australia can rest assured that Japan does not contemplate to increase her own troubles by trying to send any immigrants into Australia itself. Between Australia and the Philippines there lies the colonial empire of the Netherlands and to the west on the continent that

of the French in Indo-China. These along with the mandated territories of New Guinea and the Bismarck Islands are all closed to Japanese immigration, and trade facilities are not altogether too favorable for Japan. Then to the north of Japan lies the vast continent of Siberia all closed to trade and migration.

Here we find ourselves vis-à-vis a grave situation. While some parts of the Western Pacific are densely populated and social unrest of no slight importance is taking place, the greater part of land in the same region is lying vacant, unsettled, and waste, and yet closed ruthlessly to the useful exploitation by the human race. Is it fair or is it just? On what ground can this be defended?

In the social development of our community life the right of property is being gradually restricted for the benefit of many. Then some may question, How long will it be justified that the right of sovereignty alone will be exercised unchallenged to the extent of hindering the normal progress of humanity? And how is the sovereign right maintained after all? Is it on the moral basis of justice and fairness, or, failing it, is it maintained simply by force? If it is force that maintains a morally unjustified use or unuse of land and natural resources, will it not follow then that force will again be the

weapon to compel it to open? Will it not then upset the whole philosophy of modern international life based on the renunciation of war as an instrument of policy? Is it then merely to protect the present territorial distribution so unfairly made, some cynics may question, that the renunciation of war was established as an international principle? Here, I think, lies the serious and fundamental feature of the politico-economic situation of the Western Pacific.

International peace is the result of an equilibrium of moral and physical forces. As the old Chinese proverb says, "A thing rattles when it loses its balance." So the situation of the Western Pacific has causes for some rattling.

IX

I indicated before that there was an element which was gathering force to threaten the traditional policy of America as well as that of other nations. America's open-door policy was originally addressed to six powers in order to keep these powers from closing the market of China to free and fair competition. It was chiefly directed against Russia in its first period and, since the World War, more or less against Japan. Now there is some indication that, from a different quarter,

this open-door policy is beginning to be challenged; that is the attitude of China.

There are some Japanese who entertain a serious concern lest China's old anti-foreign sentiment should again gather force in a different form. The anti-Japanese sentiment and anti-British sentiment can be turned into any anti-foreign sentiment. When China regains all her rights she lost by unequal treaties, she might go back to her former policy of the closed door, which she had practiced up to 1842, because China can be a self-sufficient country. She is not much in need of foreign intercourse to continue the present state of civilization, and her traditional anti-foreign feeling is not a thing of the past. The awakening of a strong nationalist sentiment frequently leads to this.

Therefore, this group of Japanese is afraid that, if things were left to drift without a definite policy, the powers might be forced to repeat the history of 1842, i.e., to open the door of China again by force. These people would continue to argue that in order to avoid this lamentable turn of events a concerted action of Pacific powers is imperative. This brings us to the discussion of my topic of this lecture: "The Balance of Power in the Western Pacific."

In order to make my conclusion clearer, let me

sum up the main points I have been trying to bring out in the past three lectures. In the first place, Japan is in sympathy with America's far eastern policy of the open door and equal opportunity. In the second place, Japan's internal conditions have undergone such radical changes due to the industrial revolution therein that the middle class, which is the deciding element, stands at the parting of the ways wondering which party to support, the liberal democracy of the capitalist or the social democracy of the labor. In the third place, the nationalistic revival of China is gradually giving her a new consciousness of power, which might be directed toward a new policy of isolation and seclusion. In the fourth place, there is latent a desire common to all Asiatic peoples to organize a new Asia to claim a politico-economic independence and cultural renaissance. In the fifth place, geography and history have placed Japan in a strategic position to throw her weight in the new alignment of forces. In the sixth place, America and Great Britain as outstanding naval powers with profound Pacific interests occupy important positions in the new orientation of policies in the Western Pacific.

The treaty between nine powers concerning China stipulates in detail the principle of the open

door, equal opportunity, and territorial and administrative integrity of China. The Pact of Paris in its general application lays down the fundamental policy of the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. But treaties are garments that cloak bodies, which are constantly growing and changing. They need timely tailoring to fit the situation. Some skeptics in Japan thought that the Nine-Power Treaty was merely a magnificent gesture to save the embarrassment caused by the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Then again there are some who sincerely hope that the formulaters of the Pact of Paris would go a step farther and not only renounce war as an instrument of policy but also would courageously face the causes of war and find means to eliminate them.

One of the greatest causes of future dangers is the problem of population and the amount of land at its disposal. As the aim of modern government within a country is to afford to each individual equal opportunities for his activities, so the aim of future international relationship must be that of smoothing the unequal conditions among individual nations. The balance of power in the Western Pacific is only possible if the serious economic conditions of the countries in this region are taken into

consideration in a new alignment of forces for permanent peace.

One practical and concrete suggestion would be a thorough co-ordination of America, Great Britain, and Japan with a view to two things: first, to find how unity and stable government in China can be attained; second, to find how Japan may be guaranteed a free access to the raw materials she needs. If a definite step is made toward these objectives, it will gradually tone down the radicalism in the Far East and tend to stabilize the peace of the Western Pacific. It will allow Japan to follow the course of normal development toward liberal democracy. This will give the world a space of time to tide over the difficult period following the Great War and gradually adjust itself to changed conditions with a new and more liberal international relationship.

If this fails and the social upheaval in China develops to the extent of complete chaos in that country or the pressure of population in Japan becomes too acute, there is a serious reason to anticipate a drastic change in the Far East which may culminate in an entirely different balance of power from that which exists at present. Social democracy will gain force in Japan and gradually lead her away from Anglo-Saxon countries in the direction

of a new confederation of Asiatic peoples. A new social democracy in Japan will make it easier to settle her differences with China. And it will also be easier to make a new understanding with other rising peoples in the South Seas and India. How far this will affect the relationship with Russia is not certain, but it will not make it worse than it is at present. It will gradually tend, although in how many years I do not know, toward a division of the nations of the world into two camps, the capitalistic West with Anglo-Saxon leadership and the socialistic East with a new leadership beyond human ken.

However hard you may try to maintain the present *status quo* with treaties and navies, you cannot stop the march of human progress based on necessity and justice.

In studying the present trend of thought and affairs in the Far East I have been impressed more and more with the idea that the new balance of power in the Western Pacific will be a test of Anglo-Saxon liberalism. The coming ten years will affect profoundly America's Asiatic policy and Japan's stand in the Far East.

INDEX

INDEX

ABC powers, 122
Aeroplanes, 100, 101, 102
Alaska, 52, 53, 89, 165
Albania, 68
Aleutian Islands, 165
Alexandri, 111
Alfaro, 153
Alverstone, Lord, 53
American foreign policy. *See* United States of America
American International Law Institute, 145
America-Japan Society, 187
American League of Nations, proposed, 140
Americas, the, 13; and foreign policy of the United States, 4, 14
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 177, 225, 239, 245
Anglo-Saxons, 65, 80, 86, 90, 212, 246, 247
Antarctic, the, 87
Anti-Americanism, 52, 54 f., 60
Anti-Japanese immigration law. *See* Immigration, Japanese
Arbitration in South America, 134–51
Arbitration Treaty of 1908, 49
Arctic, the, 87
Argentina, 111, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 141, 143, 146, 148, 153
Armament, reduction of. *See* Disarmament
Asia and American "aggression," 165 f., 169 f., 175, 179, 185, 189
Atacama, 135
Atlantic Ocean, 87, 102
Australia, foreign policy of, 7 f., 20, 240
Austria, 68
Avezzano, Baron, 127
Awa, Katsu, 192

Bahamas, the, 96
Balance of power: in Europe, 138; in the Western Pacific, 165, 186, 218–47
Behring Sea seal-fisheries, 53
Belaunde, Victor Andres, viii, 87, 107
Belgium, 58, 68
Bingham, Hiram, 22
Bismarck Islands, 241
Blaine, James G., 135, 136
Blakeslee, George H., vii, 1, 161
Blanco, Guzman, 117
Blum, 81
Bolivia, 112, 119, 132, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 143, 148, 150
Bolivar, 130, 131, 132, 135, 139
Bombs, 101
Borah, William E., 6, 92

Boundary Waters Treaty, 54, 56
Boxer indemnity, 171, 177
Boxer uprising, 224
Brazil, 133, 134, 137, 141, 143, 153
Briand, Aristide, 15, 66, 80, 81, 82, 83, 136
Briand Doctrine, 78
Briand-Kellogg Pact, 49. *See also* Kellogg Pact
British America, 76, 78
British Commonwealth of Nations, 73
British dominions, foreign policy of, 6–9, 20 f., 240
British Intercolonial Conference, 20
"British Monroe Doctrine," 20 f.
Britten, Fred A., 92
Brum, Dr., 140
Bryan treaties, 48, 49, 54
Bryce Embassy, 89
Buchanan, James, 113
Buddhism, 214, 228
Byzantines, the, 72

California, 28, 72, 165, 176
Canada, 96; and American foreign policy, 39–61; and anti-Americanism, 52, 54 f., 60; and disarmament, 44 f.; exports of, to the Far East, 50; and the Far East, 50–52; foreign policy of, 6 f.; imperialism and waterways, 45–47; and the Monroe Doctrine, 40–44; and the Permanent Court of International Justice, 47–50; and tariffs, 57–60, 72; and water diversion, 55–57
Canadian navy, 40
Caribbean policy of the United States, 17, 19–21, 23, 25, 137, 142. *See also* Latin America; Pan-Americanism
Carranza, Venustiano, 122, 123
Castle, 27, 187, 188, 237
Central America, 72, 97, 120 f., 122, 125, 126, 128, 133. *See also* Latin America
Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 82
Chanak crisis, the, 42
Chang Tso-lin, 180
Chen, General, 230
"Chicago Water-Steal, the," 56, 57
Chile, 111, 112, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 143
China, 8, 97, 222, 223, 246; anti-foreign sentiment of, 243; and the balance of power in the Western Pacific, 223–34; and Canada, 50, 51; courts of, 233; equal opportunity in, 162, 163, 237, 244, 245; and extraterritoriality, 233, 234; and Great Britain, 239; the integrity of, 27, 225, 245; and Japan, 170–76, 177, 180, 193, 195, 197, 204, 223–34, 237, 242 f., 247; and Manchuria, 235 f.; Nationalist party in, 226; nationalistic revival of, 243, 244; and Russia, 225, 230, 231, 236, 242; and tariff autonomy, 233; and the Tariff

Treaty, 51; and trade, 50, 232 f., 237; and the United States, 51, 52, 162, 163, 166, 170–76, 183, 184, 233, 234, 237, 242. *See also* Open Door
Chinese students in America, 171 f.
Civil War (United States), 91
Clark, J. Reuben, 19
Colby, Bainbridge, 127
Colombia, 68, 131, 132, 134, 135, 143
Committee of Imperial Defence, 99
Communism, 202, 216, 226
Conciliation in South America, 148 f., 151
Confucianism, 228
Congress. *See* Havana, Lima, Panama, and Pan-American conferences
Conservative party (England), 74
Consolidation of political institutions in Latin America, 109–29
Coolidge, Calvin, 13, 20
Corbett, Percy Ellwood, vii, 37, 87
Costa Rica, 122, 135, 141, 143
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Count, 15
Covenant of the League of Nations, 5, 7, 9, 49, 75, 97, 98, 99, 149. *See also* League of Nations
Cuba, 97, 139, 143
Customs duties, European, 67–75. *See also* Tariff
Democratic party (United States), 11
Diaz, Porfirio, 111, 121
Disarmament, 29–31, 42, 44 f., 92–96, 100, 103 f., 182 f. *See also* Naval warfare; Sea power
Dollar Diplomacy, 45
Dominican Republic, 26
Drago Doctrine, 138
Earthquake, Japanese, of 1923, 177 f., 202
Ecuador, 119, 134, 135, 141, 143
Egypt, 21, 46, 97, 230
Einstein, 100
England. *See* Great Britain
Equal opportunity in China, 162, 163, 237, 244, 245
Esthonia, 68
Europe, 221, 224; and "balance of power," 138; and Canada, 6 f.; and China, 224; and Latin America, 133, 134, 136, 139; and Mexico, 124; and the United States, 4, 9, 14–17, 27, 63–105; the United States of Europe and of America, 65–85; the United States and the United Kingdom, 86–105
European continental customs union, 67–75
European regional association, 15
Evans, Admiral, 166
Evarts, W. M., 117
Exclusion policy of the United States, 27 f., 158, 165, 178, 179, 236
Extraterritoriality, 193, 233, 234

Far East, 13; and Canada, 50–52; and Canadian trade, 50; and the United States, 4, 26–28, 50–52, 155–247. *See also* China; Japan; Pacific; Western Pacific

Federation of the Andes, the, 131, 132

Federation of Europe, 81

Ferrara, 135, 148

Finland, 68

First Bank, the (Japan), 208

Foreign policy: of Australia, 7 f., 20, 240; of Great Britain, 8–9, 21; of Japan, 177, 180, 184, 238 f., 240; of South Africa, 7; of the United States, interpretation of, 3–35, 161 f.

France, 58, 68, 80, 82–84, 93, 184, 186, 191, 222, 228, 236, 241

General Act of the League of Nations, 149, 153, 154. *See also* League of Nations

Geneva Conference, 68, 87, 93. *See also* League of Nations

Geneva Protocol, 7, 41, 82, 141. *See also* League of Nations

Genoa Conference, 69

Germany, 68, 82, 137, 175, 236

Gondra Treaty, 140, 141, 151

Grand Chaco, 76

Great Britain, 53, 68, 82, 84, 184, 186, 191, 222, 223, 228, 233, 234, 239, 243, 244, 246; foreign policy of, 8–9, 21; and tariff, 71, 74. *See also* United Kingdom

Great Lakes–St. Lawrence waterway, 56, 58

Great War, 91, 100, 122, 138, 140, 205, 214, 231, 246. *See also* World War

Greeks, the, 71

Guam, 30, 165, 168

Guatemala, 124, 143, 150

Guianas, the, 134

Hague Conference, 137

Hague Convention of 1899, 137

Haiti, 26, 143

Hara, 200

Harding, Warren Gamaliel, 13, 92

Harriman, E. H., 167, 168, 170

Harris, Townsend, 163

Havana conferences, 109

Hawaii, 26, 165, 168

Hay, John, 117, 163, 184, 225

Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 137

Hayes, Rutherford B., 116, 117, 124, 127

Hispanic America. *See* Latin America

Holland, 68. *See also* Netherlands, the

Honduras, 135, 141

Hoover, Herbert C., 4, 13

Huerta, Victoriano, 121

Hughes, William Morris, 7

Hughes, Charles Evans, 13, 18, 19, 20, 23, 29, 34, 123, 124, 125, 146, 147, 148, 176

Hu Shih, 172

Immigration, Japanese, 27 f., 158, 165, 178, 179, 209, 236, 240 f.
Immigration Act of 1924, 28
Imperialism: American, 45–47, 166, 176; Japanese, 166, 176, 205; and waterways, 45–47
India, 46, 97, 170, 227, 228, 230, 240, 247
Institute of Pacific Relations, 51
Institute of Politics, 158
Integrity of China, 27, 225, 245
International Joint Commission, 49, 54, 57
International law, 96, 97–100, 103, 145, 146
International peace, 242; and Latin America, 109, 153. *See also* World-peace
Intervention, 145–47
Investments: American, in Europe, 16; Japanese, in China, 232
Ireland, 74
Ishii-Lansing agreement, 188
Italy, 58, 68, 93, 215
Ito, Prince, 199

Japan, 21, 27, 30; and "aggression," 238, 240; and American exclusion policy, 27 f., 158, 165, 178, 179, 236; and American foreign policy, 157–88, 220, 236–39, 242, 243, 246; and the balance of power in the Western Pacific, 218–47; and Canada, 51; capitalism in, 198 f., 200, 208 f., 215; and China, 170–76, 177, 180, 191, 193, 195, 197, 204, 223–34, 237, 240, 242 f., 247; at the crossroads, 189–217; and democracy, 200 f., 202, 215, 216; development of, 189 ff., 201 f., 203, 215 ff.; economic conditions, 203 ff., 218 ff.; foreign policy of, 177, 180, 184, 238 f., 240; and Great Britain, 239 f., 246; and imperialism, 166, 176, 205; industrial revolution in, 194–98, 200, 201, 203 ff., 209, 211, 218, 244; and Korea, 225, 233; and Manchuria, 167–69, 180, 181, 188, 225, 232, 233, 234–36; the middle class of, 214–16, 219 f., 244; and migration, 218, 233, 240 f.; "Monroe Doctrine" of, 21; and political conditions, 200 ff., 208 f., 219; and population, 206, 245, 246; and the press, 199, 202; and radicalism, 202, 206, 208, 213, 216, 219, 246; and Russia, 164, 167, 170, 179, 191, 193, 197, 225, 226, 230, 231, 247; and sense of solidarity, 210 ff.; and socialism, 202, 217; and trade, 50, 160 f., 195, 201, 204, 219, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237, 241; and unemployment, 206–8, 219
Japanese-American Relations Committee, 27
Jefferson, Thomas, 4, 71, 112

Kaneko, Viscount, 167, 172
Kato, Count, 177, 200

Katsura, Premier, 167, 200
Kawasaki, 208
Kellogg, Frank B., 4, 6, 13
Kellogg Pact, 16, 29, 31, 32, 33, 49, 180. *See also* Pact of Paris, Peace Pact
Kemmerer, 52
Keyserling, Count, 228
Knox, P. C., 168, 169, 170
Komura, Marquis, 167, 172
Koo, Wellington, 172
Korea, 176, 225, 227, 230, 233, 238
Kuomintang, the, 51

Labour party (England), 44, 87 f.
Lake Michigan, 47, 55 f.
Latin America, 24, 76; and Europe, 133, 134, 136, 139; the Havana and Washington conferences, 130–54; the recognition of revolutionary governments, 109–29; and the United States, 4, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 107–54. *See also* Caribbean; Central America; Pan-Americanism; South America
Laurier, Sir Wilfred, 6
Leacock, Stephen, 40
League of Nations, 7, 9–16, 29, 31, 32, 33, 39, 41, 42, 47–50, 68 f., 73, 75, 76–79, 84, 85, 102, 123, 139–41, 142, 144, 149, 153. *See also* Covenant; Geneva Protocol; Permanent Court of International Justice
Leguia, Augusto B., 111, 123
Lima, Congress of, 135
Limitation of armament, 29–31
Liquor traffic, 59
Livingston, E., 112
Locarno, 82; treaties, 141, 142
London Conference. *See* Naval Conference
London Naval Treaty, 6, 186. *See also* Naval Conference
Louisiana Purchase, 165

MacDonald, J. Ramsay, 88
MacDonald, Sir John, 53
Madero, Francisco I., 121
Maine, 52, 72
Manchuria, 31, 167–69, 180, 181, 188, 225, 232, 233, 234–36, 237
Maurtua, 149
Mexico, 72, 111, 116, 121, 122, 123, 124, 133, 137, 140, 141, 143, 148, 153
Mines (for warfare), 100
Minseito, 200, 209
Miquelon, 59
Missionaries, American, in China, 173 f.
Mitsubishi, 208, 209
Mitsui, 208, 209
Moltke, Count Karl, 68, 69
Mongolia, 181
Mongols, the, 72
Monroe Doctrine, 17–25, 39, 40–44, 72, 75, 76, 78, 96, 140, 149, 162, 183, 184, 185, 186
"Monroe Doctrine," British, 20 f.

INDEX

"Monroe Doctrine," Japanese, 21
Montevideo, 133
Moreno, 126
Morgan loan to the South Manchuria Railway Company, 181
Morrow, Dwight W., 143
Mussolini, 82

Nationalistic differentiation of South America, 130
Naval Conference, 8, 30, 93, 159, 181 ff. *See also* London Naval Treaty
Naval disarmament, 29–31, 44 f., 92–96, 103 f., 182 f. *See also* Sea power
Naval warfare, 100–102. *See also* Sea power
Near East, 12
Netherlands, the, 186, 222, 240. *See also* Holland
New Guinea, 241
New York, 72
Niagara Falls, 122
Nicaragua, 26, 46, 121, 126, 135, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148
Nine-Power Treaty, 245
Non-intervention, 177
Non-recognition of governments. *See* Revolutionary governments
Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation, 157
North Atlantic fisheries, 53
North Pole, 87
Northern Africa, 12

Obregon, Alvaro, 123, 124
Ohio, 72
Olney, Richard, 23
Open-door policy of the United States, 27, 162, 163, 183–86, 237, 242, 244
Orellanna, 124
Oribe, General, 133
Oriental Province, 133
Ozaki, Yukio, 169

Pacific, policy of the United States in, 26–28. *See also* Far East; Japan; Western Pacific
Pact of Paris, 19, 21, 54, 182, 183, 245. *See also* Kellogg Pact, Peace Pact
Panama, 46, 139, 143
Panama, Congress of, 131
Panama Canal, 20, 137
Pan-American conferences, the, 128, 139, 154; First, 136, 137; Second, 137; Third, 138; Fourth, 138; Fifth, 140, 141; Sixth, 142–48
Pan-American Union, 26, 73, 75, 76, 128, 161
Pan-Americanism, 17, 21–26, 138, 142, 161, 162. *See also* Pan-American conferences
Pan-Asiaism, 232
Pan-Europa, 15
Pan-European organization, 14 f.
Paraguay, 133, 144, 148, 150
Paris Treaty of 1898, 137
Peace. *See* World-peace

Peace Pact, 97, 98. *See also* Kellogg Pact, Pact of Paris
Peace Treaty of Portsmouth, 164, 167
Peace of Versailles, 5, 226
Permanent Court of International Justice, 12, 13, 14, 39, 42, 47–50, 139, 141, 149, 150, 154
Perry, Commodore, 163
Persia, 97, 230
Persian Gulf, 21
Peru, 68, 111, 112, 116, 123, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 143
Philippine Islands, 26, 30, 97, 165, 166, 168, 238, 239
Phoenicians, the, 71
Pierce, Franklin, 113, 115
Political institutions in Latin America, consolidation of, 109–29
Politics, 11 f.
Politis, 15
Portugal, 134
Preble, 95
President of the United States, the, 32
Prohibition, 96

Renunciation of war, 29, 34, 242. *See also* World-peace; Kellogg Pact
Republican party (United States), 11, 33
Restoration of 1868 (Japanese), 189, 191, 223, 224, 229
Revolutionary governments in Latin America, recognition of, 109–29
Romans, the, 72
Roosevelt, Theodore, 23, 164, 166
Root, Elihu, 19, 35, 89, 138, 149
Rosas, 133
Rotarians, the, 11
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 51
Russia, 127, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 179, 191, 193, 197, 215, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 230, 231, 236, 242, 247. *See also* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Russo-Japanese War, 164, 165, 197, 217, 230

Saigo, 192
St. Lawrence–Great Lakes waterway, 56, 58
St. Lawrence ship channel, 46
St. Pierre, 59
Salvador, 144, 150
Samoa, 165
Samurai, 192, 194, 198
Santa Cruz, 132
Santo Domingo, 117, 143
Scandinavia, 77
Scott, James Brown, 148, 149, 152, 154
Sea power, 88–96, 99, 182 f. *See also* Disarmament; Naval warfare

Seiyukai, 181, 200, 209
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19
Seward, W. H., 115, 116, 117, 118, 126, 127
Shantung controversy, 174 f., 177
Shibusawa, Viscount, 28
Shidehara, Baron, 177, 180, 209
Siam, 238
Siberia, 241
Sims, 93
Singapore, 222, 240
Sino-Japanese War, 170, 224
Snowden, Philip, 82
South Africa, foreign policy of, 7
South America, 72, 111, 116, 117, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 130–54, 218. *See also* Latin America
South Manchurian Railway, 167 f., 181, 207
South Pole, 87
South Sea Islands, 230, 232, 247
Soviet Union. *See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Spanish America. *See* Latin America; South America
Stimson, H. L., 13
Suarez, Pino, 121
Submarines, 100
Sumitomo, 208
Sun Yat Sen, 230, 231
Switzerland, 68
Tacna-Arica nationality, 123, 137, 143
Taft, William Howard, 3, 23, 121, 125, 149
Tanaka, Baron, 179, 180
Tarapaca, 135
Tariff, 57–60, 69–75, 96, 205, 209, 219, 237; autonomy, 193, 233; and China, 51. *See also* Customs duties
Tariff Treaty, the, 51
Texas, 72, 165
Three-mile-limit, the, 96
Tinoco, 122
Tobar Doctrine, 119, 120
Tokugawa Shogunate, 192, 193 f.
Trade, Oriental, 50, 160, 195, 201, 219, 232, 237, 241
Treaties of 1907, 120, 125, 126
Treaties of 1922, 125, 126
Treaty of 1909, 47
Triple Alliance, the, 133
Tsurumi, Yusuke, viii, 155
Twenty-one Demands, the, 171, 226
Turkey, 170, 230

Unemployment and Oriental trade, 160
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 68, 73 f., 79. *See also* Russia
United Kingdom, 67, 74; and the United States of America, 86–105. *See also* Great Britain

United States (of America), "aggressive" Asiatic policy of, 165 f., 169 f., 175, 179, 185, 189; and Canada, 39–61; Caribbean policy of, 17, 19–21, 23, 25, 137, 142; and China, 51, 52, 162, 163, 166, 170–76, 183, 184, 233, 234, 237, 242; and Europe, 4, 9, 14–17, 27, 65–105, 161; and European trade, 69; and the Far East, 4, 26–28, 50–52, 155–247; foreign policy of, interpretation of, 3–35, 161 f.; and imperialism, 45–47, 166, 176, 220; and Japan, 30, 155–88, 236–39, 242, 244; the Japanese viewpoint regarding the American foreign policy, 157–88, 220; and Latin America, 4, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 107–54; and Russia, 168, 169, 170, 242; and the United Kingdom, 86–105; and the United States of Europe, 65–85; and the Western Pacific, 4, 26–28, 30

United States of Europe, 15, 65–85, 136

Uruguay, 133, 134, 139, 140, 143

Van Buren, Martin, 112

Venezuela, 112, 116, 134, 135

Versailles, Peace of, 5, 226

Wang, C. T., 172

War, renunciation of, 29, 34, 97–100. *See also* Kellogg Pact; World-peace

War of 1812, 90, 91

War of 1829, 132

War of Independence, North American, 90, 91

Wars of Independence, South American, 130

Wars of intervention, 131 ff.

Washington, George, 6, 71

Washington agreement, the, 68. *See also* Washington Treaties

Washington Conference, 13, 27, 29, 92, 109, 120, 148 ff., 176, 182, 183, 226

Washington treaties, in regard to Naval disarmament, 68, 99, 133, 149–51, 153; in regard to Central America, 126

Water diversion, 55–57

Waterways, 45–47

Western Pacific, 13, 162, 169, 187, 189, 191; balance of power in, 218–47; and the United States, 4, 14, 26–28, 165, 183. *See also* China; Far East; Japan; Pacific

White, Edward D., 143

Wilson, Woodrow, 92, 99, 121, 122, 123, 125, 139

World Court. *See* Permanent Court of International Justice

World-league, 76 f.

World-peace, 5, 29, 31–34, 100, 103–5. *See also* International peace

INDEX

World War, 5, 6, 8, 21, 23, 24, 197, 198, 201, 219, 226, 242. *See also* Great War
Wright, Quincy, vii f., 153
Wu, C. C., 172

Yamagata, 192
Yamamoto, J., 181
Yamaoka, 192
Yap, 176
Yasuda, 208
Young, George, viii, 63
Yregoyen, Hipolito, 111
Yui, David, 172

Zollverein, an American, 136

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